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Abstract 
 
The thesis provides a case study for how settler colonialism intertwined with ethno-
nationalism to shape social identification in the Israeli town of Kiryat Shemona. Jews 
from Arab and Muslim lands were categorized by Zionist nation-builders as Mizrahim 
and disproportionally placed on the geographic and socio-economic margins of Israeli 
society to Judaise territory, to prevent the return of the displaced indigenous Palestinian 
population and to provide cheap labour for Ashkenazi settlements. They were excluded 
from the Ashkenazi-dominated centre of power, yet included as essential members of a 
militaristic frontier ethos. The thesis explores how Mizrahim negotiated Israeliness from 
the margins within the dynamics of ethnocratic exclusion and inclusion, in what I have 
termed peripheral nationhood. It examines the Israeli State’s attempt to mould loyal 
subjects through Hebrew education, national ceremonies and military campaigns. In 
everyday life, Mizrahim contested the socio-economic and cultural hegemony of the 
Ashkenazi through ethnic and transnational identifications and practices. 
Simultaneously, their support for the nation-in-arms and creative self-fashioning as 
‘strong’ and ‘civilized’ reinforced the dominant logic of ethno-nationalism. Mizrahi 
residents redeployed stereotypes and an Oriental stigma in their descriptions of 
Mizrahim, Russian-speaking Israelis and Arabs to elevate their own social status and 
position in the ethnocracy. The nation was only intermittedly salient as a category of 
belonging, thus challenging theories of ‘everyday nationalism’ that consider it 
omnipresent. During the Israeli war on Gaza in 2008/2009, sentiments of national unity 
were heightened, and the border Mizrahim appeared to be move and/or moved 
themselves from the periphery to the centre of the nation as key actors in the moral 
legitimization of war. The dissertation argues that the qualities that make up peripheral 
nationhood are coeval with construction of national unity as a colonial practice by the 
centre. 
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Introduction  
 
Kiryat Shemona is an Israeli
 
border town situated near the Lebanese border in the Upper 
Galilee populated predominantly by Mizrahim (Jews descending from Arab and Muslim 
countries).
1
 The goal of the Zionist settler colonial movement was to construct a 
homogenous national identiy. This entailed the expansion and control over contested 
territory and a clear boundary between the Arab and Jewish national collectives 
(Veracini 2010:5). With mass immigration to the newly established Israeli state in 1948, 
Jews from Arab and Muslim countries were racialized and orientalised as Mirahi Jews 
with non-European pasts. On the one hand, they were perceived as an integral part of 
the national community and as the expression of its primordial foundations. On the 
other hand, they suffered from ethno-racial discrimination and a policy of cultural 
erasure (Shenav 2006:192). Mizrahim became Zionism’s internal other, only partly 
included into the Ashkenazi-dominated Zionist nation.  
During the 1950s Mizrahi immigrants were disproportionally placed by the 
government in semi-urban development towns, in peripheral regions to the south and 
north for economic, security and settlement reasons. These towns were seen as an 
integral part of the management of the conflict with the Arabs. The new towns supplied 
Ashkenazi settlements with cheap labour, populated remote districts to prevent the 
return of the displaced Palestinian population and created a human militarized frontier 
against the neighbouring Arab countries considered hostile to the new state. The 
Mizrahim became “trapped” by Israeli nation-building on the geographic and socio-
economic margins of society, positioned between the dominant socio-economic and 
cultural Ashkenazi elite and the Palestinian population. Their belonging has crystallized 
between Israeli-Ashkenazi-Jewish and Arab culture, between inclusion and exclusion. 
Over the years, Kiryat Shemona has been the frequent target of Katyusha rocket-
attacks, producing fear and anxiety and a shared perception of common threats and 
dangers. Starting in the late 1980s, neo-liberal privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
and mass immigration of Jews and non-Jews from the former Soviet Union have 
                                                 
1
 The term Mizrahi (pl. Mizrahim) literally means “Eastern” or “Oriental.” It’s meaning overlaps with the 
older term, Sephardi (m). Prior to the emergence of the term Mizrahi, Arab Jews was a commonly used 
designation (Shoat 1988:27). I have decided to use Mizrahi, as a term that is widely used by modern 
scholarship and public discourse.   
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increased unemployment and labour competition. From the perspective of nationalism 
from above, the most notable response to the Ashkenazi political hegemony and 
existential uncertainty has been the intensification of Mizrahim’s bond with the political 
right and regional forms of ethno-nationalism. The Mizrahi ethno-class in border towns 
has voted heavily for right-wing parties such as the ultra-nationalistic Yisrael-Beitenu 
and Likud. The interrelationship between neoliberal reforms and Jewishness was a key 
factor in the rise of the party and ethno-religious movement Shas
2
 that draws most of its 
electoral support from the peripheral Mizrahi religious lower classes (Lehmann & 
Siebzehner 2006).  
This dissertation explores how the boundary of Israeliness was negotiated and 
reproduced, undermined and contested amongst Mizrahim in their daily exercises of 
labour, neighbourhood, household, kinship and self. By examining the character, 
dynamics and variable salience of everyday nationalism, it challenges methodologies 
that typically overstate national and ethnic identity and fill the categories of belonging 
with conventionally political content. In addition, I explore ‘non-nationalist’ and ‘non-
ethnic’ ways in which Mizrahim experience belonging and exclusion, such as family, 
class, religion and region.  
The dissertation suggests that there exist a particular context of Israeli 
nationalism that I have termed peripheral nationhood, which entails a negotiation of 
hegemonic nationnesss by peripheral minorities on the margins of the state. Peripheral 
nationhood contests the cultural-political hegemony of secular Ashkenazi Israeliness, 
while it reinforces the militaristic, religious and Eurocentric definitions of Israeliness. In 
the context of ordinary insecurity and suspicion it produces coping strategies such as 
self-fashioning as ‘strong’, as well as material and symbolic ties to the West and 
nostalgia for an imagined ‘Eastern’ past. Even in a context of perceived permanent 
absence of peace, my informants did not identify as nationalists in all situations, thus 
challenging theories of nationalism that social actors are always nationalist (Billig 
1995:6).  
In the center you can more easily critique and defy nationalizing forces, whereas 
amongst Mizrahi ethno-class in a border town, peripheral nationhood is integral to the 
Zionist frontier ethos. In the border town there was little divergence over militarism due 
                                                 
2
 Shas is a Hebrew acronym for Sephardi Torah Guardians (Lehmann & Siebzehner 2006).
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to a shared feeling of common threats and social mobility through the IDF. During the 
build-up to war national politicians and media aligned the border town with the centre 
as essential members of the nation, thus moving them from a stigmatized periphery to a 
national frontier. The Mizrahim were used in the moral legitimization of war and 
perceived as guardians of national territory. My informants considered themselves 
relevant to the centre and invested more emotional energy in the symbols of nationhood 
and in fashioning themselves into nationalized subjects (Jean-Klein 2001:90). In 
ordinary times of insecurity, the deep divisions in Israeli society created competing 
claims over Israeliness, while during wartime, national unity was heightened. Their 
marginalized position, yet centrality during wartime, might explain why protests by 
Mizrahim, although consistent, have not been intense and have largely fallen within the 
‘legitimate’ boundaries of Zionist political discourse. 
 
Theoretical and methodological approaches to everyday nationalism 
 
Nationalism is the project to make the political unit, the state (or polity) congruent with 
the cultural unit, the nation (Fox & Miller-Idriss 2008). Attempts to accomplish this 
congruence have been studied from a variety of perspectives. The classic debates in 
studies of nationalism have been divided between primordialists and modernists. The 
former emphasize the deep roots, ancient origins and emotive power of national 
attachment (Smith 2003). Modernists conceptualise nations as primarily modern 
constructs shaped by capitalism, industrialization, the growth of communication and 
transportation networks, and the powerfully integrative and homogenizing forces of the 
modern state (Gellner 2006, Anderson 1983). While the classic debates between 
modernist and primordialist have made a contribution to theorizing nations and 
nationalism, these approaches have mostly been concerned with defining what is a 
nation.  
State institutions and practices are central in the production of nations as 
categories for identification and imagining. Nationalism from ‘above’ seeks to define 
and bound the nation, to construct and maintain the boundaries and internal organization 
of the national. Modern nations are re-imagined (Anderson 1983), reinvented 
(Hobsbawm 1991) and re-narrated (Bhaba 1990). However, showing the 
constructedness and routine reproduction of nationalism does not explain why these 
constructions are invoked (or ignored) by social actors.  In order to appreciate the 
12 
 
variable meaning and salience of nationhood, it is not sufficient to focus solely on state-
sponsored construction and elite manipulation. Hobsbawm argues that while 
nationalism is “constructed essentially from above, it cannot be understood unless also 
analysed from below, that is, in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and 
interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist” 
(Hobsbawm 1991:10).     
  By opposing the supposition that the nation is only ideologically produced, 
scholars have shown how nationhood is negotiated and reproduced (Herzfeld 1997) in 
everyday life (Billig 1995, Brubaker 2008). With his well-known and widely cited book 
Banal Nationalism
3
 (1995) Billig draws attention to the unnoticed everyday habits that 
contributes to the ideological reproduction of nations. He expresses concerns with 
studies of nationalism that privilege macro instrumental processes over others. Macro 
‘methodological nationalism’ has placed contemporary nationalism outside the civilized 
and outside the domain of the everyday. If nationalism is applied only to forceful social 
movements and extraordinary circumstances, something slips from theoretical 
awareness. It is as if the “flags on those filling-station forecourts do not exist” 
(1995:38). Billih argues that the nation with its symbols and rhetoric is flagged 
routinely in everyday life. As well as flags hanging unnoticed on public buildings, ideas 
of nation and home are embedded in our language and practices that provide banal 
reminders of nationhood. This banal nationalism routinely reproduces a taken-for-
granted reality composed of sovereign, discrete nations. The ongoing production of a 
hegemonic discourse gets its power from its apparent naturalness. Nationalism must 
therefore be conceptualized as ‘a form of life which is daily lived in a world of nation-
states’ (Billig 1995:68). 
The shift to routine and everyday life makes Billig’s theoretical contribution 
relevant to contemporary anthropological studies of nationalism. By focusing on the 
mundane level of everyday life we are getting closer to the banal reproductions of 
nationhood. The shift from the more macro-scale theorizing to a focus on everyday life 
has had consequences for how scholars approach agency in the study of the ‘nation’. 
Brubaker argues that macro-approaches to the study of nationalism treat nations as 
collective individuals, capable of coherent, focused collective action (Brubaker 
1996:15). He suggests viewing national groups as constructed, contingent, fluctuating 
                                                 
3
 The formulation builds on Hanna Arendt’s reflection on the “banality of evil” (1963). 
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and having elusive boundaries rather than as static categories (Brubaker 1998). Instead 
of focusing on nations as real groups, we should focus on nationhood and nationness, 
on the nation as a practical category and the ways it can come to structure perception, to 
inform thought and experience, and to organize discourse and political action (Brubaker 
1996:7). An analytical distinction between subject-description by institutions and the 
actual processes of self-identification and self-understanding can shed valuable light on 
the relationship between the individual and the social in their production and everyday 
workings of ethnicity and ethnicized categories (Brubaker 2000).  
In the context of increasing ethno-nationalism and neo-Zionism, it is tempting to 
adopt a nation-centered perspective or methodological nationalism. The Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian territory, the treatment of minority-populations, the many 
wars, do not this demonstrate the reality and power of nations? However, nationalism is 
not engendered by nations. It is produced and induced by political fields of particular 
kinds. Nationalism, although ideologically produced, is locally negotiated.  
Jean-Klein (2001) is critical of scholarship that tends to see “nationalism as a 
category of practice committed by one group (rendered active and immoral) against 
another (passive, but innocent)”. This polarised analytical approach ignores nationalist 
production in everyday life; in other words, “self-nationalization” by ordinary national 
subjects who fashion themselves into nationalist subjects. Her ethnographic work 
focuses on nationalist production in Palestine during the second Intifada focusing on 
domestic space and neighborhood as key sites for the production of nationalism and 
resistance. In contrast to Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, individuals from 
the Mizrahi ethno-class in Kiryat Shemona belong to the Jewish majority population in 
Israel and are not protesting the fundamental tenant of Zionism, that Israel should be a 
Jewish nation-state. However, the focus on authentic self-fashioning represents both an 
important shift in the study of nationalism and in the study of the Mizrahi ethno-class 
that are located in a ‘third space’ between definational borders of race, culture, class and 
nation. 
 
Challenging dominant nationhood from the margins 
 
Mizrahi is shorthand for a combination of frontiers and markers. Scholars have tried to 
deconstruct these markers, asking why they become frozen in social categories or 
institutionalized by a combination of legal, bureaucratic and political mechanisms 
14 
 
(Shoat 1999, Khazzom 2005, Shenhav 2006, Yiftachel 2006). Scholarship has 
concentrated on the absorption of Mizrahim in Israel (Eistenstadt 1954), their encounter 
with the state, their mobilization through politics (Peled 1998, Dahan-Kalev 1999, 
Lehmann & Siebzehner 2006), their spatial marginalization (Yiftachel 2006) their 
mobility or immobility and their place within the Israeli stratification and political 
systems (Swirski 1989, Smooha 1993). Chetrit (2000) explores the emergence of 
Mizrahi resistance through an analysis of social and political movements such as the 
Black Panthers, Tami, Shas and the Mizrahi Democratic Rainbow, that all have 
challenged the hegemony of Ashekanzi Zionism .  
Research at the macro and discursive levels reveals much about how Jews from 
Arab and Muslim countries were crystallized by Ashkenazi settlers into one category as 
Mizrahim. However, it tells us less about the diverse subjective experiences within that 
category of belonging or various reasons for why essentialist identities continue to be 
invoked and often deeply felt. While Mizrahim have a voice through collective 
activism, political contestation and cultural articulation, ethnic and national categories 
are also produced and reproduced through everyday experiences (Brubaker 2006:11).  
As is conventional knowledge in the field of anthropology, ethnic and other 
identities are not static and fixed, but boundary- exceeding and filled with internal 
contradiction. An anthropological approach to the study of nationalism can shed light on 
how the Zionist ethno-racial hierarchy is not only institutionally produced and enforced, 
but also pinned to and negotiated in the intimate register of neighbourhood, family and 
household (Cohen 1993:5, Jean-Klein 2001:86). The methodological focus on everyday 
life can move beyond the static categories of Israeli identity, which is excessively laden 
with ideological declaration. It can capture the situational dynamics of belonging and 
not-belonging and shed light on the contingency, (in)consistencies and meaningfulness 
in Mizrahim’s understanding of themselves as nationalist subjects. The dissertation 
aims at building analytical and methodological bridges from the macro-processes of 
national and ethnic subject-ascription to the reproduction and contestation of these 
categories by Mizrahim themselves in everyday life.   
 The production of in-betwen ethno-classes is intrisic to settler colonial societies 
that turn  peripheral communites into relatively weak structurally placed between a 
powerful founding group and excluded and dispossessed indigenous populations or 
other groups of exogenous ‘others’ such as labor migrants (Tzfadia & Yacobi 2011, 
Veracini 2010, Kimmerling 2008, Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis 1995). Colonial settler 
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societies code in-between minorites as foundational elements of a ‘nation’, and yet at 
the same time mark them as racially and culturally different from the national identity 
(Das & Poole 2004).  
 The agency of actors in such ‘in-between-ness’ has been analyzed as a third 
space (Bhaba 1994) or in the Israeli case, a twilight zone (Yiftachel 2006).  Steffen 
Jensen’s (2008) ethnography amongst the coloured people of the Cape Flats treats a 
population caught in a similar twilight zone as Mizrahim. Apartheid turned them into a 
separate race group as coloured people, placed them between white and black 
physically, socially and psychologically, and fixed them to the stereotype of skollie.   
Jensen examines how the population in Hedeveld creates a sense of dignity in the face 
of racism, poverty, violence and dispossession. They are rejecting definitions imposed 
on them by dominant society. Some turn to church, family and neighborhood while 
others restore to violence to gain respect and turn it into a form of heroism. The female 
relatives of these men, caught in a twilight world of ambiguities, escape into narratives 
of denial.  
Smadar Lavie has analyzed the search for identity amongst Palestinian and 
Mizrahi intellectuals by referring to blow-ups, or the explosion and fragmentation of 
identities in postmodern borderlands. The Palestinian and Mizrahi ‘Third World 
Israelis’ must continually strive ‘to articulate the locus and the process of the 
intersections where Arab and European, Palestinian and Israeli, Mizrahi and Ashkenazi, 
clash and merge’ (Lavie 1996:90). From the perspective of Lavie and Jensen the in-
between borderland is both a creative zone of negotiation as well of domination and 
control. I apply this insight to the particular context of an ethno-class population on the 
margins of the state. The Mizrahi border residents were not only formed by passively 
inherited legacies and state-imposed nationalism, but also by negotiating national 
belonging and social categorisation within the dynamics of ethnocratic exclusion and 
inclusion, through peripheral nationhood.   
 
The variable salience of nationalism 
 
Although this thesis places nationalism at the centre, it is equally important to show the 
many parts of social experience that cannot be reduced to nationalism. While the field 
of nationalism and ethnicity has grown impressively since the 1990s, academic 
scholarship of nationalism from below has not attached enough importance to the 
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variable salience of nationhood. Billig presents everyday nationalism as omnipresent 
without paying sufficient focus to when the nation is made relevant. He argues that 
“nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic 
condition” (Billig 1995:6). The notion of banal nationalism, while useful for examining 
the implicit, everyday and routine reproduction of nationness cannot adequately capture 
situational nationalist self-identification. Billig’s perspective focuses mainly on textual 
analysis and his argument is more concerned with the naturalized social reproduction of 
social categories. A sole focus on discourse and the external symbols and flagging of 
nationhood cannot account for change, negotiation or in what situations the nation 
matters to ordinary people. While seeking to analyze how nationness and ethnic 
identification work in a variety of forms, but public and private, we have to be sensitive 
to their limits (Brubaker 2006:364). National identification and what it is believed to 
imply can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods. Even in a 
country where ethno-nationalism is an all-powerful force, nationalism is not all 
pervasive in everyday life. We still need to explain those aspects of everyday life where 
the nation is not salient. The nation as an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1983) refers 
to only one of the multiplicity of relationships and associations with which people live. 
Regional and local attachments, activities and relationships also shape and inform self-
identification. A one-sided focus on “finding” the nation can lead one to a theoretical 
and analytical blindness regarding the many aspects of life that are not nation-centered. 
This thesis moves beyond the reductionist notion that the nation matters at all times, to 
explore the various situations in which the nation matters.   
 
Research methods and ethics 
 
Israeli society, as part of one of the most controversy-ridden conflicts constantly at the 
fore of international media, is a particular sensitive and inherently politicised topic to 
study. In Norway, telling friends that I study Mizrahi social experience and Israeli 
nation-building, I am often met with the questions “are you pro-Israeli or anti-Israeli?” 
Such a dichotomy regarding the conflict unfortunately prevails both in scholarly 
production and media discourse. Focused on framing actors as Zionist, post-Zionist or 
anti-Zionist, the complexities and nuances are often missed. This is a paradox in the 
context of Israel, a country where the multicultural and religious reality on the ground 
should spark interest in understanding the nuances on the ground. 
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In addition to a shorter stay in Israel in the summer of 2006, I spent a total of 
twenty months in Israel from 2007 until 2009. During this period, I went through a 
process of becoming Israeli myself, but perhaps not the Israeli many of my informants 
and indeed friends would have wanted me to become. On the one hand, I immersed 
myself in Israeli society. I opened a bank account in BankHapoalim (a requirement for 
temporary residents) and I obtained my driving license in the Northern Israeli town of 
Metual. I enjoyed the warmth of countless Shabbat dinners and I socialized with Israelis 
of all backgrounds in the boa (bubble) of Tel-Aviv. On the other hand, I became 
increasingly disillusioned with the right-wing political turn, highly critical of the 
occupation of Palestinian land, and at times stunned over the salience of racism. I 
witnessed how villages of Bedouins were demolished, how Palestinians were 
humiliated at Israeli checkpoints, the poverty of Jewish neighborhoods in Haifa, the 
uncertainty of immigrant workers from the Philippines. I saw how Palestinians living 
inside Israel tried their best to cope and create a future for themselves in a state where 
they are confined to the status of second-degree citizens.   
The academic year 2007/2008, I had an official affiliation with the University of 
Haifa where I studied Hebrew. This year, including a shorter Hebrew language course 
(ulpan) in Netanya the summer of 2006, was covered by scholarships granted to me by 
the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although my Hebrew studies were funded by the 
Israeli government, I had no formal obligation to this funding body and felt completely 
free in the process of conducting research and writing up. The funding not only ensured 
that I reached the level of Hebrew required to conduct fieldwork, but I also gained 
invaluable insights into the production of nationalist culture and knowledge. After a 
year of living in Haifa and travelling extensively throughout Israel, I moved to Kiryat 
Shemona in July 2008. Rarely did I encounter informants wanting to talk in English, 
besides a few younger ones who wanted to practice and improve their English. Having 
lived and studied Arabic in Damascus and Sana’a for ten months I have a basic 
knowledge of Arabic, but very few of my Arabic-speaking informants wanted to speak 
Arabic to me
4
. I made a conscious effort to ensure diversity (in terms of socio-economic 
background, gender, and age) and moved between different locations. I spent most of 
my time with two families and their wider networks, the Chakotay and the Zakay 
families. I also spent time with a few other families and had countless discussions with 
                                                 
4
 The muting of the Arabic language will be analyzed in a chapter 5 about public stigmatization of 
Arabness. 
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a number of other residents.  
I had prepared myself, academically and emotionally, for doing fieldwork in a 
politicised research setting and potentially ‘under fire’ (Norstrom and Robben 1995).  
How would I feel listening to opinions I did not agree with or handle a situation where 
it was assumed that I’d be sympathetic? As an anti-occupation, non-Israeli student, my 
political views were different from the majority of the residents in Kiryat Shemona, 
who were at times fiercly patriotic and openly anti-Palestinian. However, I was rarely 
asked to make my own political beliefs explicit and as such largely avoided situations 
where my informants might have been offended. I was bordering on an apolitical stance 
in the ulpan class, but at times that was very hard. During some of the more politicized 
conversations I was suspected of being a leftist (smolanit).  
Living in a border town caused particular emotional stress during the Gaza war 
in 2008/2009 when Kiryat Shemona was the target of rocket attacks. While condemning 
the military for the attack on Gaza, I sympathized with and shared the residents’ sense 
of fear. There were certain situations when I did not share the extent of my personal 
critical view of the political right-wing developments within Israeli society. Although I 
had to cope with feelings of self-censoring in certain contexts, in others I felt able to 
speak freely amongst Israeli friends with a variety of political opinions. Some of the 
people I met were eager to know whether I was going to write a ‘nice’ account of Kiryat 
Shemona, perhaps contrasting the largely negative picture that both scholarship and 
media have created of the town.  
 Various actors had interests in using me as a vehicle for carrying their message, 
particularly since I was conceived as an outsider. I could not promise anyone to write 
glowing accounts of life in Kiryat Shemona, which would have been deceitful. 
Combining close interpretations of my informants’ narratives and practices with a 
critical approach has been important from a methodological point of view. Hopefully, I 
have managed to let the people I got to know stand in focus without reproducing their 
stereotypes and politically charged discourses. Hylland Eriksen reminds us “if the 
researcher fails to regard folk concepts of national and ethnic identify critically, analysts 
can easily become the hostages of nationalists wishing to justify violent and 
discriminatory practices” (Eriksen 1992:12). The analytical deconstruction of ethnicised 
and nationalist discourses is therefore essential. 
The vast majority of those I interviewed or spent time with did not decline to be 
named, and for that I am grateful. The families I worked with expressed their 
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enthusiasm and support for my research and presence and asked to be inlcuded with 
their full names. When an informant shared a sensitive or potentially embarrising fact or 
story about themselves or others, I have either concealed the source or asked for 
permission to narrate the situation. I have assigned pseudonyms to a few informants 
who wanted to remain anonymous, or to those whom I only met for shorter interviews 
and thus were unable to develop their situational character and complexity. I have tried 
to write as accurately and sensitively as possible. Still, my interpreation may not 
correspond to my informants’ and I might have analyzed their statements in ways that 
they might not find favorable.  Except for my quotations of what they said, I hold the 
people who helped me in no way responsible for my analysis as presented in the 
dissertation, much less for any inaccuracies that it may contain.  
 
My role as an outsider 
 
“At Yehudia?”  (are you Jewish?) I was asked on numerous occasions. As a Norwegian 
researcher with no ethnic connections or relatives in Israel, the answer was no. My 
answer was often followed with the question: “aval, at ohevet et Israel?” But do you 
love Israel? Many were curious to know whether I, as a non-Jew, empathized with 
Israel or was a Zionist. In no other place have I encountered the need to state and 
articulate one’s national identity as clearly as in Israel. As a self-defined Jewish country 
in law and constitution, Israel is in reality a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country. 
Still, the prevailing mono-ethnic ideology encourages all citizens to identity with and to 
create sentimental attachment to Jewish Israeliness. Not being Jewish in Israel is not 
unique, indeed a quarter of the population are not Jews according to the orthodox 
definition. However, the constant flow of questions I received concerning my own 
identification with Israel reflect the ongoing negotiation of what it means to be Israeli 
today. Do you have to express an allegiance to the Jewish nation-state to be accepted as 
a citizen or temporary resident? The many efforts being made to include me as an 
insider reflect the wider dilemma that arises from being a non-Jew in a Jewish state.  
Some of my informants ascribed to me a symbolic insider status. “At Betah 
Yehudiya” (“For sure, you’re Jewish”) was a joking phrase I often heard. Revital, a 
woman I got to know very well, was convinced that there must be some Jewish blood in 
me since destiny had brought me to their town, and was overtly eager to include me 
amongst them. She was a well-known and successful matchmaker in Kiryat Shemona, 
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and she began considering marriage matches for me almost as soon as I got to know her. 
She was generally acknowledged as having a remarkable gift for the reading of people’s 
futures in their coffee cups. Once she read my future, and her eyes shone as she 
excitedly mumbled her predictions: “I see a Jewish man!” Revital had counseled Jews 
to return to religion and Russian goim (non-Jews) to convert to Judaism and encouraged 
me to do the same. Although I clearly stressed that I had no intension to convert, she 
was a devoted instructor of religious customs and traditions. Having spend a couple of 
months attending sermons in synagogue on a regular basis, I found that Revital 
encouraged me to wear a skirt in stead of my regular jeans, cleary wanting to include 
me as a religious insider. Her husband Benny often introduced me jokingly to 
congregation members as “Israeli in the soul” (Israelit baneshama). It was perhaps all 
the attention I gave my informants that led them to hope that I eventually would become 
Jewish-Israeli and remain in Israel.   
When I told an Ashkenazi colleague at the University of Haifa about my plan to 
do fieldwork amongst Mizrahim in Kiryat Shemoan, he promtly replied that he could 
not have done it. Israeli anthropology was largely institutionalised by Ashkenazim who 
gathered knowledge about the ‘Orientals’ through ethnographic documentation in the 
service of settler-colonialism. Their orientalising descriptions stressed the difference 
and exoticism of Mizrahi and Palestinian culture. Anthropology at Israeli universities 
continues to be dominated by Ashkenazim, and sixty-seven percent of Israeli 
anthropologists today study Mizrahim and/or Palestinians (Lavie 2005). My colleague 
thought that he would be met with justifiably suspicion if he was to do research in a 
Mizrahi predominantly working-class community as an Ashkenazi middle-class man.  
The assumption that anthropology is the study of primitive people was a 
commonly-held view amongst the people I worked with, some of whom had been 
described as backwards and irrational by academics representing anthropology’s early 
history in Israel. “Oh, so you think we are primitive!” my friend Keren laughed self-
consciously when I first introduced myself as a student of anthropology. As time went 
by, I felt more comfortable with a clarification after I had used the term antropologia, 
saying that I was conducting research on the various historical and contemporary 
experiences relating to border town life in Kiryat Shemona. I acknowledge that my own 
biography, as a twenty-five year old, white female researcher from Northern Europe, 
middle-class and non-Jewish, perhaps influenced my informants’ articulations and 
concerns. However, my outsider status might have gained me an enhanced level of trust 
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and possibly the people I met felt less restrained in their discussions. 
 
Structure of dissertation  
 
To understand the current character and dynamics of ethnicity, nationalism and place 
related to belonging it is important to know about the histories out of which they 
emerged. The first chapter examines the impact of the Zionist settler colonial project on 
Jews from Arab and Muslim lands. The Zionist ideology entailed from the beginning a 
Eurocentric bias that placed non-European Jews at the bottom of the ethnocracy. The 
chapter traces the destruction of the Palestinian village of al-Khalsa and its subsequent 
transformation into the Jewish town of Kiryat Shemona, constructed to ensure colonial 
control over peripheral minorities and territory. Chapter 2 is mainly about ‘hot’ 
instructive nationalism from above and elaborates on the differences between 
nationalism in the centre and periphery. Everyday flagging was present more in the 
border town while the ulpan was an explicit site of nationalist instruction from the 
centre.  Nationalist myths and religious symbols were used to instil the idea of the 
nation as a sacred and transcendent object of worship for which people must sacrifice 
their lifes. The bounded discourses of nationhood generated both cohesion and 
fragmentation amongst its consumers. Chapter 3 moves from institutional nationalism 
to the level of everyday life in the border town of Kiryat Shemona. It analyzes the 
meanings and variable salience of the ethnicised category Mizrahi, examining the 
dynamics of ethno-racial stereotypes in everyday life and how these were used to 
negotiate status and class membership. The encounters and exchanges between 
members of the Zakay and Chackotay families demonstrate that the nation did not 
matter in numerous situations where class, religion and other categories of belonging 
were more relevant axes of identification. Chapter 4 explores how fear and suspicion 
are intrinsic characterisitcs of peripheral nationhood. I suggest that the local values of 
being ‘strong’ and ‘steadfast’ have emerged to counter the tension between Zionism’s 
esteemed valuation of frontier settlements and their actual deprivation.  During war, 
political actors and media moved the border towns from a stigmatized periphery to a 
central national frontier. When national sentiments intensified, social and ethno-class 
divisions were temporarily undermined. Chapter 5 explores the process of marking 
boundaries and categories of belonging and not-belonging from the perspective and 
daily experience of Mizrahim. Peripheral nationhood is reproduced routinely through 
22 
 
negotiations over Israeliness in relation to Russian and Arab others. The Euro-
civilisational discourse stressing the relevance of a shared Western culture in relation to 
national identity profoundly shaped how residents identified themselves and others. An 
Oriental stigma was redeployed by Mizrahim towards Jewish and non-Jewish Russians 
and Druze and Arab others. Religion became a peculiar resource for Mizrahim, even the 
secular, for claims to Jewish Israeliness. Chapter 6 addresses associations and 
imaginings trancending the nation-state. While maintaining material and symbolic links 
to Arab otherlands, Mizrahim strived to fashion themselves as western and 
cosmopolitan oriented. To imagine their lives in an Arab past or American future 
became a way to cope with disillusionment over life in Israel and borderland anxieties. 
The final chapter revisits the main themes, particularly in regard to theories of everyday 
nationalism. 
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Figure 1. Map of Israel.
5
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The map is drawn and adapted by Mina Moshkeri from LSE Cartography after a map in Tzfadia 
(2011:6). I define Israel in its pre-1967 borders, not including the Occupied Territories.   Israel has never 
defined its borders or accepted the 1949 Green Line as its legal border. Israel does not have 
internationally agreed upon official borders and they are still expanding into Arab space (Kimmerling 
2008:177).   
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Chapter 1 
 
Zionist settler colonialism and its impact on Jews from Arab and 
Muslim lands   
 
This chapter examines the ideolgocial roots of the Israeli ethnocracy and its impact on 
the position and identity of Jews from Arab and Muslim lands.
6
 Zionism, as a settler 
colonial project, claimed its ‘historical’ right to colonise Palestinian land with the goal 
of constructing a Jewish nation-state. Jews from Arab and Muslim lands, classified as 
Mizrahim, were the victims of exclusionary processes of racialisation and had to adapt 
to Eurocentric nationhood as defined by the Ashkenazi elite. During the 1950s, colonial 
practices of securing territorial control consolidated the ethnocracy as Mizrahi 
immigrants were disproportionally placed in peripheral frontier areas on the geographic 
and socio-economic margins of Israeli society. They served as a cheap labour force for 
Ashkenazi-dominated settlements which were an intrinsic part of creating a Jewish 
frontier against Palestinian Arabs who were located outside the confines of the Zionist 
project. Colonial settler practices and policies turned the Mizrahim into an in-between 
peripheral minority and ethno-class, caught between inclusion and exclusion, 
submission and defiance.   
 
Zionism’s ideological motivation for a national home in Palestine 
 
The Zionist movement arose in central and eastern Europe in the late 1880s as a 
response to excessive persecution and antisemitism in Europe. When Theodor Herzl, 
one of the founders of political Zionism, wrote “The Jewish State: an attempt at a 
modern solution to the Jewish problem” in 1896, he was only one of a long line of 
Jewish intellectuals advocating a political answer to the problems facing European 
Jews. The goal of Jewish unity and the desire for a secular Jewish nation-state was the 
founding principle for political Zionism. Herzl argued that: “A return to national 
existence in a nation-state like all other nations would help to terminate the long and 
                                                 
6
 Ethnocracy’ is a specific expression of nationalism, which exists in contested territories, where a 
dominant 'ethnos' gains political control and uses the state apparatus to 'ethnicise' the territory and society 
in question (Yiftachel 2006:11).   
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dark period of Jewish exile in Gentile lands” (Herzl [1896] 1988:85). Herzl himself was 
more ambivalent about where the future State should be but after his death in 1904, 
most of the leaders of the Zionist movement associated the national revival with the 
colonisation of Palestine and claimed biblical territory as the cradle for their new 
nationalist movement (Pappe 2006:10).
7
  
Benedict Anderson argues that in order to properly understand why nationalism 
commands profound emotional legitimacy, it has to be understood as not just aligned 
with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that 
preceded it (Anderson 1983:12). He argues that “nations combine elements of faith and 
ethnic communities to produce a new synthesis, which draws much of its strength and 
inspiration, as well as many of its forms, from older religious beliefs, moral sentiments 
and sacred rites” (ibid:23). Sacred belief remained central to the Zionist movement’s 
claims to territories. The social and political project of Jewish immigration to Palestine, 
the settlement and colonisation of the land, and the construction of a Jewish community 
and state there, all against Arab opposition and hostility, were rendered culturally in 
terms of national revival, territorial repatriation and historical redemption (Ram in Olick 
2003:228). In the urgent need to establish a common origin for the Jewish people, the 
Zionist movement used the foundation myth from the Old Testament presenting the Jew 
as the eternal exile (Sand 2009:255). This focus, adopting a biblical conception of time, 
suggests that the meaning of the Jewish people is intimately bound up with the working 
out of Jewish history (Handelman 1998:224). In Zionist ideology, the return to a 
historical homeland was a reward of ethnic selection, God giving a specific homeland to 
his ‘Chosen Peoples’ (Smith 2003:92).  
The notion of aliya, as physical and moral ascent to the land of Israel, 
epitomised by the story of Exodus, inspired the movement.
 8
 Jewish immigration to the 
sacred land was represented as a return to the Jewish birthplace totally disconnected 
from the movements of European immigration to other countries (Kimmerling 
2008:231). Modern, political Zionism strategically distanced itself from the global 
colonial context of the time, and rather emphasised the uniqueness of the Jewish 
problem. Antisemitism, persecutions, and later, the Holocaust, provided the background 
                                                 
 
8
 The term aliya, literally meaning ascent, was borrowed from traditional Judaism and has been used ever 
since the first wave of immigrants arrived in Palestine. The term has synagogue connotations as readig 
the weekly Torah portion on Saturdays is also called aliya.    
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that made nation-building in Israel the only realistic and moral solution (Kimmerling 
2010:231).  
Although the Zionist movement distanced itself from the colonial context at the 
time, it still shared several characteristics with settler projects in Canada, the USA, 
Australia and Latin and South America and later South Africa and Algeria.   However, 
there were differences between these colonial projects in terms of the nature of the 
world economic order and whether settlers continue to have relations or not to a 
political metropolitan power. Unlike other settler movements, the Zionist movement did 
not have a formal ‘mother nation’ outside the colonised land. The Jewish National 
Fund, based in the United States, played a quite different role to a motherland or 
imperial power. Its role was to ensure support for the settlers as nation builders, but not 
to rule through them. Still, the Zionist movement clearly attached itself to the dominant 
imperial powers of the day, Great Britain and the United States, and followed their 
colonial exploitation and displacement practices.
9
 European imperial powers colonized 
land while seeking to remove or subjugate the indigenous inhabitants (Masalha 
2007:16). The British imperial powers imported indentured workers to their colonies 
from countries whose populations were considered to be racially and culturally inferior, 
such as Malays and Indians who were brought to South-Africa to work the lush tropical 
farms of the Cape as well as areas in KwaZulu-Natal (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis 
1995:5, Susser 2011:5).
10
 The advancement of the ethnically dominant groups was 
predicated upon forms of subordination imposed on the assumed inferior and backward 
indigenous minorities (Veracini 2010:5, Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis 1995:16).  
In the late nineteenth century, the first aliyah, or wave of pioneering settlers, 
mostly Jews of Polish and Russian birth, emigrated to Palestine and formed the yishuv, 
the Jewish settlement in the land of Israel (Hayishuv Hayehudi b'Eretz Yisrael). Central 
to the emergence of a modern Jewish secular national consciousness was the revival of 
Hebrew which served as a “central symbol for the awakening and maintenance of 
national sentiments” (Spolsky 1991:72). In the 1880’s, Hebrew was revitalised and 
modernised by Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, and within a short period (approximately 1890-
1916), it became the official spoken language among Jewish settlers in Palestine (ibid).  
                                                 
9
 The state of Israel continues to get political, economic and ideological support from the United States.  
The often automatic and uncritical support for Israeli military actions and occupation of  Palestinian/Arab 
land, can be seen as an outcome of a settler consciousness appeased by ‘frontier’ images of pioneering 
enterprise (Veracini 2006:88).   
10
 The exception was Australia, where convict labor from Britain was used as a mean of achieving their 
‘moral regeneration’ (Veracini 2012:82). 
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The existing pre-Zionist Jewish settlements were at this time predominantly 
located in the four towns considered sacred in Judaism: Hebron, Tiberias, Safed and 
Jerusalem. The early Zionist settlers were less interested in the ultra-traditional 
Jerusalem, and directed their resources toward buying up plots of land. A majority of 
settlers who moved to Palestine shared an orientalist vision of biblical times and 
proclaimed indigenous status for the Jews in Palestine as the ‘Land of Israel’where their 
ancient forefathers had lived (Tal 2002:20). Their ideology is well illustrated in the 
following passage from their revolutionary programme:   
 
The terrible position of the Jewish nation will not be improved unless we emigrate, alter 
our way of life, and engage in productive work. Every nation lives on a land of its own; 
the majority of its members are farmers living by the toil of their hands, the rest being 
engaged in other branches of work that have visible results and are of real value. The 
Jewish people have become a people of ‘the spirit’, logicians, merchants and 
middlemen; and for this reason it has become physically impoverished…Let us 
therefore summon our strength and start out. Let us return to our ancient Mother, to the 
country which awaits us full of compassion, to nourish us with the best of her fruit. Let 
us abandon the scale and measure and take up the plough and sickle (I.L, Pinkser, 
quoted in D.B Gurion, Jewish Labour, quoted in Weingrod 1966).  
 
The Zionist programme presented socialism and pioneering as the primary ideals 
for the movement. They turned their backs on the Jewish Diaspora (galut) as a place of 
unproductive deformity and weakness resulting from an age-long enforced 
homelessness.  Only immigration to Eretz Israel would solve the “terrible position of 
the Jewish nation” by placing it in “a land of its own”.  Early immigrants viewed 
themselves as vanguards of a future, much larger immigration for which they were to 
“pave the road for the return of the masses of Jews to their land” (ibid:17).  
There were five major aliyot (plural of aliyah) during Ottoman times and the 
British Mandate. The second aliyah (1904-1914) was sparked by a fresh wave of 
persecution of Jews in Russia. An estimated 40,000 Jews emigrated to Palestine during 
this time and agricultural settlements took off. In contrast to other settler societies who 
relied on an indigenous work force, the Histradut
11
 (General Federation of Workers in 
                                                 
11
 The Histadrut (whose leadership substantially overlapped with the labour political party Mapai) ruled 
the main elements of the Zionist project: colonisation, economic production and marketing, the labour 
force and defense (Hanieh 2003:6).  
28 
 
Eretz Israel) tried to prevent dependence on Palestinian labour. Through the ‘conquest 
of labour’ and the principle of Jewish labour (avodah Ivrit) in the 1920s, Jewish settlers 
campaigned for the non-employment of Palestinians (Shimon 2004).
12
 The racist 
exclusionist policies were articulated in the constitution of the Jewish National Fund: 
land provided to a settler was to be worked “by himself or with the aid of his family…, 
if and whenever he may be obliged to hire help, he will hire Jewish workmen only” 
(Stasiulius & Yuval-Davis 1995:292). 
 
Many Zionists envisaged a new ‘covenant’ not between humanity and God, but 
between human being and nature. The commitment to pioneering labour was conceived 
as integral to the redemption of the Jewish people in its historic homeland (Smith 
2000:48). The pioneer was going to be both a worker and military defender.  
Zionism redefined gender in relation to the perception of national regeneration. 
The figure of the mythic Sabra epitomized the ideal of the New Jew who was strong, 
muscular and masculine, in contrast to the physically soft and weak feminine qualities 
of the Diaspora Jew.
13
 Women were for a long time a minority among the Zionist 
settlers, but held crucial roles in carrying out the necessary domestic tasks, by bearing 
and rearing the New Jew and by acting as honorary men, working in the productive 
labour and military aspects of the settlement projects (Stasiulius and Yuval-Davis 
1995:312). Zionist shelihim (emissaries) toured the Jewish communities abroad to raise 
money and to “gain soul” for the movement, especially young people who could be 
halutizm (pioneers) on the land. These efforts were mostly directed at European Jewry, 
but there was also active immigrant recruitment from Yemenite Jewry, that satisfied the 
need for Jewish “working and fighting hands” (ibid:122).  
In 1911 the Israeli Bureau appointed Shemuel Yavnieli to a mission to Yemen to 
encourage the Jews there to emigrate to Palestine. His efforts of persuasion about the 
                                                 
12
 According to Shafir, during the first and second Aliyahs (1882-1903 and 1904-14), six different models 
were elaborated vis-avis the Palestinians presence and in relation to the question of whether the 
developing colonial economy should rely on Palestinian labour. It was only after the ‘conquest of labour’, 
that Zionism turned into an exclusivist colonial settler movement.  75 per cent of the total South African 
labour force was indigenous, compared to only 15 per cent of the Jewish sector of the Israeli economy 
between 1948 and 1967 (Shafir in Veracini 2006:21). The expulsion of Palestinians during the Nakba and 
current calls within Israel for “transfer” also illustrates how Jewish labour still is preferred to Palestinian.    
13
 The word is derived from the word tzabar, the name of a cactus. The allusion is to a tenacious, thorny 
desert plant with a thick surface that conceals a sweet, soften interior, i.e., tough on the outside and sweet 
and tender on the inside.  It’s a plant that is not indigenous to Palestine, but was originally brought from 
Latin America. Thus, it is quite ironic that both Palestinians and Israelis claim the sabra as symbol of 
indigeneity. 
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importance of Jewish labour were not met initially with great enthusiasm. Only after 
continuing his efforts using messianic terminology of ‘redemption’ did his recruitment 
plan succeed.  
 
I announce to you that redemption is close, the redemption of the souls of our people 
which are awakening to immigrate to Israel to recover it through manual labour…Any 
part of the land of our country which Hebrew hands cultivate is being redeemed 
(Yavnieli quoted in Klorman-Eraqi 1981). 
 
 The sacred promise of the Land of Israel combined with the reward of ethnic 
selection served as a powerful symbolic bridge to connect Jews with their national 
identity (Zerubavel 2005:132). Already, at this early stage of nation building, the 
ethnocracy was in the making. Ashkenazi pioneers shared the mission civilisatrice 
doctrine of European colonial powers and treated the Yemeni workers brought to 
Palestine as ‘uncivilised’ Jews from an inferior culture. Many of the Yemenite reluctant 
pioneers became utterly disillusioned with the hard labour and treatment they had 
received and decided to return to Yemen in the 1920s. More Jewish immigration would 
come soon from somewhere else.  
British rule in Palestine was confirmed by the Mandate issued by the League of 
Nations in 1920, whose text incorporated the words of the Balfour declaration dated 2
nd
 
November 1917, supporting Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine and the 
creation of Jewish homeland. In the prevailing orientalist Eurocentric ideology, the 
devastating impact of such a solution to the ‘Jewish problem’ on the Palestinians 
remained largely invisible. Until the early 1920s, settlement in Palestine was largely 
under the control of private European Jewish capitalists (especially Baron Rothschild). 
After that, control passed to the Jewish agency, and Keren Kayemet (The Jewish 
National Fund of the World Zionist Organization). Between 1920 and the mid-1930s, 
the Zionist movement received full support from the British colonial government in 
Palestine which played a key role in the materializations of the settler project. The one-
way transfer of lands from Palestinian to Zionist settlers was secured through legal and 
illegal coercive measures like taxation, imprisonment and collective punishment 
(Stasiulius & Yuval-Davis 1995:292). 
Antisemitism was at its most extreme in Germany under the National Socialist 
regime during the 1930s and 1940s, and Jewish immigration to Palestine increased 
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significantly. British authorities had heavy restrictions on immigration, and the majority 
of Jewish refugees were not permitted to enter Palestine legally. As the urgency for 
Jews to leave Europe intensified, more refugees managed to enter, referred to by the 
British as illegal immigrants. The German Zionist organisation collaborated with Nazi-
Germany to ensure German Jewish migration to Palestine. An economic agreement 
named Haavara, signed in November 1933, allowed for the transfer of German assets to 
Palestine. Nazi Germany got rid of Jewish citizens they considered racially inferior 
while the Zionist movement gained new settlers for the colonialisation of Palestine.
14
 
By 1936, the Jewish population had reached almost 400, 000 (Gartner 2001:196). In 
1947, the last year of British rule, the Jewish population was approximately 600,000, 
counting for 30.6 percent of the total population (Bernstein 2000:21).  
 
Two national narratives: independence and catastrophe  
 
Referring to the establishment of Israel in 1948 as the War of Independence by Jewish 
Israelis or Nakba (catastrophe) by Palestinians, reflects two competing national 
narratives. Kiryat Shemona, like other Jewish towns and cities, was built on the ruins of 
a village in which Palestinians once lived.  The making of a national identity is not only 
an act of memory, but also an act of forgetting (Shenhav 2006:138). In Kiryat Shemona, 
the official Israeli-Jewish version of history was dominant. Few of my informants 
referred to the history of their town pre-Israeli statehood. Eitan Bronstein, the director 
of Zokhrot, an Israeli NGO that aims to raise awareness of the Palestinian Nakba, was 
the only Israeli I met (who was not from Kiryat Shemona) who knew its former name- 
al-Khalsa. Eitan, himself an Ashkenazi Jew, started the organisation in 2000. It was 
dedicated to teaching about the Nakba to Israelis as a means to create reconciliation in 
the future. Together with volunteers he has erected signs in Hebrew and in Arabic to 
indicate the places that were destroyed in 1948. When I met him in August 2008, he 
                                                 
14
 The transfer agreement forced German Jews to give up the majority of their assets to Germany before 
emigrating. Parts of these assets could be obtained later by transferring them to Palestine as German 
export goods. The Zionist movement broke the boycott against Germany that had been initiated by 
several, mostly American, Jewish organizations. The transfer agreement meant that German Jews who 
emigrated were able to meet the minimum financial requirement for immigration established by the 
British Mandate Authorities. German Jews were able to use the system until December 1939 when it 
ended. Some 50,000 people were assisted by the agreement. The majority of German Jews were no 
convinced that immigration to Palestine was the answer to anti-Semitism. Had German Jewish emigrants 
not been allowed to transfer their capital, they might not have come to Palestine (Segev 1991:22). 
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said that there was a great ignorance and suppressed knowledge about the Nakba among 
Israeli Jews.  
 
My experience is that the general Israeli population and government continue to live in 
denial with regard to a central piece of history of the early days of the Israeli state. 
People might know that they live in a town once inhabited by Palestinians, but they 
don’t know about their life or why they left the place and where they are today and what 
they want for the future.  
 
Settler colonial practices and imaginations reveal a shared mythology of the 
colonised space as empty land. In his book Chosen Peoples (2003), Smith compares 
Zionism with Afrikaner nationalism. Both have insisted on indigenous absence, on a 
‘land without a people’, or the emptiness of the South African frontier, arguing that the 
indigenous peoples had entered the colonised geographic space at a late historical stage, 
and thus have no valid claims to sacred rootedness in the land.
15
 Both Palestinian and 
black South Africans were denied their ethno-national specificity, and categorised as 
local segments of a wider, more undifferentiated indigenous context (Veracini 2010:19). 
 In Israel, in the last three decades, the so-called ‘new historians’ and critical 
post-Zionist critical sociologists have challenged the truths of conventional Zionist 
historiography and the founding myths which surrounded the establishment of the State 
of Israel.
16
 Pappe
17
 (2006) and Morris (2004) both promote alternative Israeli collective 
memory by including Israel’s role in the ethnic cleansing and expulsion of Palestinians 
in 1948, a recent, but muted past of living memory.
18
 Jewish immigrants, many with 
traumatic experiences of death and displacement, did not arrive to an ‘empty landscape 
                                                 
15
 Afrikaner nationalism claimed that  Black South Africans had entered the settler space after the Boer 
treks of the 1830s and Zionism represented  Palestinians as non-indigenous to Palestine (Veracini 
2010:26). The term a ‘land without a people for a people without land was first uttered in 1901 by Israel 
Zangwill, a contemporary of Herzl (Stasiulius & Nira Yuval-Davis 1996:291).   
16
 Starting in the 1980s, post-Zionism is according to Uri Ram a scholarly trend of libertarianism and 
strives to lower the boundaries of Israeli identity and to include in it all relevant “others”. Many Post-
Zionists advocate the evolution of Israel into a non-ideological, secular, liberal democracy in a state 
which is officially neither Jewish nor Arab in character (Ram 2003).   
17
 The space for critical scholarship is narrow in ethnocratic nationalistic societies and has created 
difficulties for scholars who critique Zionism. Ilan Pappe was boycotted by his former employer, the 
University of Haifa and found it increasingly difficult to live in Israeli with his critical views on Zionism 
and moved to England.   
18
 Today, the subject that Palestinians were expelled is hardly disputed amongst scholars, though issues of 
circumstances and the issue of return are still very much a topic of disagreement and debate (e.g. Kadish 
1989). 
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in need of cultivation’, as was told by Zionist emissaries and leaders, but to a place 
where Arabs lived and laboured, and from which they were violently expelled.
19
  
The history of al-Khalsa has received little attention in Israeli historiography. 
Although sources on this topic are meagre, they are sufficient to print a picture of the 
town both before its destruction and the process of the actual demolition. Benvenisti and 
Kaufman-Lacusta’s book “Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land 
Since 1948” and Walid Khalidi’s “All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied 
and Depopulated by Israel in 1948” are useful for this purpose.  
 After the British withdrawal, the Israeli legislative body (Knesset) acted as if it 
was the successor to the Jewish National Fund (JNF) by adopting the latter’s method of 
‘redeeming’ the land (Benvenisti 2002: 146). Before 1948, Jewish landowners could not 
violate the right of the Palestinian tenants to remain on their land. With statehood, the 
ethos of pioneering (haluziyut) was transformed into that of statism (mamlachtiut). 
Jewish settlers no longer purchased land, but expropriated and expelled villagers from 
their homes. Implementing the military doctrine Plan D (Tokhnit Dalet) launched by 
Major General Yigael Yadin on 10 March 1948, Jewish military forces conquered about 
20,000 square kilometers of territory, far beyond the 14,000 square kilometers granted 
them by the UN Partition resolution of 29 November 29, 1947 (Kimmerling 2008:158). 
Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were expelled from their lands and property. The 
process included the expulsion of some 800,000 Palestinians, the destruction of more 
than 531 villages, and expulsion of eleven urban neighbourhoods and their inhabitants  
(preface to Pappe 2006). The Jewish state’s territories were enlarged far beyond the 
borders allocated to it by the United Nations resolution of 29 November 1947. Only one 
hundred thousand Palestinians remained in areas allocated to Israel and additional areas 
occupied by Israel from the designated Arab states. The Palestinians who remained 
within Israel were reduced to a low-ranked minority without legal right to hold Jewish 
land or property or to serve in the army. They were not allowed to organise themselves 
into political parties or to campaign on a Palestinian political platform (Said & Hitchens 
1988:247). Palestinians were subject to martial law until 1966. Confined to their 
                                                 
19
 The Zionist myth of the desertification of Palestine under Arab and Turkish rule and their mission to 
make the desert bloom was a shared trope of other European colonial movements.  The French 
colonialists claimed that ancient Algeria had been the breadbasket of Rome, but under Berber rule had 
become barren and malarial (Penslar 2007:95). 
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villages, they needed special permits from local military commanders to leave them, 
whether to seek employment or to visit relatives (Gelvin 2005: 135).  
The village of al-Khalsa, located on a low hill on the north-western edge of the 
al-Hula plain, was originally founded by Bedouin from the Jordan Valley. During the 
Ottoman Empire, in 1596, it had a population of 160 and was administrated by the 
nahiya (sub-district) of Jira, part of Sanjak Safad. The population in the water-rich Hula 
valley at this time was predominantly Bedouin and subsistence farmers who lived in 
some twenty small villages, tent encampments and huts constructed of reeds and mud 
structures. The villagers grew field crops and vegetables, orchards of fruit trees and 
raised water buffalo. The houses in al-Khalsa were made of bricks and basalt stones cut 
from the hillside. In 1916, Temimi and al-Katib described how they were generously 
welcomed by the head of the tribe in a large guesthouse with rug-covered floors 
(Khalidi 1992:463). These descriptions show that the Palestine that Jewish settlers 
found before the Mandate period was not under-cultivated and barren as presented by 
Zionist leaders and later mythology. Although the Palestinian population was 
predominantely fellaheen (peasants), with a significant nomad Bedouin population, it 
also consisted of a large urban population that was engaged in both international trade 
and export of agricultural products like oranges and olive oil (Stasiulius & Yuval-Davis 
1995:292). 
Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, the allies divided the remains of the 
empire between them in what would be the basis of the finalisation of the northern 
border into the present day. The Sykes-Piko Agreement was signed in 1916, two years 
before the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The agreement stated that the dividing 
line between the French and English Mandate would be the line that connects the point 
from north of Acre with the point of the western beach of the Sea of Galilee   (today 
Kibbutz Ginosar). Four Jewish settlements, Metula in the North and Kfar Giladi, Tel-
Hai and Hamra to the South, existed in the area at that time. The French and English left 
the northern area with no real control between the years of 1919-1921 due to confusion 
surrounding their secret border agreements.  
At this time Palestinians were struggling for their national independence and 
were resentful of Zionist settlements (Stasiulius & Yuval-Davis 1995:293). In 1920, the 
leader of the al-Ghawarina clan, Sheikh Kamal Hussein, led an attack on the Jewish 
settlement of Tel-Hai as an Arab protest against the French Mandate. Joseph 
Trumpeldor and seven others were killed, an event that became a central myth of Jewish 
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steadfastness and heroic sacrifice. Although Sheik Hussein established closer 
relationships with the Jewish settlers in the years preceding 1948, the settlers of the Kfar 
Giladi (today’s Kibbutz Kfar Giladi) did not forget or forgive, and instead established 
relations with Hussein’s rival, Emir Faour, leader of the al-Fadel tribe, whose members 
lived in the Golan heights and the eastern part of the Hula Valley (Benvenisti 
2000:128).   
The borders between the British and French Mandate passed north of the village 
and the line which cuts the Hula Valley from its central base at Marjeyon, made al-
Khalsa an important crossroad in the region. The village served as a centre of commerce 
for the Bedouins, the mountain settlers, and villagers across the border. The weekly 
Thursday market, Suk el-Khamis, drew people from villages in the Naphtali mountains, 
the Alawi villages, Druze from the Golan Heights and South Lebanon Christian and 
Muslim Arabs. Most of the villages in Galilee were small, with populations not 
exceeding 500 individuals. Al-Khalsa was the largest village, and according to a village 
survey from 1945, its population numbered 1,840, out of whom 20 were Christians. The 
village had a boys' elementary school, which also admitted students from neighbouring 
villages, and a council that administered its affairs (Khalidi 1992:463).   
In 1934 the Jews received the concession to a large piece of swampy Hula land 
(54,000 dunams) from the Mandatory government, on the condition that they drained it.  
The following year the land was purchased by the Jewish National Fund and in 1939 the 
Osheskin Fort settlements of Dan, Dafna and Shaar Hayeshuv were established.  A map 
of the region in 1947 shows that most of the area north and west of the Hula was under 
Jewish ownership, and there were only nineteen Arab villages where Jews did not have 
a foothold. In the 1948 War, there was a total of eighteen Jewish settlements in northern 
and southern Hula, the first of which had been established in 1882 and the last in 1945 
(Benvenisti 2000:128). 
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The destruction of al-Khalsa 
 
The cleansing of indigenous populations is another shared feature of settler colonial 
projects (Veracini 2010:33). The leaders of al-Khalsa attempted to strike an agreement 
with the Hagana to save the village from attack, but it was rejected.
20
 On 12
th
 May 
1948, the Israeli army, the Palmach’s first battalion, conquered the police station in al-
Khalsa as a part of the Plan Dalet and Operation Yiftach. The commander of Operation 
Yiftach, Palmach chief Yigal Allon, intended to expel as much of the area’s population 
as possible during the offensive and later wrote: “We regarded it as imperative to 
cleanse the interior of the Galilee and create Jewish territorial continuity in the whole of 
the Upper Galilee” (Allon quoted in Khalidi 1992:455).  Al-Khalsa’s population of 
approximately 2,100 inhabitants fled as a result of the massive destruction. According 
to Israeli historian Benny Morris (2004:123) the villagers felt threatened and fled, while 
eyewitness accounts state the cause of their flight was Safad’s fall to Israel on that same 
day. Villagers interviewed by the Palestinian historian Nafez Nazzal stated:  
 
Upon the fall of Safad the villagers fled from their houses to the village of Hunin. 
About one hundred men remained in the village (and one of them recounted): The 
morning Safad fell we met members of the Arab liberation army retreating towards the 
mountains. They suggested that we take our families across to Lebanon for a week or 
two…They assured us that they were regrouping to recapture Safad (Nazzal quoted in 
Benvenisti 2002: 130).  
 
The village's residents stated that after they fled, only the local militia remained, 
but withdrew after shelling from the Jewish settlement of Manara and an armoured unit 
approached the town (Morris 2004:120). The militiamen retreated through the hills and 
made their way to Hunin, and probably moved on to Lebanon a few days later, along 
with the people of Hunin itself (Khalidi 1992:463). The Jewish forces blew up the stone 
or concrete houses in the abandoned villages and burned the reed huts (Benvenisti 
2002:130). Al-Khalsa was completely destroyed with the exception of the village 
school, the British Mandate government’s office, the village mosque and the police 
station. One of the militiamen returned after a few days to retrieve money that he had 
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 The Hagana was a Zionist underground paramilitary organization during the British Mandate in 
Palestine.  
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buried in the courtyard of his house, and he found that the Israeli forces had burned and 
destroyed most of the houses. Former villagers interviewed in Tell al-Zaatar (the hill of 
thyme) refugee camp in Lebanon in 1972 recounted that when they later returned to the 
village;  
 
We found that the Jews had burned and destroyed the houses belonging to Ali Zakayan, 
Abu Ali Muhammad Hamadih, Mustafa al-Haj Yusif, Issa Muhammad, Ali Salih 
Ahmad, Muhammad Arab al-Haj Mahmud, Salih Ismail, Sari al-Khadir, Dawud 
Hussein, Abdul-Raziq Hamid, Qassim Muhammead al-Salih and Ali Hussein 
Mahmud....The village was in ruins (Nazzal 1978:47).
21
  
 
Palestinians remained in only three villages in the Hula Valley: Khisas, 
Qaytiyaa, and Ja’una. In June 1949 they were expelled to Akbara, near Safad. Only one 
Bedouin settlement, now called Touba-Zangahariyya, which had allied itself with 
Jewish forces, remained intact in the Hula Valley. By the end of May the Jewish 
settlements in the Galilee had begun to harvest the Arab fields of their winter crops 
(Nazzal 1978:131).
22
  
 
The Ingathering of the Exiles 
 
The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, 
religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created 
cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal 
Book of Books.  
 
- The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel May 14
,
 1948. 
 
Here everybody is both Jewish and universal: in the soil…the trees…the roads…the 
houses…the factories…the ships…the air…the schools…the army…the planes…the 
language…the landscape…the vegetation…all of it is Jewish. 
 
David Ben-Gurion (quoted in Handelman 2004:43). 
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 I repeat these witness stories and their careful naming out of respect for the Palestinian commemoration 
of Nakba and their claim to return and demand for compensation.  
22
 In the Hula Valley alone, this land encompassed an area of 15,000 dunams (Nazzal 1978:131). 
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The new state of Israel depended on Jewish immigration. During a briefing at 
the Lausanne conference in 1949 Ben-Gurion
23
 made it clear that immigration was the 
main political goal that would bring about the redemption referred to as “a model 
people and a model state” (quoted in Segev 1986: 96). He believed that only in a Jewish 
state “where everything is in our hands, from the land and the army to the university and 
the radio”, was a full and complete Jewish life possible (Ben-Gurion in letter to Simon 
Rawidowich 24
th
 November 1954, in Ravid 1998:197). Ben-Gurion, called The Law of 
Return “the foundation stone of the State of Israel,” as it granted Jewish immigrants 
citizenship upon arrival. The ‘ingathering of the exiles’ represented a secular Zionist 
ambition (drawing rhetoric and images from biblical notions found in the prophets) to 
construct a national, modern and homogenous identity that would result in one unified 
nation (Zsfadia 1997:66).  
With statehood, tens of thousands of Holocaust survivors and displaced persons 
immigrated to Israel.
24
 Of the nine million Jews who had resided in Europe, two thirds 
were murdered by Nazi- Germany. Efforts to reach the Jews of Arab countries and 
organise them for immigration were intensified as the dimension of Holocaust became 
known. Before the genocide of European Jews, the Zionist movement, whose members 
were for the most part of eastern European origin, had taken little interest in the Jews of 
North Africa and Arab countries. “We were used to think of the Oriental Jews mostly as 
subjects for historical and anthropological research,” one leader said (Segev 2000:121). 
The state embarked on a massive immigration program aimed at bringing Jews from the 
Middle East and North Africa (Mizrahi Jews) to settle in the new state. Overall 900, 000 
Jews left Arab and Muslim countries after 1948, of which 600,000 went to Israel. Of 
those 600,000, almost half arrived during the three first years of Israeli statehood. Two 
hundred and sixty-six thousand came from Morocco, twice as many as the next largest 
contingent, who came from Iraq (The Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel 2002, 
Lehmann & Siebzehner 2006:57). The disintegration of the Jewish populations in Arab 
lands was almost total.   
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 Israel’s first prime minister, David-Ben Gurion (1886-1973), held the position of prime minister twice, 
from 1948–53 and then again from 1955–63 (Karesh & Hurvitz 2006:51). 
24
 First to arrive were those who had been held in the Cyprus refugee camps, approximately 52,000. 
Throughout World War II,  Jews tried by all methods to reach the shores of Palestine. The British, 
viewing this as illegal, intercepted most immigrant ships and dispatched their passengers to Cyprus. Some 
ships like the “Patria” and the”Strauma” sank at sea. Approximately 300,000 immigrants arrived from the 
Eastern block until their Communist regimes forbad emigration. Bulgaria, one of few European states 
from which mass deportation of Jews was not carried out, provided 40,000 immigrants. 
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The extent of historic anti-Jewish feeling and persecution in Arab and Islamic 
countries is a matter of scholarly controversy and debate. However, compared to the 
ideological antisemitism and state-sponsored extermination of European Jewry, it is 
hard to discredit the view that until the Jewish-Arab conflict developed during the 
British Mandate, Jews lived in relative peace with their Muslim neighbours, especially 
in the more cosmopolitan corners of the Ottoman empire (Lehmann & Siebzehner 
2006:58). The Jews of Dar al-Islam
25
 had lived among Arabs as protected people 
(dhimmis) for centuries, and although their relationship was not harmonious all the time, 
they managed to coexist, interact and benefit from one another (Stillman 1991:242).
26
 
The Jews of Arab countries had been scarcely affected by the Holocaust. Even the 
German occupation of Tunisia seems to have had a limited effect on the treatment of the 
Jewish population there (Weingrod in Lehmann & Siebzehner 2007:66). 
While there was a concern about the physical safety of Jewish communities in 
the Arab world, particularly after the 1941 pogrom in Baghdad, they were mainly 
considered as subsidiary to the population lost in Europe (Shiblak 2005:133). 
Discussions of Jewish communal disruption and trauma often overlook the fact that for 
Jews from Arab and Muslim lands the disruption resulted from the establishment of the 
Israeli state and not from the Holocaust (Kantrowitz 2007:94). Mizrahi residents I 
interviewed in Kiryat Shemona, for the most part, gave descriptions of harmonious 
Jewish life before emigration, although some did recall fear and breakdown of trust 
between neighbours after the establishment of Israel. 
Except for the descendants of the pre-Zionist old yishuv and several thousand 
Yemenis who were brought to Mandate Palestine by Zionist authorities as cheap labour, 
only a  small minority participated actively in the Zionist project before 1948 (Shafir & 
Peled 2002:242). The vast majority of Jews from Arab countries had no connection with 
Zionism prior to immigration, but they had lived with the sacred concept of exile in 
traditional Judaism throughout generations (Boyarins 1993). 
Israeli governmental institutions, such as the Aliyah Department and Jewish 
Agency appropriated these sacred beliefs and rhetoric and ran public propaganda 
campaigns persuading Jews to emigrate. Zionist recruiters actively spread myths about 
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 The term is used for lands where Islam became the predominant religion, literally the abode of Islam. 
26
 As dhimmis; protected people, the Jews had to follow certain rules and regulations and generally they 
were seen as second-class citizens. They were also referred to as Ahl al-kitab (Arabic): People of the 
book. 
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life in Israel (Laskier 1994:296). In Morocco, letters were circulated to local rabbis, 
who during Shabbat services, read to their congregations glowing accounts of life in  
Eretz Yisrael (Weingrod 1966:34). In Iraq, the emissaries spread the same Zionist 
thesis: that Jewish life in the Diaspora was poisonous and impossible and that the only 
salvation was to become pioneers on the land in the collective of Eretz Israel. This 
messianic inpired doctrine seemed foreign to those Arab Jews who had not experienced 
any crises of identity (Benjamin 2006:134). 
Undoubtedly there is no unified Jewish experience of life in the Arab world. 
Deciding to emigrate from one of the Arab countries was based on the particular 
circumstances and was dependent on timing, the country, the community and the person 
and often combined push and pull factors (Segev 1998:161). Some immigrants were 
attracted by life in a Jewish state by messianic expectations of redemption, some 
encouraged by the prospects of a better economic situation. Others simply followed 
their family and friends and were afraid of being left on their own when the rest had 
departed (Segev 1998:114). Wealthier families from Morocco went on pre-visit tours to 
Israel to observe life before deciding on migration. Large numbers of Moroccan Jews 
preferred to delay their departure from Morocco due to the discouraging descriptions of 
life in Israel (Hakohen 2003:237).  
Happiness over the creation of Israel did not necessarily translate into a wish to 
live there. The metaphysics of Becoming implied in aliyah: exile, return, redemption, 
ignores moments of refusal or of ambivalence towards being uprooted (Handelman 
2004:135). Aliyah created images of a joyful return to one’s beloved homeland, when 
the reality was that many Mizrahi immigrants experienced social and material descent 
(yerida) rather than ascent with the act of leaving their countries (Shoat 2001). It was 
largely to a land of myths the immigrants set out (Weingrod 1972:35).  
In contrast to conventional forms of colonialism, settler colonialism is premised 
on the domination of a majority that has become indigenous. As such, Israel resembles 
other settler states such as the United States and Australia where the immigrant minority 
settlers have become the majority through coercive colonial practices. Zionist settler 
colonialism created differentiated and unequal citizenship between Israeli Jews and 
Palestinians and between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim.  Jews from Arab and Muslim 
countries with a variety of backgrounds and life histories were categorised as 
Sephardim and later Mizrahim in contrast to the Yiddish-speaking Jews whose 
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Ashkenazi identity preceded Zionism.
27
 The category Mizrahi (Eastern) was originally 
constructed and used as a hegemonic tool by Ashkenazim to Westernized Jews from 
Arab and Muslim lands, while simultaneously used to highlight their innate social moral 
inferiority (Chetrit 2004, Shoat 1988). The Zionist movement also had far-reaching 
effects upon the identity of Palestinians who were divided into Druze, Bedouin, 
Christian and Muslim Arabs. All Jewish immigrants had to adjust to a single system of 
values, norms and sensibilities in order to escape from their “exile mentality” and 
become a “person like all other persons” liberated from the defects acquired in the 
Diaspora (Massad 1996:54).   
 
The policy of population dispersal 
 
From the beginning of Jewish settlement in Palestine in the late nineteenth century, the 
Galilee was considered a frontier by the Zionist leadership. After the expulsion of the 
indigenous Palestinian population, one of the urgent and most important goals was to 
establish a Jewish presence. The Israeli government and military constructed two main 
regions as the country's internal frontiers: the Negev in the south and the Galilee in the 
north. In mid-1949, the government’s ‘physical planning division’ prepared a 
nationwide plan for the dispersal of the country’s population. The goal was to Judaize 
areas heavily populated by Palestinians in order to increase the size of the Jewish 
population and meet the official demand for defensible borders  (Yiftachel 2001:23).  
The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) became a central institution and symbol in the 
newly established state.
28
 The military was regarded as the major institutional tool for 
the absorption of immigrants and the major equaliser of ethnic differences (Weiss 
2002:44). The chief of staff Yigael Yadin issued a public statement in 1950 about the 
importance of the IDF’s aid and presence in peripheral transit camps (ma’abarot):  
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 The original definition of Sephardim is of those whose mother tongue is/was Ladino (Judeo- Español) 
and whose religious practice and diaspora path can be traced at some point through the Iberian Peninsula 
(Spain and Portugal). After a Golden Age of relative peaceful coexistence with Muslim and Christians, 
they were forced to convert, were killed or expelled (the majority settled in Northern-Africa) during the 
Spanish Inquisition in 1478. Today, Spanish Sephardim sometimes resent the blurring of distinctions 
between themselves and Mizrahim, refferring with pride to their history and with Eurocentric bias against 
non-Europeans, referring to themselves as “true or “pure” Sephardim (Kaye/Kantrowitz 2007:82).   
28
  Ben-Gurion saw the IDF as the expression of the normalization of the Jewish people. The IDF soldier 
was also the successor to the tradition of courage first revealed in the biblical period. Ben-Gurion argued 
that the qualities of these new soldiers were no less heroic than those of their predecessors-the biblical 
warriors. Since the IDF held a special sanctity among the state’s institutions, those who criticised the 
army were accused of profaning the holy (Liebman & Don-Yehiya 1983:98).   
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The ma’abarot have an important role to play in safeguarding the nation’s border. If we  
do not turn every ma’abara into a commanding ground and all ma’abara dwellers into 
persons who are capable and willing to defend themselves, we shall have no security 
(Hakohen 2003:215). 
 
 This shows how the transit camp, a predecessor to the development town, had an 
esteemed value in the Zionist military and melting-pot ethos.  
Jews from Arab countries, the majority from Morocco, constituted 63 percent of 
all immigrants during the 1950s and were expected to become a part of the working 
class in rural areas (Shiblak 2005:12).
29
 During the first immigration wave from 1949-
53, some 85 kibbutzim (communal farms) and 158 moshavim 
 
(cooperative farms) were 
built, mainly along the borders with a total population of seventy thousand.  Moshav is 
an agricultural co-operative and settlement whose members own their land and cultivate 
it individually.
30
 Moshavim tend to be associated more with immigrants from North 
Africa, in contrast to the kibbutz. However, the overwhelming majority of new 
immigrants to Israel settled in towns and cities of abandoned villages not destined for 
agricultural settlement. Only one or two of every ten immigrants went to live in a 
farming community (Tzfadia 2011:67).  
The second phase of population dispersal was realised through the Sharon Plan, 
which involved the establishment of twenty-eight strategically placed development 
towns (ayarot pituach) in outlying regions in the North and South. Mizrahi immigrants 
were disproportionately placed in development towns by government agencies in the 
Northern Negev, the upper Galilee, and along the borders in places like Afula, Beit 
Shaan and Kiryat Shemona where they were housed as a part of a wider political project 
(Khazzom 2005:120). They were intrinsic to political Zionism in terms of security as 
they functioned as a means of solidifying the boundaries of the state and thus seen as an 
integral part of the management of the conflict with the Arabs. Khazzom argues that the 
pre-state elites “removed to social and economic peripheries those whose cultural 
characteristics threatened the country’s self-presentation as western” (ibid:120). By 
placing Mizrahim on the border, where they would be targets of Arab/Israeli tension, 
elites ensured they would not form alliances with Palestinians with whom they shared a 
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 During the period between 1950 and 1957 alone, over 100,000 Moroccan Jews arrived in Israel 
transplanting almost the entire Moroccan Jewish population to Israel (Stillman 1991:166). 
30
 The original moshav was a cooperative agricultural community. Several moshavim are today only 
small settlements or villages.  
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language and marginalised socio-economic position (Shafir & Peled 2002:17). The 
development towns also supplied Ashkenazi settlements with cheap labour, populated 
remote districts to prevent the return of the displaced Palestinian population and created 
a frontier against the neighbouring Arab countries (Yiftachel 2006:108). From the early 
1950s the state distributed more and better land to both the kibbutzim and moshavim 
than in the development towns and later moshavim with Mizrahi majorities (Shabi 
2009:163). Mizrahi immigrants became dependent on the veteran Ashkenazi settlers for 
their livelihood, solidifying the ethno-class hierarchy.  
 
From ma’abara to development town 
 
The earliest immigrants were passed from their entry camps to tented camps and 
maabarot, a type of more permanent transit community. The most northerly, and in time 
also the largest maabara (immigrant camp) of the 129 maabarot that were built in Israel, 
was built on the ruins of al-Khalsa (Hakohen 2003:209). The destroyed village was 
targeted to be the administrative, commercial and industrial centre of the Upper Galilee 
under the jurisdiction of the Upper Galilee regional council. The council, established 
towards the end of 1949, focused its municipal activities around the the absorption of 
new immigrants (mizug ha`galuyot). The first immigrants to arrive in the transit camp 
of al-Khalsa were fourteen families from Yemen who arrived in July 1949 as a part of 
operation “Magic Carpet.”31 A second group of Yemenis arrived in August, a group of 
fifteen families. The two immigrant groups settled down in the abandoned houses of al-
Khalsa. During the first ten months only immigrants from Yemen arrived. At the end of 
this period there were 46 families and 177 individuals living in the village in total. By 
the end of 1950, as many as ten buses transporting new settlers were arriving daily from 
Haifa. On 30
th
 July 1950, the regional council of the Galilee received instructions to 
absorb 5000 more families. Volunteers and functionaries from the centre and nearby 
settlements assisted the new immigrants. They were often transported directly from the 
port or airport to the maabara in the middle of the night. Throughout the coming years 
immigrants from such diverse countries as Iraq, Yemen, Morocco, Turkey, Romania 
and India were directed to Kiryat Shemona, most often against their wishes (Yiftachel 
and Tzfadia 2004). When the masses of immigrants from North Africa began to arrive 
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  British and American transport planes made some 380 flights from Aden, in a secret operation that was 
not made public until several months after it was over.  
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in the mid 1950s, the town was transformed  into the development town of Kiryat 
Shemona. 
The immigrants were housed in tents, canvas huts and tin shacks and received 
some economic assistance. The Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Labour supplied the 
immigrants with a primary needs package with basic necessities such as simple 
furniture, cooking utensils and iron beds that were to become an Israeli symbol. Food 
and clothing were apportioned through a system of rationing and coupons. The tents in 
the transition camp stood eleven in a row, but were often ripped down by the wind and 
winter-showers. This brought about the hasty construction of metal shacks. There was 
no running water, bread was trucked in from outside, and the immigrants grew bitter. 
Disillusioned and disappointed with the harsh conditions many newcomers asked to be 
relocated shortly after arrival. Some left after a few days, others after several weeks, 
turnover was high. The lack of employment, shortage of suitable housing, distance from 
the centres, and specifically, the sense of disappointment and gloom which relatives and 
visitors spread among the settlers, encouraged them to find another, closer place of 
residence while they still had the opportunity to do so (Hakohen 2003:172).   
 
The (re)making of place 
 
A shared characterisation of settler colonial societies is the transformation of non-
European spaces into European spaces (Yacobi 2000:132). In the newly established 
Israeli State, Palestinian spaces were given Hebrew names as an integral part of the  
effort to Judaize the physical and demographic landscape. Erasing Arabic names 
reflected the colonial practice of inventing historical continuity by omitting the 
indigenous history and the present day (Sand 2009:111). In the middle of the year 1950 
the regional council of Galilee Alion agreed after the advice of Keren Kayemeth 
LeIsrael (Jewish National Fund), to approve al-Khalsa’s new Hebrew name. Kiryat 
Shemona, meaning the city of eight in English, was given in commemoration of the 
national hero, Joseph Trumpeldor and his seven comrades who fell defending Tel-Hai in 
1920.  
Azaryahu (1996) notes that the power of street names derives from their ability 
to convey the national narrative of the past. They are instrumental in rendering the 
official version of history more natural when incorporated into the spatial practices of 
everyday life. In Kiryat Shemona commemorative street names were constructed around 
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a recent golden age. Anthony Smith argues that these serve an important function.  
 
The golden age articulates the defining moral and aesthetic standards of the cultural 
group; they provide hope and inspiration for moral regeneration and national rebirth; 
they indicate, through lineal heritage, the inherent capacity of the group to recapture its 
glorious past, and they provide guidance for action in the present, justifying people’s 
sacrifices for the national cause (Smith 1999:263).  
 
The streets were named after heroic figures, military events or great cultural 
achievements. Other streets were directly named after authors, poets and pioneers of 
Modern Hebrew. The street where I lived was named after a Russian poet, David 
Shimoni (1886-1956).
32
 The Hagana Street was named after the Jewish paramilitary 
organisation in the British Mandate of Palestine, which later became the core of the 
IDF. Timelines were knitted together to expose a particular vision and collective 
national identity (Smith 1986:191). The absence of any symbols or characters from 
Mizrahi Jewish culture and heritage reflects how ethnocratic nationalism privileges 
Ashkenazi memory and experiences of Judaism. The street names provide a daily 
reminder of the subjugation of Arabic and Judeo-Arabic cultural attainments.   
 
    
Figure 2. Street names in Kiryat Shemona. 
                                                 
32
 The streets were named after Shai Agnon (188-1970), Haim Nahman Bialik (1873-1934) and Yosef 
Haim Brenner (1881-1921). Zionist leaders such as Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), Ze’ev Jabotinski (1880-
1940) and Joseph Sprinzak (1885-1959) also have their own streets dedicated to their memory. The 
Szenes Street is named after the national heroine Hannah Szenes (1921-1944) who became a symbol of 
self-sacrifice. Henriette Szold (1860-1945) was a U.S Jewish Zionist leader and founder of the Hadassa 
women’s organization. Jewish philosophers such as Rambam (Moses Maimonides) and Yehuda Halevi 
(1075-1141) have their own streets, as do the Ashkenazi chief Rabbis HaRav Herzog (1888-1959) and 
HaRav Kuk (1965-1935). 
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A house of memory and forgetting 
 
The museum alongside the map, census and other cultural amenities are instrumental 
tools in the construction of nations (Anderson 1983:178). Israeli museums housed in 
Palestinian mosques and homes have been appropriated and incorporated into Israelis’ 
lives as historical heritage sites (Davies 2010:174). The Museum of the History of 
Kiryat Shemona was located in the former village mosque of Al-Khalsa, an Ottoman era 
stone building. In October 2008, the museum manager Haim Elias, guided me through 
the exhibition telling the story of Kiryat Shemona. Schoolchildren visit the exhibition 
regularly, which begins with this poster: “After 2,600 years in the Diaspora, Jews 
returned on masse to Eretz Yisrael, settled here and integrated into all spheres of life in 
the State of Israel.” This idealising text portrays the return to Israel as a natural 
culmination of the long path of Jewish history. The Jewish people were presented as one 
permanent group of people, despite their spatial dispersion and temporal ruptures for a 
period of close to two thousands years (Ram 2011:4).The previous existence of an Arab 
town named al-Khalsa was briefly mentioned. An exhibition poster printed in the 
national colours blue and white read:  
 
Kiryat Shemona was born in the turbulent days of massive immigration to Israel after 
the War of Independence, when the locked gates of the country were finally 
thrownopen. It was built on al-Khalsa (home of the Gang that murdered Trumpeldor 
and his comrades and abandoned during the war of Independence). 
 
The usage of the word gang reduces all civilian Arabs into armed enemies and 
al-Khalsa to a temporary home of the nameless murderers of the Jewish national hero 
Trumpeldor and his companions. It was clear that the ideological strategy of the 
exhibition was to gloss over the ‘darker sides’ of the Zionist project. The ‘return’ of 
Jews to their ‘promised land’ was presented as unproblematic, and as a ‘national 
narrative without natives’ (Veracini 2010:93). The brutality of the 1948 War or Nakba 
was conspicuously absent from the museum exhibition.  
The exhibition was accompanied by black and white pictures artistically 
portraying hard nation-building labour and everyday life in the camp. Replicas of metal 
transit-camps shacks were located next to the Museum in Park Zahav to provide a 
glimpse of life in a ma’abara. A plastic doll dressed in Moroccan traditional clothing 
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was supposed to symbolise a housewife. The refrigerator of the time, an icebox, was 
placed in the corner of a sparsely furnished hut. The exhibition seemed to express the 
everyday living conditions and ‘time of modesty’ as necessary hardships for the 
national good. Immigrants were portrayed as moving willingly to the periphery and 
being filled with an eager nation-building spirit. This stood in stark contrast to the 
majority of narratives my informants who shared their memories of spatial and cultural 
displacement and misery, stories largely excluded from the national heroic settlement 
ethos. What the narration of local history indicated was therefore perhaps the wish that 
Mizrahim be counted as vital members of the Jewish nation-building project and be 
considered as proper agents of its realisation.  By creating a limited space of expression, 
the exhibition served to reinforce the centrality of formal state discourse in Kiryat 
Shemona.  
           
 
 
 
                      Figure 3.  The museum of history located in the former mosque of Al-Khalsa. 
 
Tsipman’s diary 
  
Haim Elias lent me the unpublished diary of an Ashkenazi state official, Tsipman, who 
was posted in Kiryat Shemona to monitor immigrant absorption. The diary Al Ha-
Derech Sheli (On My Road) provides unique insights into the settler-colonial 
orientalising logic and the prevailing ethno-national ideology of the 1950s. One passage 
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describes a meeting between Iraqi immigrants stereotyped as educated and Yemeni 
immigrants as having a ‘traditional’ appearance.  
 
Rostam Prochi, an immigrant from Iraq whispered in shock to her sister when she first 
saw Kiryat Shemona: Look at what we’ve come to. I don’t think there’s a book in the 
entire place, and the men haven’t had a haircut in at least two years. Her sister 
comforted her, by pointing out that a full beard and luxurious peot was a respected 
Yemenite custom It was the first time in their lives they had seen Yemenite Jews in 
their traditional clothing and full beards (ibid:125). 
 
Tsipman wrote about the misery the immigrants experienced and referred to 
them patronisingly as “chronic complainers”. The immigrants expressed frustration 
towards a broken promise given by the ruling Ashkenazi elite. 
 
At the end of 1952, a relative of one of the local volunteers visited. He took note of our 
difficult conditions and found them intolerable. He wondered if we had gone mad. Why 
did you leave Central Israel for this place? One day, the Arabs will come down from 
Lebanon and stone you. Another immigrant cried out:  You’ve been had! Cheated! 
Open your eyes; can’t you see that you’ve been parked at the end of the world? They 
obviously wanted to get you out of their way. They promised you something? Look 
what you’ve got...There are better places around. You have nothing to lose by leaving 
this pit, fit only for lost causes... (Tsipman 1953: 65). 
 
Tsipman includes observations of other state officials working in the town at the 
time. Baruch Bez, a Metula region police commander, patrolled the tented transition 
camp in 1951 and encountered many bitter immigrants. Some would break into tears of 
shock and disappointment upon arriving in Kiryat Shemona. 
 
Is this the Garden of Eden which they promised us? They would ask: Why us? Why 
were we shipped here, consigned to this fate? Such a remote, desolate 
place…mountains closing us in, the border over our shoulders with our enemies not far 
beyond it… (Tsipman 1953:74). 
 
This passage from the diary illustrates how  the immigrants felt a claustrophobic sense 
of being entrapped and enclosed by Arab hostile enemies. The Orientalist discourse of 
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nation-building at the time also influenced commonly held views of Mizrahim as 
“exotic” Others. The establishment of a health centre brought foreigners to town, and 
the WHO (World Health Organization) directed delegations to witness the Israeli model 
of  “rapid development”. At the spring Ein Zahav, which served as a dishwasher, 
laundry and general rendezvous for the village’s women a resident describes the 
encounter with outsiders.  
 
Volunteers, foreign contributors and ordinary tourists came in with their cameras, trying 
to photograph the women from every possible angle. One tourist wanted to take my 
mother’s picture, but she wouldn’t let him. He tried to explain that it was very important 
to him, that the picture would be published abroad so that people there would see what 
conditions were like in Khalsa, have pity on us, and give  more money to Israel 
(Tsipman 1953:48).  
 
Tsipman notes how the police commander Baruch Bez tried to instil new 
immigrants with a Zionist spirit and convince them about the importance of living on 
the frontier.  
 
There, in those villages and kibbutzim, Jews have settled on the border, and have been 
there for many years. They work by day and guard by night for their homes and 
families…and for us, as they are defending us too. People used to tell me that they were 
on the verge of leaving the area due to the conditions, but Haim Roz (the local Mapai 
representative) talked them out of it. He told them that one must learn to love Kiryat 
Shemona, that a better future awaited us all (Tsipman 1953:56-57). 
 
This passage of his diary suggests that the state official saw it as his patriotic 
duty to instil immigrants with sentimental attachment for the land. The colonial practice 
of idealising the periphery to secure territorial dominance and control is still taking 
place today, particularly during wartime.
33
 The promise of a better future resonates with 
the messages of savlanot (patience) I received repeatedly from my Hebrew teacher in an 
ulpan in Kiryat Shemona. “You can do it, with hard work and savlanot.” We were 
encouraged to accept the current circumstances, even if these were hard and 
disappointing, for the sake of a better future. Haim Roz tried to convince the new 
immigrants of the beauty of the place by appropriating its Arab past and name. “The 
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 Chapter 4: Fear & Strength in a border town deals with this issue further.  
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Arabs that used to live in Khalsa called the spring which flows at your feet Ein Dahab 
(The Eye of Gold).” Like other sites, the Arabic name of the spring was later changed to 
its Hebrew equivalent, Ein Zahav. Tsipman idealised employment as a pioneering 
activity referring to one of the immigrants who allegedly said:  
 
Early every morning, we lined up, young people from all ethnic backgrounds, singing 
as we marched to our work in the forestation project
34
. We hiked to the Dan regional 
nursery, and from there, pine saplings in hand, climbed the hills and began planting 
(Tsipman 1953:40). 
 
As in the museum exhibition, the activities of Mizrahi immigrants were 
idealised and incorporated into a heroic view on settlement and labour. The Tsipman 
diary sheds light on Zionism’s idealisation of settlement and the immigrants’ 
disillusionment. These narratives are strikingly similar to stories my informants shared 
with me. Looking at the content of the diary in light of what my informants expressed 
about their life today, it becomes clear that the Zionist idealisation of frontier 
settlements and their actual deprivation have created parallel discourses and practices of 
‘strength’ and ‘bitterness’, that have been passed down through generations.  
 
The powerful kibbutzim   
 
By 1953, Kiryat Shemona had 5,000 residents and the institutional framework of the 
town was developing. The Histadrut had maintained a network of schools since the days 
of the Mandate. The Public Education Act which supplanted it was not passed until 
1953; only then did education become universal and compulsory. The immigrants from 
Yemen established a school with approximately fifty students. The stone building that 
housed the students had also been used as a school during the British Mandate period. 
The first teachers and kindergarten teachers were Ashkenazim from the surrounding 
kibbutzim and passed their training sessions in a hurried seminar for teachers conducted 
at the transition camp. Due to the economic hardship amongst the families, the strategy 
was to teach the students agriculture. Although the town was constructed to provide 
services for the surrounding settlements, the opposite happened. The population of 
Kiryat Shemona became dependent on the Kibbutzim for their livelihood. Mizrahi 
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 The forestation program was managed by the Jewish National Fund
 
 (Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael) that 
was founded at the Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901 to buy and develop land for Jewish settlements.  
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immigrants found employment in Kibbutzim, and these settlements established 
manufacturing plants at the outskirts of KS. Some immigrants were either employed in 
the olive harvest in the northernmost town of Metula or by Sole Boneh (paving and 
building) on construction projects. Women found work mainly in the kibbutzim and in 
the local nursery. A regional seedling farm near Kibbutz Neot Mordecai, became a 
major source of employment, and an important branch of the agricultural development 
industry. Some of the families from Yemen who had supported themselves through 
textile weaving had to undergo retraining, and began to produce mats from reeds which 
grew by local streams in the area and in the yet un-drained Lake Hula. Other families 
established small farms of their own as a supplement to family income.  
The kibbutzim at the time constituted a major cultural symbol of the new 
modern, western-oriented Zionist national identity (Tzfadia 2007:58). Even though 
several Mizrahi immigrants in the development towns were employed in classic 
‘pioneering’ work, such as the draining of the Hula Swamp, they were never considered 
proper haluzim (pioneers) or nation-builders. Their settlement activities were not 
spoken of as pioneering acts, but as externally directed and regulated activities (Katriel 
1997:152). Mizrahim were simply reduced to tools used and controlled by the 
Ashkenazi centre. Pioneering was at this point in history not part of the border town 
agency according to the dominant account.  
By 1963 the development towns had a total of 170,000 inhabitants, of which 71 
per cent were Mizrahim. To reduce the high unemployment rate amongst Mizrahim, the 
government provided loans and other incentives to textile manufacturing, food 
processing, as well as to metal and chemical industries to set up factories in 
development towns to provide employment to unskilled immigrants.
35
 In the 1970s 
about 70 percent of employees worked in these industries that typically pay low wages 
and do not require higher education or particular skills. These industries did succeed in 
reducing unemployment in several towns, but created other problems. The companies 
were run on the most part by private investors who lived in the centre, whereas the 
residents were employed in production lines which were on the unskilled bottom of the 
employment ladder. Local managers were mostly Ashkenazim with minimal connection 
to the towns, and they became overdependent on central government allocations. A 
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 From the 1950s to 1970s the employment share of the textile sector in development towns increased 
from approximately four percent to more than 40 percent (Drori 14) 
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Mizrahi-dense, low-income, low-skilled town was an unintended consequence of the 
planning policies. The spatial proximity and economic dependence between the town 
and surrounding populations created tensions that continue to the present day (Swirski 
1989).  
 
The monoethnic rationality of Zionism  
 
The Orientalist and Eurocentric foundations of the Zionist movement reflected the 
ideological habits of European colonialism (Shoat 1989). Herzl envisaged that the 
Jewish state in Palestine would “form a portion of a rampant of Europe against Asia, an 
outpost of civilisation as opposed to barbarism”. (Herzl 1988 [1896]:96).  The Zionist 
movement promoted the superiority of the European culture and taught the immigrants 
the right Zionist spirit (Ram 2002). It promoted a monoethnic rationality to make Jews 
national that was embedded in bureaucracy and “in its abstract, intentional principles of 
hierarchical organisation and integration, and in its clean-cut definitions of categories 
that are exclusive and inclusive” (Handelman 2004:27).  
Several Ashkenazi immigrant groups arrived in Israel suffering from a policy of 
cultural erasure, especially Holocaust survivors from Eastern Europe. However, their 
culture was closer to the dominant Ashkenazi-Israeli culture, and thus not stigmatised to 
the same extent as Mizrahi culture, which was considered too similar to the native 
Palestinian culture (Tzfadia 2007:67). Israel’s Arab citizens were excluded from the 
programme of cultural assimilation, but judged on their level of loyalty to the Jewish 
state (Louer 2007:11).  
Mizrahim were not considered to have the same Zionist spirit as the pioneers 
and their descendants and were met with dismay and hostility. The Ashkenazi 
establishment and their attitudes toward the Mizrahim were infused with prejudices 
reflecting their Western self-image. David Ben-Gurion is reported as saying, in the mid-
1960s, “we do not want Israelis to become Arabs. We are in duty bound to fight against 
the spirit of the Levant, which corrupts individuals and society, and preserve the 
authentic Jewish values as they crystallized in the (evidently European) Diaspora” 
(quoted in Shafir and Peled 2002:77). Jews from Arab countries were stereotyped as 
“primitive, aggressive and difficult human material” and forced to distance themselves 
from the Arabic language which had become stigmatised as the language of the Arab 
Other (Weingrod and Levy 2006:8). The extent of the public stigma attached to Arabic 
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is illustrated by the many immigrants that took new, more European sounding names.  
Most of the press’s references to the Mizrahi immigrants at the time were 
negative. Even before the immigrants from Arab countries began to arrive in large 
numbers, the Ashkenazi journalist Aryeh Gelblum, a reporter for the Israeli daily 
newspaper Haaretz, wrote the following about the arriving Mizrahi immigrants:  
 
This is the immigration of a race we have not yet known in the country. We are dealing 
with people whose primitivism is at a peak, whose level of knowledge is one of 
virtually absolute ignorance and, worse, who have little talent for understanding 
anything intellectual. Generally, they are only slightly better than the general level of 
the Arabs, Negroes, and Berbers in the same regions. In any case, they are at an even 
lower level than what we know with regard to the former Arabs of Israel. These Jews 
also lack roots in Judaism, as they are totally subordinated to savage and primitive 
instincts. As with Africans you will find among them gambling, drunkenness, and 
prostitution ... chronic laziness and hatred for work; there is nothing safe about this 
asocial element. [Even] the kibbutzim will not hear of their absorption (Ha’aretz Tel-
Aviv, April 22, 1949 quoted in Wurmser 2005).   
 
  This colonial racism was characteristic of the entire Zionist movement. The 
scientist, leading Zionist and one of the first Jewish anthropologists in mandatory 
Palestine, Arthur Ruppin, believed that the Jewish nation was primarily a biological 
entity. Inspired by Darwinism and biological theoretisation of race at the time, the 
young Ruppin mentioned in a footnote: “It is perhaps due to this severe process of 
selection that the Ashkenazim are today superior in activity, intelligence and scientific 
capacity to the Sephardim and Arabian Jews, in spite of their common ancestry” (Sand 
2009:263).
36
  David Ben Gurion described immigrants from the Orient as being 
“without a trace of Jewish or human education” (Shoat 1997:42). Yakkov Zerubavel, 
head of the Middle East Department of the Jewish Agency responded to Yosef 
Shprintsak’s anxiety about “preserving the cultural standards given the massive 
immigration from the Orient” by saying. “Perhaps these are not the Jews we would like 
to see coming here, but we can hardly tell them not to come….” (Segev 1998:156).  
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 Arthur Ruppin was a formative figure in what has become Israeli Anthropology.  
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The colonial construction of Mizrahim as eastern, uncivilised and uneducated 
was used to justify discrimination with regard to salaries and housing. The newspaper 
HaTsvi wrote in an editorial that: “The Yemenite worker is the simple and natural 
worker, capable of doing any kind of work without shame, without philosophy, and also 
without poetry. And Mr. Marx is, of course absent from both his pocket and his mind” 
(quoted in Shoat 1988:14).  
The quarterly Megamot approached five prominent scholars of the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem, all of Central or East European origin, and asked them to 
consider this new problem that the number of immigrants from Arab countries had 
begun to exceed that from Europe.
37
 Karl Frankenstein’s article ended with the 
sentence: “We must recognize the primitive mentality of many of the immigrants from 
the backward countries” (Segev 1998:157). All participants in the Megamot symposium 
considered the absorption of the immigrants from Arab countries to be a cultural 
mission. They believed the transmission of European values and culture would uplift 
the immigrants from their backwardness (Segev 1998:158). In his influential book “The 
absorption of immigrants” the leading Israeli sociologist of his generation, Shmuel 
Eisenstadt argued along similar lines, using modernist and functionalist paradigms, 
stating that immigrants remained external to the social system until they became 
successfully integrated by the dominant group, the Ashkenazim (1954:9). 
 
The immigration narrative of Avri Moshe 
 
The telling of one’s life is a particular way of accounting for the self, a particular kind 
of narrative and self-understanding (Freeman in Knowles 2004:55). Although life and 
narrative, living and telling are not the same, they are intricately connected, telling 
becomes part of living and living becomes part of telling (Knowles 2004:55). The 
narrative of Avri Moshe (72) reflects the ethnic tensions that emerged during the first 
decade of Israeli statehood. Avri arrived in Kiryat Shemona in 1950 with his family 
from Kifri, a Kurdish town in northern Iraq. They were sent to Haifa and the 
immigration camp of Atlit before being redirected to Kiryat Shemona a couple of 
months later. They were told that the town, located 115 km north of Haifa, was only 
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 The five scholars were Ernst Simon, Nathan Rotenstreich, Meshulam Groll, Yosef Ben-David (Gross) 
and Karl Frankenstein (Segev 1998:157).  
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approximately twenty minutes from Haifa, even though it took four hours in reality. 
Avri had clear memories from the early years in the absorption camp: 
 
We could not buy what we wanted, everything was strictly rationed. We got ten eggs, 
one-kilo sugar, ten tomatoes…everything was prescribed. It was impossible to get more 
even if you had some money. You received according to the size of your family. It was 
similar to what you see in the primitive villages in Africa today. Until 1954 there was 
no electricity, and every morning you saw entire families standing in line in front of the 
few, shared toilets. The tin huts we lived in after the tents were extremely cold during 
winters and burned like an oven during summertime. It was truly awful. Everyone was 
in the same situation, there was no difference. This was a country we could call our 
own. It is a place I can feel at home…After a year we began to build a house. My entire 
family, all seven of us, shared two rooms. I slept next to my brother head-to-feet. 
 
There was a great lack of employment, but some found work in the nearby 
Kibbutzim. In order to support his family, Avri began to work alongside his father in 
construction work in Kibbutz Kfar Sol at the age of fourteen. One had to be at least 
sixteen years old to be accepted as a worker, so Avri lied about his age. He worked in 
the Kibbutz for three years, eight hours a day. The kibbutz manager paid out salaries 
every third month, but they did not cover the daily needs of their household of nine 
members. Once a week it was possible to obtain a small loan of five lirot. Avri got tears 
in his eyes when sharing a painful memory of financial scarcity. 
 
There is one image I can’t forget up until this day. My father was standing in line 
waiting for a loan. When it finally was his turn they said that there was no more money 
left to borrow. It is the first time I saw my father cry. It was very difficult. At that 
moment I said to myself that I would never depend on a salary. I would create a 
business on my own. 
 
Careful to insist that relations were better and friendlier today, Avri described a 
painful memory of discrimination (aflayia). He knew that Kfar Giladi screened weekly 
films, but its cinema was declared off-limits to outsiders (meaning youth from Kiryat 
Shemona). In the first years the workers from Kiryat Shemona were not allowed to enter 
the communal dining room. “They looked down upon us because of our skin colour. 
But I behaved well… I did not cause trouble…I was polite… I was a good boy,” Avri 
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said slowly, exposing his discomfort about describing his experience with 
discriminatory practices and attitudes.  
He experienced racism when he was employed by kibbutz Kfar Sol in the 1950s. 
A kibbutz girl fell in love with him, but they were prevented from talking because of 
their different class and ethnic background. So deep went the antipathy towards Mizrahi 
outsiders that Avri was afraid he would lose his job if he spoke to a bat Kibbutz 
(daughter of the Kibbutz).  Sometimes, after he finished work he stood outside the room 
where she gave piano lessons, admiring her at a distance. Avri described this part of the 
unhappy love-story in a very elaborate and sentimental manner. Decades later when 
Avri went with his wife to dance in the kibbutz he met the love of his youth and for the 
first time he got an explanation directly from her.  
 
Avri, I did not talk to my mother for seven years! I used to watch you working, and I 
could not talk to you although I longed to. I was frustrated because I was like the house 
woman, and you worked for me. I told my mother: Look at that boy, I love him. My 
mother burst out in anger and said: What, that boy from Kiryat Shemona. He is black!  
 
What is particular noteworthy is that in contrast to my other informants who 
mostly shared stories of bitterness and disillusionment, Avri shared the dominant 
Zionist narrative of sacrifice and resilience. In correspondence with Zionist ideology, he 
presented the hardship he had gone through as a necessary step to individual 
assimilation and accomplishment. His present attitude toward the Ashkenazi 
Kibbutznikim was different than the sentiments he had growing up. He became a 
prosperous factory manager, and employed many Ashkenazim and Russian-speaking 
Israelis throughout the years. It seems that his socio-economic mobility and subsequent 
status in the local community had weakened the grief he once felt. A memory of  
bitterness was transformed into a personal success story of strength and resilience.  
Either this is a strong example supporting the hegemony of the ethnocracy, or 
my position as a European researcher elevated me in Avri’s eyes to a position of power 
that did not allow him to be put off sharing his rhetoric. My impression in meeting Avri 
is that he was genuine and this was an expression of who he was. Hence I do not feel 
comfortable with deeper analysis that would ascribe too much to him as an individual. 
In general, the Ashkenazi hegemony seems to have succeeded as we can see in the 
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example of Avri who had internalised some central myths of Zionist thought and sought 
to accomodate himself with the hegemonic political culture.  
 
Grievances and Resistance  
 
The files of the immigration departments of the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, the 
municipalities and diaries are full of reports that document the misery of the immigrants 
(Segev 2000:163).  Tspiman writes how delayed salaries were a source of frustation for 
the immigrants who found work in Kiryat Shemona (1953:43). In 1951, a horde of 
unemployed gathered around the employment office and a riot broke out, someone had 
decided to obliterate the structure and its manager, Zeév. They shouted in unison 
slogans: “Jobs and Bread” and "Peace and Security!” He does not reveal whether the 
protesters managed to throw him out of office, but it is clear that they were deeply 
frustrated (Tsipman 1953:43).  
In addition to unemployment, discrimination and hardship, the security situation 
began to worsen. Confrontations with Syrian forces began to take place in the Mishmar 
Hayarden regions over Israel’s development projects, especially the draining of Lake 
Hula. Israeli agriculture workers constantly transgressed the 1949 Rhodes Armistice 
Line into Syrrian territory. These transgressions were a reason for the Syrian attack on 
Tel Motila (Mount Kallah) in May 1951, which resulted in putting a stop to draining of 
the lake. Although the uppermost region of the Galilee had remained quiet during this 
period, fear of escalation drove some out of Kiryat Shemona and dispirited many others 
(Segev 2000:388). Faced with public discrimination and the grim realties of the 
immigration camps a sizable number of immigrants left Israel. Around 2500 Moroccan 
Jews returned to Morocco between 1949 and 1953. Several hundred returned to Tunisia, 
and a small minority chose to leave Israel for France, Canada and the United States 
(Simon 2003:499). Disillusioned and disappointed the returnees spread stories of the 
hardship and rough conditions they had encountered.
38
 It has been estimated that during 
the first 25 years, approximately 75,000 entered and left Kiryat Shemona. It was hardly 
the realisation of a 1950 declaration that said “here will rise the city of the North” 
(Troen and Lucas 1995:451). The massive desertion of development towns threatened 
                                                 
38
 The Israeli government tried to deter yeridah. One strategy was to confiscate letters by disillusioned 
immigrants with critical descriptions (Laskier 1994: 108). 
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to undermine the government’s policy of population dispersal (Hakohen 2003:226).  
Their relegation of Mizrahim to Zionism’s internal others led to various 
articulations of their grievances (Massad 2006:55). More organised resistance than local 
protests and individual flight started with the rebels in Wadi Salib, the formerly Arab 
neighbourhood of Haifa in which North African Jews had been settled after the 
expulsion of the Palestinians. Problems with overcrowded housing, poverty, 
unemployment and discrimination from Israeli authorities led to a series of violent 
demonstrations that took place intermittently for nearly two months and spread to other 
urban locations (Dahan-Kalev 1999).    
In early 1971, the resistance movement Black Panthers (HaPanterim 
HaShkhorim) was established as a reaction against Ashkenazi discrimination of Mizrahi 
Jews, using ethnicity instrumentally to protest their marginal social and economic 
position (Regev & Seroussi 2004:234). For the first time since the mass immigration 
from Arab countries began, there seemed to be a threat to the hegemony of the 
Ashkenazi establishment led by the Labour party, Mapai. It was also feelings of 
discrimination and deprivation amongst Mizrahim that led them to withdraw their 
electoral support from the ‘establishment’ party of the Labour alignment which had 
dominated every government until 1977 (Ben-Rafael 1991:35, Chetrit 2000:63). 
Menachem Begin was the first national politician to tap into the resentment that the 
development town workers nursed against the kibbutzim.  The Likud Party’s victory 
was largely due to the Mizrahi vote that paradoxically supported Begin’s anti-Arab 
ideology because the Labour Party had thought them to be self-hating because they 
came from the “uncivilized” Arab world (Lavie 1996:63). A feeling that their own were 
governing the country (although most of the Likud Party leadership were Ashkenazim) 
gave Mizrahi Jews a sense of added legitimacy and allowed them to express their 
ethnicity without endangering their status as Israelis (Regev & Seroussi 2004: 234).  
Both the Wadi Salib uprising
 
and the creation of  Black Panthers were 
unintended consequences of the state’s regional planning policies; the emergence of 
ethnicity by the very policies that were meant to eliminate ethnic differences (Ferguson 
1990).  In the late 1980s, Shas played up the religious component, accusing the Israeli 
establishment for bestowing economic hardship on the Mizrahi population and of 
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disconnecting these Jews from their religious and cultural roots.
39
 During the 1990s the 
Shas movement obtained most of their votes from Mizrahim in development towns. The 
case of the towns exposed a paradox; the very frontier settlements promoted as essential 
for nation-building, caused intra-national fragmentation and conflict (Yiftachel 
2006:234).
 
Since the 1980s a minority of non-Ashkenazi activists has adopted the category 
Mizrahi as a source of empowerment for political mobilisation, social action and 
theoretical reformulation.
40
 Mizrahim as a new collective identity was born out of 
resistance and solidarity against racial discrimination and oppression uniting Jews from 
such different countries as Morocco and Yemen. As a category of belonging it 
condenses a number of connotations; it embraces the past in Arab countries and it 
affirms the specific experiences of non-European Jews in Israel (Shoat 1998:13). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Zionism distanced itself from the settler-colonial context of the late nineteenth century 
even as it colonized a land in which others already lived. Despite attempts to construct 
the uniqueness of Zionism by invoking historical chronology and ethno-nationalist 
ideology, the explicitly racialising discourses of the leaders, intellectuals and journalists 
of Israel at the time, illustrate the contrary. There were clear parallels between Zionist 
settler colonialist coercive practices and other colonial projects at the time. 
Subordination was not only imposed on the indigenous populations, but also on in-
between populations such as the Arab Jewish minority. The production of in- between 
ethno-classes was intrinsic to the colonial settlements projects that sought territorial 
control and cultural and socio-economic hegemony. The ethnic hierarchy and 
Eurocentric concept of identity was promoted both by early Jewish pioneers in Palestine 
and in Zionist nation-building practices.  Frontier settlements were idealized as 
instrumental in the ‘Judaization’ of land predominantly populated by Palestinians. 
Settlements in frontier regions were crucial for securing the contested borders of the 
                                                 
39
 Shas is more concerned with religion than ethnicity and how this when they used the religious term 
“Sephardi” and not the sociopolitical appellation “Mizrahi” (Shabi 2010: 202).   
40
 One example is the Oriental Democratic Rainbow (HaKeshet Ha-Demokratit HaMizrachit) was 
founded in March 1996 by forty men and women, the majority of whom are second- and third-generation 
Mizrahim. Its main purpose was to influence the public agenda and bring a bout changes within Israeli 
society and institutions, struggling for increased women rights, for minorities and socially disadvantaged 
segments of society (Chetrit 2006).  
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state and preventing the return of Palestinians. Whereas Ashkenazim in Kibbutzim were 
valued as proper and authentic nation-builders, Jews from Arab lands were excluded 
from the heroic settlement ethos, and presented as primitive and backwards, in need of 
modern education. The colonial Westernisation/de-Easternisation process and practices 
compelled the Mizrahim, and others perceived to be threatening the vision of the New 
Jew, to distance themselves from their cultural and linguistic particularities. In one 
sense the Zionist melting pot did succeed since Jewish immigrants of diverse 
backgrounds acquired the same language and nationalist values. On another level, it 
failed to do so because Israelis still draw symbolic, material or political resources from 
ethnic differentiation.  
Both state idealisation of the frontier, a sense of entrapment and colonial racism 
are elements that continue to resonate amongst residents in Kiryat Shemona and are 
essential for grasping the persistence of peripheral nationhood. The question that 
remains is: why, despite all the hardship and discrimination and the current withdrawal 
of the welfare state, the hegemony of Zionism, including settlement and the security and 
army apparatus, although receiving individual criticisms, largely is taken for granted 
and viewed as unavoidable? One answer can be derived from the prevailing logic of 
ethno-nationalism combined with a colonial settler society, which incorporates in-
between populations as inferior, but nonetheless as members, of the expanding settling 
nation while simultaneously excluding indigenous populations. The next chapter 
examines how the state seeks to secure national unity and loyalty through Hebrew 
language education and state ceremonies.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Promoting Love and Loyalty for the Nation   
 
The declared purpose of the Israeli State is to serve as a ‘home’ for Jews worldwide. 
This definition excludes the Palestinian citizens from nationality, but include Jews who 
are citizens of other states. The Jewish character of the state is explicit at all symbolic 
and institutional levels. In Israel, as elsewhere, a political culture with its institutions 
and symbols is central in the facilitation of national identities (Smith 2001:34). This 
chapter shows how the logic of ethno-nationalism was promoted in a state-sponsored 
Hebrew language class (ulpan) and national public events. These sites, amongst others, 
are central to the creation of “the ideological habits which enable…nations…to be 
reproduced” at the heart of everyday life” (Billig 1995:6). The great identity mission of 
the Israeli State is to mould all Jews into one nationality. Nationalism is not simply 
something subjects believe in (or not) but something they become habituated to. 
Hebrew education in Kiryat Shemona promoted a Eurocentric discourse of identity that 
sought to naturalise the dominant model of Israeliness, that of  a Western-oriented, 
Jewish citizen. The ulpan manifested itself differently in the centre than in a peripheral 
border town, where it was more an explicit site of didactic nationalism. The state events 
used explicitly national symbols emphasising sacred belonging in the ordering of 
feelings and to rationalise self-sacrifice to the nation. Both the ulpan and state events 
appealed to Jewish history and continuity, and thus reproduced a firm boundary in 
opposition to non-Jews. Despite the efforts of this nationalising logic to produce loyal 
and obedient citizens, my informants revealed a complexity of contradicting positions. 
They did not internalise the national ideology of unconditional unity and sacrifice to the 
‘homeland’ uncritically. They thus challenged the Zionist hegemony of national identity 
but not to such an extent as to threaten it. 
 
Nurturing national sentiments in Hebrew language studios 
 
Kiryat Shemona is today a town of 25,000 inhabitants, in which the majority of the 
population belong to the Mizrahi ethno-class. The mass immigration of Jews and non-
Jews from Former Soviet Union (FSU) has changed the town’s demographic 
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composition. Today, Russian-speaking Israelis compose around a fifth of the total 
population in Kiryat Shemona.
41
  
Learning the national language is key in the creation of national affiliation and 
loyalty and is a convenient administration tool for the nation-state (Eriksen 1993:103). 
The opposition to linguistic variation is a method of making the nation fit the state 
(Calhoun 1992:226). Both before and after the establishment of Israel, Hebrew 
education represented the educational core of Zionism and had a dominant role in the 
nationalisation of immigrants. In addition to military service, education in Hebrew and 
Zionism is still considered modular to the melting pot doctrine, and regarded as the 
major institutional tool in binding the allegiance of citizens through a shared Hebrew 
modern Jewish identity, despite ethnic and national differences (Weiss 2002:44). The 
majority of Mizrahi residents who arrived in Israel during the 1950s with Arabic as their 
primary language had learned Hebrew through schooling, in ulpanim or in the IDF. The 
military still runs vocational classes in high schools and special “land courses” as well 
as courses in Zionism and Hebrew, which usually deal with such subjects as the 
redemption and unity of the people of Israel.
42
 
A crucial governmental instrument for the social “absorption of immigrants” 
(klitat aliyah ve hevratit) is the instruction of Hebrew in ulpan
43
 (pl. ulpanim) and 
continues to serve immigrants today. There are numerous private ulpanim but the 
majority are managed by the Jewish Agency, municipalities, kibbutzim and the 
universities. State-sponsored ulpanim are run under the Hebrew Language Department 
of the Ministry of Education and Culture, which is also in charge of the pedagogical 
aspects of the training, including the curriculum and socialising activities. Since the 
establishment of the first ulpan in Jerusalem in 1949, 1.2 million immigrants have 
studied in more that 220 ulpanim, and approximately 65,000-80,000 new immigrants 
attend the ulpan each year (www.jewishagency.org, accessed on 10
th
 July 2006).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 As with the label Mizrahi, the label Russian is grossly inaccurate. The majority come from the former 
European republics, especially Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus; others, the Central Asian states of the 
former Soviet Union. Other Russians are non-Ashkenazi Jews from Islamic Central Asian republics such 
as Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Chechnya (Rosenthal 2003:132).  
42
 The study of the land pursued in the IDF is virtually non-existent in other armies (Weiss 2005).  
43
 The term is derived from the root alef, meaning to instruct, train or studio.  
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The Jewish Agency’s website reads the following:  
 
Hebrew is not taught only as a way of understanding and managing Israeli society, but 
as an intensive immersion into the language as well as into the historical, cultural and 
religious legacy of the Jewish people. Jewish festivals are celebrated at Ulpan and class 
activities include music appreciation, radio and TV broadcasts and outings around the 
country (www.jewishagency.org, accessed on 10
th
 July 2006). 
 
This description illustrates how the ulpan is designed not only to teach the 
national language, but also to promote images of Jewishness, Israeliness and to nurture 
a sentimental attachment to the land. The ulpan is a key site to explore how dominant 
political culture both defines and transmits the cultural values it wishes new citizens to 
absorb (Merelman 1988:337). Several ethnographic studies of ulpanim by Israeli 
scholars have argued that the teaching of Hebrew serves as a medium to nurture 
national loyalties among newcomers (Doleve-Gandelman 1989: Katz 1982, Lerner 
1991, Selwyn 1986, Golden 2001).
44
 Although my own participation and observation in 
ulpanim in Netanya and Kiryat Shemona converge with these studies in some ways, my 
material shows that they are not complete in their understanding. Students were shielded 
from the real, changing world and taught an essentialised model of what it means to be 
Israeli.  The Israeli cultural values which the students were supposed to learn in the 
ulpan in Kiryat Shemona, were not just that of a new temporal ordering, but also those 
of western/European modernity. Learning to become Israeli also involved learning how 
to become a western self, a model of Israeliness constructed in relation to the Arab (and 
particularly Muslim Palestinian) other. Since my Mizrahi informants historically have 
attended various ulpanim at various times, it is difficult to tell what kind of images of 
Israeliness they were exposed to. However, my ethnography in an ulpan in Kiryat 
Shemona can shed light on what kinds of accepted behaviour, values and images of 
Israeliness were presented to the students by the state-appointed educator.  
 The Hebrew lessons I attended from September 2008 to April 2009 in Kiryat 
Shemona were held in a classroom at the Arthur and Angie Fox community centre. The 
                                                 
44
 Although these studies cover a variety of Ulpanim over three decades and were conducted amongst 
different student populations, they converge in significant ways. Israeli national culture is conceived in a 
similar fashion in all the five studies. They emphasis the various ways by which the Ulpan sought to 
divest the students of their previous identities and the role played by the teachers as maternal “cultural 
mediators”. Finally, they link the Ulpan to a rite of passage and focus on temporal ordering, the learning 
of personal and collective routines as an essential element of the curriculum (Golden 2001:54). 
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class consisted of a core group of ten students from diverse backgrounds who attended 
more or less regularly twice a week. Lessons ran for three hours with a 20-minute break. 
Most of the students in the advanced level class had lived in the country for a couple of 
years and were already familiar with Israeli society. In addition to me, the class 
consisted of four Russian-speaking Israelis, two Christian Lebanese students, an English 
woman from a nearby kibbutz and a young American couple who had recently done 
aliyah and defined themselves as Messianic Jews, (Yehudim Mesichim Bney). The 
teacher, Judith, was an energetic Ashkenazi woman in her late sixties, who had moved 
from a kibbutz to Kiryat Shemona when she married her Iraqi husband in her early 
twenties.
45
 She had reached the age of retirement after forty years as a Hebrew teacher, 
but she still taught classes out of “love of the language”. 
When I presented myself to the class for the first time, the spontaneous reaction 
of Denja, a Russian student, was “Ah, Oslo, the capital of peace!”  His ironic comment 
indicated the public perception of how the Oslo Agreement was a failure because it did 
not secure lasting peace. Some of my fellow students commented on the fact that I was 
going to the ulpan despite not having any intention to live in Israel, emphasising how 
learning Hebrew was considered an integral step towards permanent residency and 
Israeliness. 
My relatively good level of spoken Hebrew was commented on by Judith and 
several others, and she was also impressed with my knowledge of Israeli history. 
Turning to the other students, many of whom had lived in the country for several years 
Judith said: “See, Cathrine is not even Jewish and she knows so much! She is becoming 
Israeli fast!” Judith’s comments illustrate the presumed relation between obtaining 
fluency in Hebrew and demonstrating national loyalty. By commenting on my non-
Jewishness she tried to inspire the other non-Jews in the class, that it was indeed 
possible to become Israeli through the Hebrew language.  In such a view, the lack of 
mastery of Hebrew is a sign of weak national devotion.  
Rather than presenting us with a rigidly fixed curriculum, Judith brought 
photocopies from various textbooks, newspapers and recordings of popular songs. In 
contrast to the previous ulpanim I had attended in Netanya and Haifa, we did not have 
to pass an exam. Since our level of Hebrew varied within the class, Judith tailored the 
tuition to individual needs and went through new vocabulary and grammar whenever 
                                                 
45
 About intermarriage in general, see chapter 3 and Judith’s marriage in particular chapter 6.   
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we asked. In spite of the seemingly flexible and ad-hoc teaching method, Judith 
organised learning and conversations around two pillars that were similar to what 
Golden (2002) describes in her ethnographic study of an ulpan. The first was the 
Jewish-national calendar and the second, aktualia, current events and political issues. 
Golden argues that these set out two (sometimes contradictory) principles on which the 
Israeli State was founded: ethno-national peoplehood and civic citizenship (Golden 
2002, Handelman 1994). The national calendar, tied as it is to Jewish holidays and 
national events of Jewish significance, serves as a prime means by which Israeli 
national culture is made Jewish. As such, the calendar can take us to the core belief 
system of the nation and the inner workings of nation building and state formation 
(ibid).  
In class, we studied material associated with the numerous Jewish religious and 
national holidays that took place during the period of the ulpan. The emphasis on 
Judaism in the curriculum was not surprising in the Israeli acculturation process, but 
was rather a paradox in our language class where less than half of the class defined 
themselves as Jewish. Judith stressed the homogeneity of the Jewish collective, even 
though both the class and the various types of Israelis were representative of its 
heterogeneity.  
 
Singing the nation into being 
 
Véronique Benei (2008) and Deborah Golden (2002) have shown how songs can 
provide an entry point for exploring the formation of patriotism and nationalism in 
everyday life.  In an ethnographic study of schools in western India, Benei shows how 
schoolchildren are phenemologically taught how to “feel” the nation with their bodies 
(Benei 2008:24). In Golden’s study amongst Russian immigrants in an ulpan, the ability 
to sing Hebrew songs also feed into the production of national selves. “Now, like real 
Israelis, let’s stand up and sing,” the ulpan instructor tells her students, demonstrating 
how singing constitutes Israeliness and is seen as an integral part of a “moral education” 
for newcomers (Golden 2001:52).  
For the early settlers in Palestine, Hebrew songs and public singalongs (shira be 
tsiburi) were a force in defining their national identity (Regev & Seroussi 2004:265). 
After statehood, the production of patriotic music played an essential role in the 
formation of Israeli identity and the strengthening of nationalism. The government 
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funded publication of songbooks and subsidised music by Hebrew composers. The goal 
was to create a national Hebrew culture, a distinctly new definition of Jewish 
(Zerubavel 2005:115). Israeli folk songs, also know as Songs of the Land of Israel, are 
still popular decades after their original release. The songs define Hebrewism as the 
embodiment of Israeliness, thus becoming a boundary within the ethos of Israeli 
national identity (Regev & Seroussi 2004:50). 
These songs are still regarded as an effective way of teaching Hebrew to new 
immigrants, whilst simultaneously instilling them with love for the land. Judith taught 
us countless numbers of these patriotic pieces that were clearly aimed at instilling the 
students with national sentiments and identification with Zionism. Some lyrics were 
simple word plays, others sang of building the nation, defending it, populating it, loving 
the land and making it bloom.
46
 Others reflected the national self-image as a country 
eternally extending the hand of peace to hostile neighbours such as: “Noladeti La 
Shalom” (I was born for peace).47  The refrain goes: “I was born for peace, if only it 
would get here! I was born for peace, if only it would come”.48  
Songs about longing for peace resonate particularly for the border town 
experience through the overwhelming perception of common threats and dangers from 
hostile enemies on the other side. In this context of felt existential fear, several of the 
students identified with the song representing dominant Israeliness and sung it 
repeatedly. Identifying with its musical and literary content, it thus became part of a 
self-nationalisation process and demarcation of both a national and local border town 
identity.  
 
                                                 
46
 One song we learned in the Ulpan was ‘Jerusalem of Gold’ (Yerushalayim Shel Zahav) by Naomi 
Shemer (1930-2004).  Considered the ‘first lady of Israeli song’, many of her compositions resemble 
anthems with deep national and emotional chords. The explicitly patriotic and nostalgic lyrics often refer 
to an idealised Biblical landscape. She wrote her most famous song ‘Jerusalem of Gold’ three weeks 
before the Six-Day War in 1967 and added another verse after Israel occupied East Jerusalem and gained 
access to the Western Wall. The original song describes the Jewish people’s two thousand year longing to 
return to Jerusalem after the destruction of the second Temple. The final verse is a celebration of 
Jerusalem’s unification under Israeli control. In 1968, a member of the Israeli parliament, Uri Avnery, 
proposed that the song should become the new Israeli anthem. The proposal was ultimately rejected, but 
the nomination was indicative of the strong emotional response many Israelis had to the melody and 
lyrics. Sabina, an artist friend from a northern Kibbutz, once told me, quite emotionally, that she had 
never felt more ahava (love) for Israel than when she first heard Shemer’s song.   
47
 The song was written and sung by Uzi Hitman, to commemorate the Israeli-Egyptian peace process in 
1978.  
48
 “This particular refrain was bizarrely humming material during the second Lebanon war in 2006, a 
bitterly ironic coping mechanism pitted against the overwhelming national chorus for attack” (Shabi 
2009:139).  
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The enemy within  
 
At the beginning of each class we spent half an hour to an hour discussing various 
topics (aktualia) ranging from socio-economic issues, to political and historical events 
(Holocaust, Arab-Israeli war etc). Judith was somewhat tolerant of differences of 
opinion, but such differences had their limits. An integral part of teaching us what 
should be said was teaching us what should not be said, the very limits to speech itself. 
Judith was in a significant position of power to shape and distribute images of 
Israeliness. The history and topics she taught were grounded in the dominant ethno-
national logic and exposed the students to partial history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 
her ethos, belonging to Israeli society entailed embracing a Western and civilised self 
and drawing strict boundaries in relation to Arab others. During the build up to the war 
on Gaza the aktualia topic of conversation was the escalating conflict and attempts at 
moral legitimisation of potential war. Judith expressed her view about the situation in 
Gaza and the border town of Sderot:  
 
They (Hamas) kill innocent people in Sderot. But if we (Israel) cut off the electricity 
supply to Gaza, our own court will rule against it! They say Palestinians will die in the 
hospitals. But it is a very difficult situation. It is war. They don’t want peace and they 
don’t want Jews here. They hide behind their women and children. I can tell you a story 
about a group of Israeli soldiers that were going to arrest Hamas members. But they hid 
in a cave, and in front of that cave they had placed a pregnant woman. So the soldier 
could do nothing, because they respect life. We (the Israelis) respect life. 
 
 Judith’s emphasis on ‘respect’ reflects the view often propagated by the Israeli 
government that IDF is “the most moral army in the world49”. 
On Thursday, the 20
th
 November 2008, we opened the class discussion with 
another current topic, discussing the break down of a six-month cease-fire between 
Israel and Hamas-governed Gaza. The towns bordering Gaza were hit by rocket fire and 
the Minister of Defence, Ehud Barak, said he was ready to implement “tough measures” 
against Hamas. Judith asked Sharbiel what he thought Israel should do. He responded 
enthusiastically with a conspicuous patriotism that Israel should hit Gaza with a military 
                                                 
49
 Even after the IDF military operation Cast Lead in 2008/2009, which killed hundreds of civilians, the 
Minister of Defense, Ehud Barak said that once again “IDF had proved to be one of the most moral 
armies in the world” (Finkelstein 2011:93). 
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strike. Judith nodded her head in agreement. “The people of Sderot have suffered a 
great deal and lived with rocket fire from Gaza. This can not continue.”  
She turned to me and asked me about my opinion. I said that I could not agree 
with their view and that there must be more peaceful solutions.  Judith seemed upset as 
she said suspiciously:  
 
I know it is difficult for you. I know. An Arab woman in Gaza is also a mother. But at 
one point you need to decide whether you are with the country or against the country. Look at 
Sharbiel. He is not Jewish, but he still loves the country. You see, Cathrine. You remember 
Gabi, the other Sadalnik that studied with us? He was the most Zionist in class. Whenever 
someone spoke out against Israel, he would defend her! 
 
Whenever we discussed a highly sensitive and engaging topic such as the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict Judith became less tolerant of the variation in opinion. She 
changed into a motherlike figure, treating the students who criticized Israeli militarism 
like ignorant children lacking deep identification with the Jewish nation-state. As a state 
representative, Judith contributed to the social production of anti-Arab discrimination 
by exposing her view of the Arab other as the eternal enemy. Judith shared her personal 
political views only a month before Israel launched Operation Cast Lead and invaded 
Gaza on December 27th.
50
 Her views reflected the views of the government: that the 
invasion was an act of self-defence to protect Israeli civilians.
51
 Judith’s anti-Arab 
views and moral justification for the war were shared by many of my informants, who 
during the build up to the war, and in the midst of it fashioned themselves as patriotic 
citizens.  
In class I noted how two tzadalnikim (a term ascribed to former soldiers of the 
South Lebanon army) who had obtained Israeli citizenship in 2001 faced with this 
suspicion of being Arab enemies within the Jewish state and not properly committed to 
Israel’s future, fashioned themselves into loyal individuals.52 Nadal and Sharbiel had 
                                                 
50
 The war on Gaza evoked widespread criticism of what Amnesty International called “22 days of death 
and destruction” (Finkelstein 2010:14). 
51
 Chapter four deals further with the strategic role of peripheral border towns in the moral legitimisation 
of warfare.  
52
 The term comes from TSADAL or the acronym for “Tzva Drom Levanon” (meaning “the South 
Lebanon Militia”). The Russian or Yiddish word suffix connote affectionate smallness or cuteness. 110 
high-ranking officers of the South Lebanon Militia and their families obtained Israeli citizenship after the 
war in 2006 and many of them now live in Kiryat Shemona. 
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joined the ulpan for two months in late Autumn 2008 after having lost their job at the 
Gibor textile factory which had recenlty closed. When Judith asked Nadal to introduce 
himself to the rest of the class he responded with a standard Lebanese (usually 
Christian) line: “I am from Lebanon. I am a Christian but I am not an Arab. We are 
descendants of the Phoenicians.” Throughout the two months they attended they seemed 
eager to please Judith by demonstrating their devotion to Zionism and their contempt 
for Palestinians and Muslims in particular. Judith in turn was thrilled with their support 
of the Jewish state, and labelled them “good Zionists and good Arabs” that “the Israeli 
state had trusted with the privilege of guarding the lives of Israelis.” 
The relationship between Judith and the Lebanese students demonstrates the 
complex relation between loyalty and insiderness in the context of language learning. 
Mastering the national language is a major asset in countering one’s outsider status but 
this alone is not sufficient. Equally important is the ability to include oneself in the 
dominant national ethos by holding accepted views and morals. By identifying strongly 
with hegemonic ideas and values, the Lebanese students symbolically transcended their 
backgrounds to become honorary Israelis. They also secured the prospects of obtaining 
work, as this group is often employed in the security sector. In exchange for belonging 
and gaining employment opportunities, they were largely expected not to criticise Israel.  
Few ulpan participants objected to the stereotypical descriptions of the 
Palestinians as violent and irrationally emotional (typified by the image of the Hamas 
terrorist).  I do not suggest that the students followed or shared the scriptural meaning of 
the narratives presented. Although we as students had to follow the teacher’s sometimes 
vacuous rhetoric, we did not embrace it uncritically. The British female student from a 
local Kibbutz was overtly critical about the militaristic nature of Israeli society. Outside 
the classroom, other ulpan students criticised such narratives as unfair and referred to 
their own Arab acquaintances.  
 
The harsh reality of war  
 
Two years earlier, during a one-month intensive Hebrew Course at Ulpan Akiva in 
Netanya, I witnessed similar negotiations over claims to national loyalty. During this 
introductory beginners’ class (kitah alef), I did have sufficient knowledge of Hebrew to 
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comprehend the conversations conducted in everyday life. Nevertheless, we were 
exposed to nationalist discourse in various arenas, from the classroom to museum visits. 
We were taught how to love the nation phenomenologically as patriotic sentiments were 
blended with other ordinary matters such as singing, hiking and eating together. This 
linking of the personal body and the body of the land (guf ha’uma) is also known as a 
practice IDF operates to instil national unity and loyalty (Weiss 2003:43). Combat 
troops are required to experience the land of Israel “through the belly”- to “walk every 
corner of Israel, lie in ambush in every valley, sit for days in look-out posts and learn 
every bush and every clod of soil in the landscape” (Roumani 1980:99 in Weiss 2003).  
As in Kiryat Shemona, the program consisted of students with varying 
motivations for attending the Ulpan. For ten new immigrants from Russia it was a 
requirement and they continued to study for five more months after the intensive 
summer course. For American, French, South-African and Mexican Jewish tourists, it 
was an opportunity to strengthen their Zionist or religious identity or to ‘experience’ 
Israel before making a decision about whether to move there or not. For a medical 
doctor from Hebron, learning Hebrew was a purely instrumental act in order to obtain 
better work and higher salary at an Israeli institution. Whereas the tourists were 
conceptualised as potential residents in a future aliyah, the Russians immigrants were 
conceptualised as coming home, returning from exile and they were expected to 
integrate and study Hebrew.  
While the ulpan nourished the participants’ national sentiments, several students 
rejected the dominant version of Israeliness promoted at the centre. During the outbreak 
of what has come to be known as ‘the Second Lebanon War’53 in Israel and the ‘July 
War’ in Lebanon, conflicting views towards the obligation of showing national unity 
became prevalent. On the day of the outbreak of the war, July 12
th
 2006, we were 
visiting the town of Acre, thirty kilometres north of Haifa. During a boattrip, we saw 
smoke rising from the horizon. As we returned to the ulpan, several participants 
                                                 
53
 The war began when Hezbollah militants fired rockets at Israeli border towns as a diversion for a 
missile attack on two armoured tanks patrolling the Israeli side of the border, killing two soldiers. Two 
more soldiers were kidnapped, and five killed in a failed rescue attempt. Israel responded with airstrikes 
and artillery fire that indiscriminately killed civilians on a massive scale. The war killed at least 1,200, 
people mostly Lebanese citizens, severely damaged Lebanese civil infrastructure and displaced 
approximately one million Lebanese (Human Rights Watch, August 2006, retrieved on 12
th
 November 
2011). Forty-three Israeli civilians were killed. Thousands  of civilians fled from these regions toward the 
central towns and cities, while others, mostly poor residents, took refuge in bomb shelter (Tzfadia 
2011:117). 
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expressed their worries and concerns. They felt that they had been poorly informed 
about the escalating conflict and that they were shielded from the harsher reality of 
Israeli society. The following day their frustrations intensified. The language centre was 
located close to an IDF military base, and it became increasingly difficult to study due 
to the loud noise from the Apache helicopters. During breaks students ran to watch the 
news in the lobby reception area. Within three days, approximately half of the summer 
students decided to leave. Some had relatives abroad who were worried about them.  A 
couple of students from the United States said that it was not their war and that it was 
difficult to be nationalistic about a country you did not live in. A young student 
expressed doubts about the government’s military strategy and the human suffering it 
caused. Other American students became fiercely nationalistic and argued that Israel 
deserved unconditional support and defence by Jews worldwide. Loyalty and 
affiliations were shaped by several factors and the students spoke and behaved in highly 
conflicting and even confrontational ways. However, the common sentiment for the 
summer students was that they felt uncomfortable with being exposed to the harsh 
realities of war which did not correspond with the images of peaceful integration 
promoted at the ulpan.  
The summer ulpan in Netanya and the ulpan in the border town of Kiryat 
Shemona  focused on nurturing an ethno-religious and national identification with the 
Israeli state. In contrast to these two, the ulpan I attended at the University of Haifa 
Autumn 2007 and Spring 2008 was promoting a discourse of multiculturalism. In 
comparison with the nationalist rhetoric of the ulpan teacher in Kiryat Shemona, the 
teacher in Haifa never shared her personal political views, and focused more on asking 
the students questions about Israeli society and current events. She often let us initiate 
conversations, sometimes based on practical difficulties we encountered in our daily 
lives.  
The teaching method was different, with more written exams. We were also 
allowed to choose topics we wanted to give a presentation on. However, a key point is 
that none of the students were in the process of doing aliyah. Although a few were 
contemplating doing it in the future, the main aim of the programme did not seem to be 
producing a quick and deep identification with the Israeli nation-state. More than the 
two other ulpanim that instructed coping strategies of salvanot (patience) and koach 
(strength), the Haifa teaching was focused on grammar. The students were also 
younger, more educated and highly conscious of the political situation and avoided 
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political talk in class, perhaps a strategy to avoid confrontations.  
In all three ulpanim I attended the students maintained their own interpretive 
space where there was room for manoeuvre. However, the boundaries of the nation 
appeared more closed in the ulpanim targeting new immigrants and residents in a 
deprived town valued historically as a frontier settlement. In Kiryat Shemona the 
Hebrew language class was more an explicit site of indoctrination than in Netanya and 
Haifa. For the students, there was less room to protest the ulpan instructor’s state and 
self-appointed mission to persuade students into national loyalty and residency. The 
students, most of whom were placed on the bottom rungs of the ladder of the Israeli 
ethnocracy, had used government subsidies to purchase affordable housing and were 
still highly dependent on state benefits. They thus seemed more inclined to subscribe to 
the canonical symbols of Israeliness. For individuals living in a stigmatised periphery, 
this endorsement of national unity and self-fashioning as loyal, served as a strategy for a 
promise of upward social mobility and a better future.  
  
The nationalization of death  
 
In addition to nationalist education in the IDF, schools and on television, one way the 
Israeli state strives to instill a sense of national cohesion is through public state events. 
These events are part of the socialisation process that teaches citizens desirable 
behaviour and values. They are aimed at directing feelings, ideas and people through 
certain kinds of practice (Handelman 2004:4). For Emile Durkheim, the main purpose 
of commemorations and public festivals was to ensure continuity and to serve as 
mechanisms of social integration. In 1915, he wrote: 
 
There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at 
regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity 
and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means 
of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one 
another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments, hence come ceremonies which 
do not differ from regular religious ceremonies…What essential difference is there 
between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principle dates of the life of Christ, 
or of Jews remembering the exodus form Egypt…and a reunion of citizens 
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commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event 
in the national life (1982:427).  
 
Anthony Smith has concluded that much of what Durkheim wrote about the 
totemic rites and symbols of Australian tribes “applies with far greater force to 
nationalist rites and symbols” (Smith 2004: 27). If the nation is a community that one is 
willing to die for, then it must be capable of touching very intense emotions. People do 
not sacrifice their lives for the nation itself but for its symbols that have the power to 
instil passions and profound emotion in its followers. The symbols must simultaneously 
justify a power structure and give meaning to people’s experiences in order to motivate 
them to give personal sacrifices for the nation. Nations are thus similar to symbols and 
gather individuals in a “symbolic presence of the dead, the living and the unborn 
members of society” (ibid: 223). In contrast to Durkheim and Smith’s functionalist 
argument about the integrative nature of symbols and rituals, we will see below that 
state events reveal tensions, contradictions and conflicting positions regarding the 
official categorisation of national belonging.  
Generations of Israeli youth have been educated and socialised in the ideal that it 
is ultimately honourable to sacrifice oneself for their country (Zerubavel 1997). Joseph 
Trumpeldor’s supposedly final words uttered in Hebrew: “tov lamut ba’ad artzenu” (“It 
is good to die for our Land”) emerged as an almost sacred credo in the eyes of the 
haluzim (pioneers). Since then, the defence of the Tel-Hai settlement has emerged into a 
sacred story and symbol of patriotism and steadfastness in the national Israeli culture.
54
  
The Tel-Hai museum, located north of Kiryat Shemona, symbolically aligned the heroic 
death of the early pioneers to the current obligation of sacrificing oneself for the sake of 
the national whole. 
 In Israel, civil religion is expressed both in myth, ceremony and the IDF. 
Through compulsorily military conscription and culture, Israeli citizens are taught to 
build sacred ties to a homeland worthy of both praise and sacrifice. Israel conscripts the 
majority of its Jewish citizens. Military service is mandatory for both young men and 
women, except for Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox Jews, who are exempt or who enrol 
voluntarily. Men serve three years while women commonly serve two, and men are 
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 The Tel-Hai settlement was founded in 1916 by a group of Hashomer guards, an organisation that 
believed that only Jews should guard Jewish settlements. After the First World War, Tel-Hai and other 
Galilee settlements were transferred to French rule and suffered in the Arab revolt against the French (KS 
museum leaflet).   
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called to miluim (reserve duty) regularly until the age of at least fifty-two. The result has 
made the Israeli civilian as Yigal Yadin, the IDF chief of staff who designed the system 
put it, “a soldier on ten months leave” (Yadin quoted Ben-Eliezer 1998:321).55 
Heroic death is commemorated throughout Israel and every combat casualty 
receives considerable coverage in the daily newspapers (Merom 2003:170). There are 
vast numbers of war memorials and shrines where commemoration rites are held at 
thirty-nine military cemeteries throughout the country (Lomsky-Federer & Ben-Ari 
1999). Individual and collective battle causalities are remembered in the names of 
streets, hills, waterways, public parks, buildings and other sites almost everywhere in 
Israel.  In Kiryat Shemona, two streets in the main centre were named after two fallen 
soldiers, Dan Dayan and Uri Ilan.
56
 A memorial wall was constructed to commemorate 
fallen soldiers. Beneath the names of fallen soldiers was a large blank space waiting to 
be engraved with more names. The empty spaces can be seen as a reminder of 
existential uncertainty, of war as an ongoing and proximate event to which citizens are 
obliged to sacrifice their lives.  
The nation-in-arms comes to the fore on Remembrance Day for the War Dead 
and Victims of Terror.
57
 The Israeli ministry of Foreign Affairs states the following 
about the commemoration on their website:  
 
Yom Hazikaron is a day of collective and personal anguish mingled with awe and 
honour for the fallen. It is a day on which the living rededicate themselves to the State 
of Israel, so that they may be worthy of the sacrifice of those who died for its survival 
(www.mfa.gov.il/, accessed 10
th 
October 2009).  
 
The narrative presented is one of Israelis expected to remember and internalise 
the deaths of thousands into a communal sense of grief. It is the embodiment of the 
military state of the past, present and future. The national ideology of commemoration 
constructs a narrative of emobodiment through which (the corpses of) fallen soldiers 
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 Chapter four deals in more detail with military service and the rise of Mizrahim in IDF.  
56
 Haim Roz was a Mapai local representative in Kiryat Shemona in 1949 and chairman of the street-
naming committee that named the streets after his two former students (Tsipan 1953:48).  
57 The commemoration of victims of terror was included in 1999 as a consequence of Israel’s experience 
with terror directed against civilians over the past two decades. Military death is not always heroic, but 
accidents, suicides or soldiers killed by friendly fire are also commemorated on this day.  
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become symbols and guardians of some collective body (Weiss 2005:5). The living 
generation, by identifying with self-sacrificial death, turns death and defeat into life and 
victory. A glorification of death gathers the dead, living and unborn and glides into a 
limitless future.  
Whether conceptualised as religious or secular, most nation-building projects are 
endowed with sacredness. Chosenness and other religious motifs, myths and symbols 
are “deep cultural resources” that continue to provide the “basic cultural and ideological 
building blocks” central to the discursive or iconic representation of self and others 
(Smith 2003:254-5). The very distinction between national and religious identites is 
therefore problematic, particularly where the construction of ethnic identities is 
concerned. National identities in Europe were formed by Christian theological discourse 
and preserved, even in a secularised form, aspect originating from theological 
discussion after the Reformation (Jamal 2001:283). Zionist nation-builders utilised 
symbols of traditional religion and recognised the importance of traditional ceremonies 
and holidays. Berl Katznelson, one of socialist Zionism’s foremost thinkers, stated that: 
“the Jewish year is full of days whose depth of meaning is nowhere surpassed. It is the 
interest of the Jewish labor movement to squander the forces latent in them” (quoted in 
Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983:48). Ben-Gurion used exsisting structures of sentiments 
to ‘sacralise the nation’. He conceptualised the Bible as the identity card of the Jewish 
people, as well as the proof of its claim to the land of Israel. His concept of history is 
clear and straightforward:  
 
When we went into exile, our nation was uprooted from the soil in which the Bible had 
grown, and torn the political and spiritual reality in which it had formed(…) In exile, 
our nation was disfigured and the image of the Bible likewise deformed. Christian Bible 
researchers, with their Christian and anti-Semitic aims, turned the Bible into a plinth for 
Christianity, and even Jewish commentators, who had been removed from the 
environment of the Bible, its spiritual and material climate, could no longer understand 
the Holy Book properly. Only now, when we are again a free nation in our country, 
breathing once more the air which enveloped the Bible as it took shape, has the time 
come, I believe, in which we can perceive the nature and truth of the Bible, historical, 
geographical, as well as religious and cultural (Ben-Gurion quoted in Sand 2009:109).  
 
Israel’s three national days, the Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Remembrance 
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Day,
58
 Remembrance Day for the War Dead and Independence Day, are presented by 
the State as secular, but they have deep religious underpinnings.
59
 As historian Saul 
Friedlander notes, through the close association of these three commemorations “the 
traditional (Israeli) mythic pattern of catastrophe and redemption is forcefully 
reaffirmed” (Friedlander in Confino et all 2008:251).60  
Yom HaZikaron (Remembrance Day) is widely observed throughout all sectors 
of Israeli society, exception most Arabs and non-Zionist Haredi Jews. Druze and 
Bedouin, many of whom have served in Israeli military are exceptions, as some do 
attend the commemoration rituals.
61
 Like other Jewish holidays, Remembrance Day 
begins the preceding night at sunset. Like Holocaust day, it is marked by a nationwide 
tzfirah (siren), accompanied by two minutes of silence. Israeli citizens are expected to 
stop their activities to pay tribute to the fallen soldiers. Even drivers exit from their cars 
on highways to take part in the commemoration. The first nation wide siren at 8 PM 
marks the beginning of Memorial Day and the second at 11 AM is sounded immediately 
prior to the public recitation of prayers in the military cemeteries. All places for public 
entertainment like cinemas or restaurants are closed for twenty-four hours (from sunset 
to sunset). Flags are flown at half-mast, the radio stations play melancholic, patriotic 
songs, and military orchestras perform IDF songs. Drawing upon the intimacy of home 
and family, the daily newspapers portray the lives of fallen soldiers, and TV channels 
screen interviews with their family members. Numerous public ceremonies are held 
throughout Israel, and the education and university system arrange ceremonies for 
students and teachers.  
                                                 
58
 Through the enactment of Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day Law in 1959 the Israeli 
State claimed exclusivity on the memory of the Holocaust. From the inception of the State of Israel, 
Mizrahim have been socialized into denying their own displacement trauma. In Israel, the diasporic 
national trauma preferred by politicians, media, and the educational system, is the Holocaust.   
59
These three days are not part of the liturgy in synagogue, but attuned with it. For Orthodox Haredi Jews, 
Independence Day is a religious holiday because they believe that the establishment of Israeli marked the 
beginning of messianic redemption, and they add a special prayer of thanksgiving, hallel (Goldman 
2000:172). 
60
 When I observed the commemoration even in Haifa, a group of young religious men and women 
recited tehilim (Psalms) in front of the stage after the official closing of the ceremony, showing the sacred 
meaning given to the holiday.   
61
 After 1954 Arab citizens were exempted from military conscription because the military leadership did 
not want to risk recruiting soldiers who were stigmatised because they were 
Permanently tainted with the suspicion of treachery. Exceptions were the Druze and parts of the Bedouin
 
community who accepted compulsory military conscription in exchange for official recognition as a 
community in their own right, thus entering into nothing less than a ‘blood pact.’ This gave them semi-
autonomy in the management of their internal affairs and allowed them to enjoy a status distinct from that 
of Arabs of other religious affiliations. 
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Presenting united soldiers in the sunset 
 
The Israeli Memorial Day YomHaZikaron illustrates the profound meaning giving to 
death and its power in the service to the nation. The day is constructed to unify the 
citizens of Israeli with the memory of the state’s fallen soldiers. It links the lives of 
citizens to the life and faith of the nation-state, by focusing on the mourning nation-in-
arms and heroism through death.  
A nation-wide siren marked the opening of the public Remembrance Day 
ceremony in Haifa Remembrance Garden I attended on May 7
th
 2008. The audience, 
counting approximately eight hundred people, stood still while the memorial torches 
were lit and the Israeli flag lowered to half-mast. The assembly on stage was dressed in 
white (except the three female choir members doing their army service who were 
wearing their IDF uniforms). The choir performed a popular song by Ehud Manor; Ein 
li Eretz Acheret (I have no other homeland), while the list of all the fallen soldiers and 
victims of terror from Haifa were projected across the screens.
62
 At this stage of the 
ceremony I noted visible tearful eyes and heard a few quiet sobs. 
 
 
I have no other homeland 
Even if my land is burning 
One Hebrew word burrows 
Into my veins, into my soul  
With an aching body  
A hungry heart, 
This is my home. 
 
Following Manor’s sentimental song, an artist read the text Yizkor (may (God) 
remember) from the root word zakhor, remember. 
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 Ehud Manor (1941-2005) was an Israeli songwrite who often wrote lyrics for some of the monst 
canoncial Israeli-Ashkenazi pop songs. “I have no other homeland” was written in 1982 during the ‘War 
of Attrition’, during which Manor’s younger brother was killed (Gordis 2006). Manor wrote the song as a 
response of the old guard Ashkeanzi Isral becoming anxious about the Mizrahization of the public sphere. 
Ironically, the song transgressed ethnic boundaries and gained national coninicity when Corinne Al’al, an 
out-lesbian singer of Tunisian origin, adopted it as part of her repertoire (Lavie 2012).  
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May God remember the valiant men and women who braved mortal danger in the days 
of struggle prior to the establishment of the State of Israel and the soldiers who fell in 
the wars of Israel. 
May the people of Israel cherish them in their memory; let them mourn the splendour 
youth, the altruism of valour, the dedication of will and the dignity of self-sacrifice, 
which came to an end on the battlefield. 
May the loyal and courageous heroes of freedom and victory be sealed forever within 
the hearts of all Israel, in this generation and forevermore. 
(http://www.izkor.gov.il/izkor11b.htm. Accessed on 5
th
 January 2010) 
 
Though the ceremony was brief in time, it illustrated that more struggles will 
come in the future, thus creating a cult of insecurity where the only stable common 
denominator is the strength of the IDF. The ultimate sacrifices of the past rely on the 
willingness for sacrifices in the future.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A choir performing in front of a soldier in a glowing sunset. 
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Figure 5. The national flag waving over the blooming land. 
 
The event relied heavily on a variety of sensory effects, including music and 
movement to evoke emotion. The myth of the glamour of military service was projected 
on five monumental screens. Heroic imagery of soldiers in a glowing red sunset fully 
equipped with their guns faded into pictures of parachutes with red tulips that faded into 
an image of a waving Israeli flag. The images were of only male soldiers, thus showing 
how the nation-in-arms was gendered as a clear masculine creature; strong, resilient and 
well-built. The masculine militarised body was linked to the body of the blooming land. 
The uses of national symbols and metaphors such as torches, flags, choreography, 
collages and coloured lights were directed towards invoking a sentimental mood and 
identification with the State. As is frequent in Zionist cosmology, there was a deliberate 
knitting together of timelines and place makers where the present and past were 
identified in the same space (Handelman 2004:121). During the memorial services, even 
exclusively Jewish symbols such as the Tallit (the Jewish prayer shawl) and the Magen 
David (Shield of David) implied continuity with the past and a pattern of destruction 
and rebirth.  
There are contradictions of citizenship, nationality and religion when a Druze 
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officer stands in front of the Israeli flag.
63
 Whether he is challenging conceptions of 
nationhood and citizenship, or is an ‘honorary Jew’ he is inevitably ambiguously 
positioned within the event. The same contradiction was evident when he sang the 
words of the national anthem, HaTikva: “while yet within the heart, inwardly the Jewish 
soul yearns”. From the outset, all possibility of psychological identification with the 
state, other than through conversion to Judaism or military sacrifice, was excluded, 
since the symbols of the State are derived from the Jewish religious tradition.  
In his speech, the mayor of Haifa, Yona Yahav, stated that on this day the ethnic 
divisions in Israel were of no importance, “because we are all protecting the same 
country”. A Druze military officer from Daliat al-Carmel, a village outside Haifa, said 
that the Druze were just as ready to sacrifice their lives for the nation as Israel’s Jewish 
citizens because they, too, “had no other homeland”, invoking the sentimental lyrics and 
mood of Ehud Manor’s song.  The mayor’s speech, stressing the unification of Israeli 
citizens, showed how the state event, in the absence of political consensus, presented 
solidarity and unity through embracing the nation-in-arms. The mayor reinforced an 
image of the nation as a deep horizontal comradeship as argued by Benedict Anderson 
(1991:7). By claiming the unity of the people on this particular day, he acknowledged 
the disruption to unity posed by ethnic and class divisions. From the perspective of 
nationalism from below, the consequence is that full national belonging for non-Jews 
exists only on days of national celebration, whereas on other days of the year it does 
not. Heroic death and support for fighting provide a promise of equality. If a non-Jewish 
citizen cannot live as a complete Israeli, he or she can certainly die as one. Moreover 
death, since it purifies, is the ultimate form of atonement.  
 
Consuming the nation 
 
While much has been written about the creation of state events, less has been said about 
the various ways in which their audiences consume them. Nationalism studied ‘from 
above’ necessarily neglects the role of individuals in the creative construction and 
consumption of the nation (Cohen 1996:804). In his study of Scottish nationalism, 
Cohen argues that the multi-vocal nature of the nation as a symbol has the ability to 
mean different things to different people, while at the same time suggesting unified 
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 The Israeli flag was designed for the Zionist Movement in 1891.  
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identity. He argues that “regardless of the nature of the regime, it is crucial to an 
understanding of how individuals perceive their selves and, therefore, to how they 
perceive their nations” (Cohen 1996:806). This insight has consequences for how we 
approach agency in the anthropological study of nationalism from below. Although the 
state is constructing national meanings for sites and symbols, citizens do contest and 
negotiate state events and celebrations sanctifying the national collectivity.
64
 Passions 
can be mobilised but not at all times, easily or automatically (Brubaker 2006:36).  
The nationalisation of military deaths and mourning at Remembrance Day 
generated conflicting responses. For Lior, a twenty-four year old student I met in Haifa, 
the event revealed a tension between national observance and private commemoration. 
Lior felt alienated from large, state ceremonies, and argued that a private Kibbutz 
ceremony provided a more authentic and personal atmosphere. Traditionally, many war 
victims were soldiers from the kibbutzim, and Lior himself had lost an uncle in the Yom 
Kippur War. However, instead of commemorating his death through national grief, his 
family demanded recognition for the singularity of the tragedy. Lior expressed 
ambiguous feelings with the staged transition from Memorial Day to Independence 
Day. The grief he felt for his lost relatives, would contradict the public expression of joy 
and celebration. Lior’s strategy for dealing with this tension was to avoid the big masses 
and stay at the northern Kibbutz.  
Another challenge to the state’s appropriation of memory and death appears in 
Eyal Sivan’s documentary Yizkor: Avdei hazikaron (Yizkor: The Slaves of Memory, 
1993). The film critiques how the trauma of the Holocaust is appropriated by the Israeli 
government as an ideological tool to create unity.
65
 The title reflects the conclusion of 
the film, that citizens are slaves of memory. However, the movie director Sivan has 
himself moved to Western-Europe, a position that stresses detachment from the 
collective experience and national obligation to commemorate (Sicher 1998:155).  
Omer, an Israeli who I met at the University of Haifa, was equally critical of 
state-orchestrated rituals of commemoration. Like the movie director, Omer was 
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 This will be elaborated on in the following chapters.   
65
 In the film ‘Defamation’ (2009) the Israeli director Yoav Shamir deals with a similar issue. The 
Holocaust is appropriated for nationalist causes and collective anxiety and fear are its direct 
consequences. “We are raised to believe that we are hated”, says an Israeli high school girl on her way to 
a concentration camp in a Poland she believes is essentially antisemitic. The phenotypes, last names, and 
accents of the Israeli schoolchildren indicate that the participants were Mizrahim. The paradox of the 
participants’ ethnic composition en their emotional responses during the school trip has been discussed by 
Mizrahi alternative media.  
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comfortably placed in the Israeli upper-middle class and could afford to express 
detachment from hegemonic values. Although he was a former solider, he rejected the 
state’s effort to create a militarised and morally unified nation. Disillusioned and upset 
with his past military experience, he did not attend any state ceremonies. Having served 
in an elite unit of the army in Hebron for two years, he had witnessed humiliating 
practices towards Palestinians that had led him to object to the military demands of the 
state. He now referred to himself a refusnik, one of around 2,000 Israeli soldiers that so 
far have refused to serve in the Palestinian occupied territories.
66
 Around 250 soldiers 
have served prison terms for various levels of refusal. Although they are numerically 
few, their stand provides a model for resistance and poses a direct challenge to the 
hegemony of the Israeli military and their world-view (Perets 2004:10).  
Omer rejected the demands of the nation-in-arms by refusing to serve in the IDF 
(Israeli Defence Forces). He was almost jailed when he failed to show up for his reserve 
duty. Emotionally he said that he had no belief in the army: “The army gave me 
nothing, just a huge scratch. The problem is that most people believe in all the myths 
the system serves them. I try to avoid it. Yesh gvul. (There is a limit).” Omer was not 
polititcally active in any organisation, but he sympathised with the Palestinians. Two 
hours before the state ceremony in the Remembrance Garden was about to begin, I was 
invited to the flat of his friends in downtown Haifa, located on Balfour Street. The walls 
were covered with symbols of political sympathies and activism: Palestinian flags and 
Nakba posters. Omer spoke passionately about the mistakes he believed the Israeli State 
was making in its treatment of Palestinians. While his old friends from the army would 
attend the IDF ceremony, he chose to find “the most anarchist space he could think of”. 
At the entrance of the Remembrance Garden where the ceremony was about to start, 
Omer left me. He seemed slightly uncomfortable, perhaps knowing that this was the 
first year he would avoid the national commemoration.  
The efforts of the state to produce national obedient citizens failed in Omer’s 
case. He challenged the principle that militarism should be an intrinsic part of 
Israeliness through conscientious objection. Similar decisions of dissent are made 
overwhelmingly by those who are native-born, Ashkenazi, secular or middle class and  
who are situated in urban centres (Cohen 2008:63). In contrast, the peripheral Mizrahi 
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 There are not many Israelis who identify themselves as refusniks and the stigma attached to not 
supporting or cooperating with the army is high. In March 2005, 635 refusniks signed a letter and 
established the organisation Courage to Refuse (http://www.calpeacepower.org/0101/refusnik.html).  
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ethno-class is more inclined to support militaristic ethno-nationalism in the hope of a 
rise in status and social mobility (Tzfadia 2011:12). Although Omer’s refusal to do his 
military service was true of only a small minority in Israel, his reservations are not 
uncommon. His stand also has important consequences for how we treat agency. Even 
within a militarised state such a Israel, where the lines between the army and society are 
blurred, Israeli citizens do re-negotiate the official demands of the nation-state.  
 
Ignoring the Sirens of remembrance    
 
Israel is unique among other countries in that its Remembrance Day is adjacent to its 
Independence Day. The construction of the content of these days and their dates is 
naturalised by their intimate connection and resemblance to religious holidays and 
rituals.
67
 YomHaZikaron glides into the festive Yom HaAtzmaut (Independence Day) 
and many Israelis spend the day of official mourning preparing for the official joy. 
Twenty minutes to ten in the morning, before the siren (tzfirah) on May 8
th
 2008, I 
entered a grocery store with Eran, a twenty-eight year old student. He was responsible 
for the barbeque preparations for his group of friends, all of whom were middle-class 
Ashkenazim from the wealthy suburb of Ramat HaSharon outside Tel-Aviv. He told me 
in advance that a grocery store was not the ideal place to find oneself during the siren. 
Especially not this particular one because it was run by Russians. A female friend had 
told him that a similar store under Russian management had forced her to serve 
customers during the siren the previous year. 
Standing next to the cheese counter inside the shop, we were prevented from 
hearing the siren itself but an unaffected voice coming from the speaker informed us 
that it had started. "Please value two minutes silence for the commemoration of the 
fallen soldiers and victims of terror.” Eran stood entirely still with his head bowed 
towards the floor, closing his eyes and commemorating. So did most of the other 
customers, but a few continued with their shopping. The voice from the speaker notified 
us that the siren had stopped and we could continue with our grocery shopping. 
Discussing the event with Eran afterwards, he said that perhaps some of the Russians 
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 The symbiotic connection of mourning and joy is integral to Judaism. The fast of Esther precedes the 
gaiety of Purim, Yom Kippur is a few days before Sukkot. During a Jewish wedding ceremony, the 
breaking of the glass recalls the destruction of Jerusalem and precedes the celebration.  
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had not learned or adapted to the national customs or worse, they chose not to respect 
the commemoration. However, it was not as “bad as he had expected and perhaps some 
of them (the Russians) had finally learned”.    
Telling Rinat, a Mizrahi Jewish woman in her early thirties from Haifa, about 
the failure to respect the siren in the grocery store, she seemed shocked and offended. 
She said that none of her friends would dream of not paying respect on Remembrance 
Day. She claimed that almost everyone knew someone who had been killed in war and 
you had to respect those who had sacrificed their lives. Although she did not remember 
how or when she learned the importance of the day, she grew up knowing that “it was 
something serious”. “This day reminds us that we are all together in this.”  
In the short story“Siren”, the Israeli author Etgar Keret deals with the ambiguity 
of national commemoration. A boy avoids being beaten by escaping from his assailant 
while the siren sounds on Holocaust Remembrance Day (Keret 2001). When his story 
was included in the Israeli high school curriculum, a group of teachers refused to teach 
it and gave two reasons. The first was that you couldn’t portray someone who does not 
respect the sound of the siren in a  positive light.  The second was that the teachers 
believed that most of the students were not making a conscious choice about walking 
during the siren’s sound.  The author explained that:  
 
If they’re not aware of the fact that they’re choosing not to walk during the siren, it 
becomes meaningless, because you’re reducing it to a reflex, like when you whistle to a 
dog and it sits. You have to know that you can choose to walk in order to make the 
choice not to walk (Interview with Etgar Keret in www.belivermag.com, accessed on 
24
th
 February 2009).  
 
The teachers believed that the national ritual of observing the siren had become 
entrenched and that this knowledge was taken for granted.  The boy failing to respond 
spontaneously and instinctively to the sound was accused of challenging what was 
considered proper conduct. Native-born Israelis, such as Eran, Rinat and the high-
school teachers, were those who observed the national commemoration and showed 
proper respect for their fallen comrades. Compared with their fluency in the national 
repertoire and its symbolic register, the Russian customers were perceived as suspect 
national subjects just as the fictitious schoolboy in Keret’s short story. Failing to 
perform the national custom, they were accused of being ignorant and assaulting the 
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national tradition.  
 
Flagging the Nation 
 
It is my great pleasure to extend to you from Jerusalem, the eternal capital of the State 
of Israel and the Jewish people, our best wishes on the occasion of Israel’s 60th 
anniversary. Every state needs a dream, a purpose and a moral compass that unites the 
nation and guides its leaders. The establishment of the State of Israel sixty years ago 
signified both the fulfilment of a millennia-long dream and a new beginning. Just as the 
dream of Israel did not end upon the founding of the State, Zionism did not conclude 
when Israel declared its Independence. 
 
From the essay: Building Israel’s Tomorrow Today (2008) by: Tzipi Livin (Former Vice 
prime minister and minister of foreign affairs).  
 
The title of Tsipi Livni’s celebratory essay shows how a connection in time and 
space between the fathers and the ‘forefathers’ of all the members of the present 
community is utilised to promote a united nation in the present. The national celebration 
of Independence Day (Yom Ha’atzmaut) is assembled to nurture this unrestrained 
allegiance and symbolic attachment to the nation-state. Ordinary Israelis are encouraged 
to take part in a range of holiday activities intended to signify and sanctify the existence 
of the Israeli (particularly Jewish) state (Podeh 2011:3).  
I attended and observed the morning of the national celebrations in Haifa and the 
rest of the celebrations in Tel-Aviv where Israeli citizens and tourists from all over the 
world gathered for the celebration of Israel’s 60th anniversary. Concerts featuring Israeli 
music and dance were held all day, and a military parade marched down the main 
streets. Military jets and paratroopers were essential components of the spectacular IDF 
show. Thousands cheered and saluted from the beaches as the Israeli Air Force flew 
above their heads. As evening fell, fireworks were displayed throughout the city.  
National flags are the most external and immediately visible rallying symbols of 
nationality and citizenship, serving as metonyms for the nation at large (Firth 1973 in 
Benei 2008:11). Flags are, in Turner’s terminology condensed symbols as they 
compress a broad range of meanings and are rich in aesthetic and emotional 
connotations (Eriksen & Jenkins 2007:3). For every patriotically waved flag we 
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encounter, many more sit quietly in the background providing daily reminders of 
nationhood. In Israel, the national flag (degel) is not only waved on particular annual 
celebrations. The flag can be seen displayed constantly outside most public buildings 
hanging from the ceiling in shopping centres as well as outside individual homes. The 
nation is flagged daily in the lives of citizens. In Kiryat Shemona, beside the national 
flag, the nation-in-arms was waved. The central bus station was covered with the flags 
of different IDF units and the kiosk was decorated with infantry corps’ shoulder tags. 
Stickers from the Golani brigade, the most highly decorated infantry unit in the IDF, 
were plastered on the cola dispensers. As such, the logic of militaristic ethno-
nationalism infused with religious symbols was on permanent public display, providing 
daily reminders of a nation-in-arms.   
 
 
                
 
Figure 6. The bus station in Kiryat Shemona decorated with national flags and flags from various military 
units. 
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                        Figure 7. A banal reminder of nationhood in a grocery store. 
 
              
 
Figure 8. “The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved 
with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building” (Billig 1995:8). The 
Ministry of Interior (Misrad HaPnim) wrapped in the national flag. 
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In the weeks leading up to the national celebration, the flag was exhibited on an 
extraordinary scale and appeared on all kinds of surfaces. The advertisement industry 
knew how to utilise the occasion, and published all kinds of tempting offers for “only 
60 shekels”, presented with the Israeli flag as the background. Although such overtly 
corporate nationalism, aimed at marketing through the flag, could potentially have a 
numbing effect on consumers, the intent was clear: to utilise patriotism for the increased 
sales of marketed commodities. White and blue Israeli flags were waved 
enthusiastically from cars, balconies, public buildings, rooftops and highways. The non-
profit organization ELEM (for neglected Israeli youth in distress) constructed the 
biggest Israeli flag in the world. The Azrieli centre’s square building in Tel-Aviv was lit 
up by 60.000 bulbs forming an enormous Star of David as a part of their ‘Light of Hope 
Campaign’. I counted passing cars in Haifa for ten minutes and, I noticed that more than 
three out of ten cars had one or two Israeli flags attached to them.  
This massive flagging was heavily assisted by Bank Hapoalim, Israel’s largest 
finance institution, which demonstrated a gesture of corporate patriotism by handing out 
one million flags in the week leading up to Independence Day. Distributed through the 
daily newspaper Maariv, the flag was given as a present accompanied by the text: 
"Israel is celebrating its 60
th
. Let's all join together to mark Israel's 60th Independence 
Day by hanging the flag with pride.” Sheli Yehimovitch, a member of the Knesset, 
called for the flags not to be hung because they were made in China but also because the 
design was wrong. "On the flag distributed by Bank Hapoalim, the Star of David 
appears upside down, resting on two points, which is not how it should be according to 
the law. Had the bank commissioned flags from an Israeli company, this disgrace could 
have been avoided (Israel Hayom 14
th
 May 2008).” That the flag made in China was not 
good enough tells a lot about what counts as a proper national symbol.  
The substantial reproduction and distribution of the flag encouraged public 
patriotism during this particular celebration. However, flagging does not necessarily 
mean that citizens worship the nation blindly. Whenever the flag is flown, it is done so 
by citizens with conflicting views of the nation-state and thier outlook for the future. 
Jewish orthodox and secular, Ashkenazi and Mizrahi, hawks and doves all fly the same 
flag. It is precisely the symbolic unspecificity of the flag that allows different groups to 
identity with it (Eriksen & Jenkins 2007:3). During national celebrations, citizens with 
conflicting views wave the flag, willingly transforming the mass-produced flag into 
their own personal allegiance, tacitly embracing the nation’s symbolic image.  
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I was invited by Eran and his midde-class friends to an outdoor barbecue 
(mangal) a popular Independence Day activity.
68
 Eran had brought collapsible chairs for 
his friends and a large Israeli flag was planted outside the camping tent. The impression 
was of young men and women who had learned to observe the national holidays with 
state-required respect. Some of the men from the group said that it was important to 
celebrate this day, particularly since they considered the Israel/Lebanon war in 2006 a 
military failure. They had been called to active combat and while they were currently 
waiting and preparing in the reserves for the next war they thought it was critical to 
demonstrate support for the Jewish state. Eran passionately articulated his love and 
loyalty to his homeland.  
 
I am proud of being Israeli, and I will fight to protect my country. This is our country, 
we love it and we are proud of it. I think everyone should show that they are happy for 
the country.    
  
The multivocality of flags is evident, but so are their excluding and boundary-
making qualities (Eriksen & Jenkins 2007). For Palestinians, Israel’s independence was 
their catastrophe. There is no place for Arab citizens of Israel who are not in the IDF to 
talk about their loss and sacrifice in traditional ceremonies that emphasise Jewish Israeli 
suffering. Not surprisingly, no Israeli flags were fluttering from the antennas of cars in 
Arab towns or neighbourhoods.
69
 When I shared my plans about going to an Arabic 
village for a commemoration ceremony of al-Nakba, one of the young men at the 
barbecue uttered “are you against Israel”? It seemed like even mentioning the existence 
of another and parallel history not only challenged the ‘collective amnesia’ but was also 
considered to be a disloyal act.  Performing national unity through their participation in 
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 The term mangal was traditionally used to refer to barbercues amongst Mizrahim and connoted low 
culture. In contrast the Asheknazi BBQ was termed bar ba kiyu, and held suburban Amercian 
connotations. With the 1990s Mizrahization of Israeli popular culture, mangal came to be the commonly 
used term for barbecues.   
69
 The annual day of commemoration for the Palestinian people of the anniversary of the destruction of 
their towns and villages and their expulsion from Palestine is held on 15
th
 May. The Israeli Independence 
Day is celebrated with the fifth day of the Jewish month of Iyar. The Jewish calendar is a combination of 
the lunar and Gregorian calendars. As a result of the fluctuating discrepancies between the Gregorian and 
Jewish calendars, sometimes there may be a gap as long as twe weeks between the two events.  
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the celebration seemed particularly important on these days structured around the state’s 
symbolic display of national destruction and rebirth.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has explored how Hebrew language studios and public state events 
promoted a singular vision of the Israeli nation as socially and morally united. Hebrew 
education and state events appealed to Jewish historiography, calendar and symbols to 
install and nurture love and loyalty for the Jewish nation-state. They appropriated 
Jewish tradition and symbols, drawing out long invented strands of continuousness 
between the present and the past to nurture a patriotic national catharsis and national 
belonging. The state-sponsored ulpan in a border town glorified for its steadfastness, 
seemed less open to negotiation and personal agency than in the centre. The ulpan in 
Kiryat Shemona tried to socialise the students to become loyal Israelis through the 
teaching of patriotic songs, historic events and about persons of Jewish importance. 
Students were promised that if they improved their Hebrew, they would become Israelis 
and be able to take part in a bright Israeli future. The teachers encouraged all students, 
including non-Jews, to express political identification with the State of Israel based on a 
Western and Eurocentric model of Israeliness built around the estrangement of Arabs 
and non-Jewish citizens. As such, there were clear continuites between Zionist historical 
and contemporary colonial practices that have worked to demote and marginalised Arab 
culture as a threat to national unity. Arab and Russian students fashioned themselves as 
loyal western national subjects, partly to position themselves on the ethnocratic 
hierarchy of belonging. The Arabs could only go beyond these boundaries by 
demonstrating their love and loyalty or through military sacrifice.     
Although the ulpan and state events presented a coherent message of the 
harmonic integration of a complex heterogeneity of identities, the multicultural 
character of Israeli society challenges this view. When nationalist myths and symbols 
were at odds with lived reality, individuals questioned their content, message and 
purpose. We have seen how a few Israelis from a variety of backgrounds actively 
embraced, rejected or reworked the official state message of a nation with a single will 
and purpose. Some embraced the curriculum and events enthusiastically, some out of 
habit, and others exhibited a noticeable measure of indifference and apathy.  This shows 
how a nationalist message can produced a complex of contradicting stances. The 
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promotion of western Israeliness and anti-Arab intolerance in the ulpan and military 
sacrifice and loyalty in state events, suggests that the crux of political culture in 
contemporary Israel is perhaps not so much about being a Jewish Sate in religious 
terms, but being a ‘non-Arab state’. By itself, the ethno-national ideology, which is one 
of the manifistations of immigrant-settler societies, maintains its supremacy. The next 
two chapters will explore how the Euro-civilisational discourse promoted in the ulpan 
and elsewhere set the terms for the distinction of cultural otherness and self-
identification in Kiryat Shemona.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Civilised Persians and cold Ashkenazim: Negotiating the ethno-racial 
hierarchy   
 
Peripheral nationhood does not only entail negotiation of national belonging amongst 
ordinary women and men at the margins of the state, but also relate to the ambiguities 
involved in people’s ethno-cultural affiliatons. This chapter introduces the two main 
families highlighted in this thesis: the Chackotays and the Zakays, and explores how 
they identified with ethnic categories in which they were classified by dominant society 
and scholarship. The family members were not only entrapped by nationalist ideology, 
but they actively renegotiated their position in the ethnocracy in which their lives were 
entangled. The many non-nationalist self- and other-identifications in town 
demonastated that the nation was not a relevant category in all situations. Through 
stereotypes, ethnicised categorisation and joking, they distanced themselves from the 
negative image of border-Mizrahim that circulated in the Israeli public in order to 
enhance their own social status and self-image. However, the ethno-racial categories 
were often intrinsic to the ethnocracy, thus paradoxically reinforced Zionist ethnic 
hierarchies.  
 
Mizrahi as a category of analysis and category of practice 
 
While macro-studies have productively probed the social construction and effects of 
policies, they have been characterised by what Brubaker defines as groupism where a 
bounded group has been the fundamental analytical unit (1996:2).
70
 As a consequence 
Mizrahim have been presented as singular actors with little agency (beyond the 
collective political appropriation of the Mizrahi label) to negotiate the meaning attached 
to the categories ascribed to them by dominant society.
 
Categories of ethnic belonging exist in discourse and one should not assume that 
they necessarily so exist on the ground. Brubaker argues that studying ethnicity and 
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 Writing from a neo-Marxist approach Swirski treats the “oriental majority” as one homogenous group 
(Swirski 1989). As with the substantialist and realist understanding of nationalism, the subject disappears. 
His groupist account ignores the various socio-economic backgrounds of Mizrahim as well as cultural 
differences between Mizahim and Ashkenazim  
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nationalism from below, the focus should not be the ‘groupness’ of nationalism and 
ethnicity, but what social actors do with nationalist and ethnicised categories. While 
ethnicity is a social and political distinction, it is made and sustained by individual 
agency and has to be explored and unpacked in place, in the political and social contexts 
in which it occurs (Knowles 2003:48). This approach can allow for more refined social 
differences to become apparent and move beyond the rather crude divisions, which have 
informed much work of scholars of Israeli ethnicity.
71
  
 
Mizrahim on the margins  
 
Mizrahim in contemporary Israel differ considerably among themselves in their rates of 
mobility and class position. More than a third of Israelis classified as Mizrahim belong 
socio-economically to the Israeli middle class, and have been more or less assimilated 
into the mainstream of Ashkenazi dominated society through a dual process of de-
Arabisation and Westernisation (Shoat 1989:54). Despite social mobility in Israel, most 
Mizrahim in the peripheral areas of Israel continue to occupy the lower strata of the 
Israeli social ladder. Sociological research shows that there is still an extensive overlap 
between ethnic background and socio-economic position that cut across generations 
(Smooha 1993:7). Gaps between Israeli-born second generation Ashkenazim and 
Mizrahim have not decreased over the past thirty years. Mizrahim only make up a 
quarter of the students in the universities and are still significantly underrepresented in 
the political and non-political elites (Khazzom 2005:2649).  
These gaps are particulary distinct in development towns where Israeli planning 
policies in the Galilee regions have served to consolidate economic gaps between Arab 
and Jews, Mizrahim and Ashkenazim (Schellekens &Anson 2007:159). The neo-liberal 
transformation of the Israeli economy has had a serious impact on the growing 
inequalities between the core and the periphery in Israel. The traditional spatial pattern 
of economic activity is disappearing from the realm of national planning and is being 
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 Zfadia & Yiftachel (2008) have recognized the absence of “the other side” in the scholarly Mizrahi 
debate, namely voices from the Mizrahi ethno-class. They conducted a survey amongst Mizrahim in six 
peripheral development towns, three in the north and three in the south. Their attitudinal questionnaire 
gave a useful and general overview of the national sensibilities, feelings of place, identity and position in 
Israeli society. However, a survey is less suited to capture the nuances of ethnicity in a moving sense of 
place and social landscape (Knowles 2003:42). It cannot properly show how the interviewees articulated 
their own emotions or negotiated the boundaries of the collective.  
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left to the market economy, marginalising the Mizrahim even further (Nitzan & Bichler 
2002:27). A geographical analysis of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)  data 
from 2008 shows that the main subjects of socio-economic gaps live in the peripheral 
areas and that the socio-economic divide between the centre and the periphery is 
growing. Most of Israel’s Ashkenazi population still reside in the central urban areas 
relatively remote from the development towns. In 2004, the Galilee region 
accommodated 680,000 residents, of which 72 percent were Arab, 21 percent residents 
of development towns and 9 percent residents of rural and exurban kibbutzim, 
moshavim and mitzpim. Mizrahim in development town make up 18 per cent of the 
Israeli population, of which about two- thirds  are of Mizrahi origin, and the remaining 
are predominatnely migrants from the former Soviet Union or even less from Ethiopia 
(Yiftachel 2004).    
  In a immigrant-settler society such as Israel the ideological and material 
connections between state and land are maintained. The state holds a monopoly over 
land and planning and grants better conditions to actors who are ideologically identified 
with the state’s interests (Tzfadia 2011:42). The development towns get allocated less 
financial resources than Jewish settlements colonsing the West Bank. The perceived 
contribution to nation-building is also evident in the northern industrial zone, where the 
Kibbutzim have gotten more and better land allocated to them than in Kiryat Shemona. 
Kiryat Shemona, has 14,000 dunams of land (a dunam is a thousand square meters) and 
the surrounding area, which belong to the region’s kibbutzim has a total of 270,000 
dunams. The state has offered economic incentives and tax benefits for the 
establishment of factories in the periphery. About 50 manufacturing plants of various 
sizes are located directly around the town or its surroundings as part of two large 
industrial zones. The industrial zone does not belong to the Kiryat Shemona 
municipality but to the Upper Galilee regional council. Farmland transformed for retail 
use attracts factories that pay taxes to the leaseholders, the kibbutzim. According to a 
survey conducted by Oren Yiftachel in four development towns structurally similar to 
Kiryat Shemona the majority of residents found the state’s policy towards the towns 
discriminatory, particularly in comparison to the state’s treatment of nearby kibbutzim  
(Yiftachel 2006:218).
72
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 The survey was conducted in Shlomi, Beit Shean, Ofakim and Maalot-Tarshiha. 
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The cost of living in Israel’s periphery is higher than that in the center due to the 
distance that results in high transportation and travel costs. Neo-liberal reforms of the 
Histadrut (the Jewish Federation of Labour) starting in the late 1980s have weakened 
organised labour, and the development towns have lost several tax benefits and social 
services previously provided by the state. Several factories, particularly in the textile 
industry, have been closed down or outsourced to countries like Egypt and Jordan 
where labour is cheaper. Mizrahi blue-collar workers were more likely to loose their 
jobs than higher educated Ashkenazim. Other factories also hired semi-legal workers 
from countries ranging from the Philippines to Romania, who earn even less than 
Mizrahi blue-collar workers. The class system and the ethnic division of labour, 
combined with place, are thus central factors in the Mizrahi experience, particularly in 
the development towns where the unemployment rate is high and economic problems 
severe  (Nitzan & Bichler 2002:27). Although the Ashkenazi establishment succeeded 
in assimilating most Mizrahim into Israeli nationality, it also deepened their sense of 
subjugation to Ashkenazi discrimination (Massad 1996: 76). The public’s image of the 
development towns as marginal and stigmatised places also serve to hinder mobility and 
development (Yiftachel 2006:220). Negative migration from Kiryat Shemona  means 
that the town has a long way to go before it reaches the population of forty thousand 
that is a requirement for external investment (Shabi 2009:166). 
The CBS data does not reveal socio-economic disparities among Mizrahim 
themselves in the development towns. A sure avenu to gain entrance or maintain 
membership in the Israeli middle class is through a salaried job with benefits. Hoever, 
many Mizrahim enter the middle class through independendt small business ownership, 
thus avoiding job interviews and application screening by an Ashkenazi, or by a 
Mizrahi who has undergone Ashkenazification. Some of my informants had attained 
middle class status through their own small business.   
 In Kiryat Shemona, the main source of employment is still in manufacturing 
and labour-intensive industries or in the security apparatus. The town also serves as a 
commercial centre for the surrounding communities and some residents are self-
employed in small businesses. Central Bureau of Statistics data from 2008 reveals that 
while the mean national monthly income was 8,000 NIS, the average wage in Kiryat 
Shemona was 5,300 NIS. The average wage was lower than the national average for 
both the self-employed and the salaried employee. The unemployment rate was also 
higher than the national average. According to CBS estimates, 5,400 residents in Kiryat 
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Shemona were living on unemployment benefits, welfare or disability pensions in 2008, 
double the national average. A ranking of Israeli local authorities from 2008 based on 
social and economic parameters of residents, ranked Kiryat Shemona  fifth out of ten 
categories.73 This was above Arab authorities, yet in a low position compared to other 
Jewish local authorities (CBS 2008, accessed 16th December 2011). The percentage of 
students aged 20-29 was 30 percent lower than the Israeli average (Tzfadia 2008:6). The 
socio-economic situation of the residents thus shows how the concept of a Mizrahi 
ethno-class has analytical value at the macro-level if not used as a category of 
identification by all residents on the ground. Similar ethno-class fissures that 
characterise settler societies can be found in virtually all contemporary societies which 
involve encounters between indigenous and migrant groups.  
 
Ethno-racial stereotyping and joking amongst the Chackotay family 
 
The need to construct stereotypes is related to the way in which individuals apply 
standardised templates for making sense of social objects (Brubaker 2006:73). 
Employing Derrida’s concept of difference, which plays on differences as dissimilarity 
and difference as deferral of meaning and closure, Homi Bhabha argues that:  
 
The stereotype is not a simplification because it is a false representation of a given 
reality. It is a simplification because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation that, 
in denying the play of difference…constitutes a problem for the representation of the 
subject in the significations of psychic and social relations (1996:98).  
 
The effectiveness of the stereotype derives from the wish for a fixed relationship 
between the signifier and the signified. Since the signifiers keeps shifting, the 
stereotypes need to be continuously repeated to make them appear as a ‘natural’ way of 
making sense of one’s own and others’ background and being. The following shows 
how ethno-racial categories and stereotypes were used in differentiation and 
symbolisation in everyday life, both reinforcing and challenging the ethnocracy.  
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 The figure might be lower. Two thousand students from the Tel-Hai Academic College have registered 
as living in KS to get benefits, which impacts the 'education' part of the index. However, the majority 
leaves once they have graduated. 
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Benny and Revital Chackotay are a Persian-Jewish married couple in their mid-
sixties. As managers of their own store, they had an above-average income by local 
standards. The Chackotay couple had financed their children’s education in the centre, 
where three out of four children had moved. Their youngest son, Tal, was enrolled at 
the local Yeshivat Hesder, combining military service with Torah studies. Their only 
daughter Keren, her Ashkenazi husband and one-year-old son Hillel lived in Kiryat 
Shemona temporarily after just having finished their engineering degrees at Technion in 
Haifa. While Benny and Revital had contributed financially to the social mobility of 
their children, they rarely left town. They were busy with managing their appliance and 
giftware store named Kol-Bo-Tal. Kol bo means “everything is in it”, and that was true 
for the eclectic mix of items you could find in their store: from textiles and kitchen 
utensils, to synagogue and liturgical items.
74
 All members of the extended family 
viewed themselves as strong Zionists and religious nationalists, accepting the 
inseparability of Jewishness and Israeliness, between religious and national identities.  
  The melting-pot ideology that denies the importance of intra-Jewish ethnicity 
has clearly failed. Judaism may be considered the most important historical focus of 
Jewish unity, but in Israeli society, different orientations towards religious tradition as 
well as subcultural religious differences such as specific religious customs, festivals, 
and prayer styles, are important components of the ethnic difference among the Israeli-
Jewish population (Ben-Rafael and Sharot 1991:23). The synagogues represent the 
clearest expression of Jewish ethnic pluralism and Kiryat Shemona contained 
approximately 40 ethnic synagogues based on country of origin. For Sephardim and 
Ashkenazim, the religious texts of the Torah and the Talmud are word for word the 
same, but in ritual and sequencing there are certain differences (Lehmann & Siebzehner 
2006:245).
75
  
Revital and Benny attended services in the Sephardic synagogue, whose 
members were of all ages and backgrounds. Benny occasionally led the prayer, a 
respected and prestigious role. He was greatly concerned by the perceived weakening of 
religiosity among Sephardic Jews and believed that the local community had been 
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 Kol bo is the mainstream Hebrew term for a small department store that sells everything from food to 
clothes to small electrical appliances. Like many Hebrew words, it does have its Biblical origins, but has 
become more secularized as Hebrew itself has become more secular. 
75
 Ashkenazim and Sephardim have different siddurim (prayer books) and Torah services. All days except 
Rosh Hashanah the Sephardim pray longer than the Ashkenazim. During Rosh Hashanah the roles are 
reversed. The Ashkenazim pray three hours longer and they also sing the tfila (prayer), whereas the 
Sephardim read more. 
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severely damaged by “secular malaise”. Secular Jews were giving up their Jewish 
identity by ignoring history and religious beliefs. Revital believed in the mystical 
powers of cabbalistic passages, in spirits and the healing effects of herbal infusions. She 
attributed sickness and personal injury to jealousy’s evil eye and she had decorated their 
shop and home with amulets and hamsot (hands) to protect the family from baleful 
spirits. Although their store specialised in religious items, it was frequented by 
customers with diverse backgrounds. A steady flow of customers came not only to 
purchase but to chat, socialise and exchange the latest news. My impression was that 
this hard-working couple was ‘well-liked’ and respected in town.  
 In one situation, I witnessed tension among members of the Chackotay family 
that stemmed from different ethnic religious practices. During the Rosh Hashanah 
dinner, the Chakotay family members discussed what synagogue to attend for  morning 
prayers because the parents, their children and their children’s spouses all had differing 
opinions. Should they go to the Sephardic or Ashkenazi synagogue? Keren insisted on 
the Sephardic synagogue, as she had been attending an Ashkenazi for the last couple of 
years as a student in Haifa. Oshri, Karen’s Ashkenazi husband complained loudly that 
he hardly understood anything of the tfila (prayer) in the Moroccan synagogue. He 
described it as “a different religion”. The next day, I met Revital outside their house in 
Trumpeldor Street.
76
 After a loud discussion in the middle of the street with her 
daughter and son-in-law about which synagogue to attend, they finally agreed to go to 
the Ashkenazi synagogue.  
The Ashkenazi synagogue, a small building with about 80 seats, was situated on 
the outskirts of the Park Zahav (Park of Gold). The predominantly Ashkenazi crowd 
was dressed in light colours, women and men prayed separately, divided by a thin wall. 
The rows of seats faced the Ark rather than surrounding it as is common in Sephardic 
synagogues. The men were rocking on their heels and murmuring as they echoed the 
rabbi’s singing prayers. I was used to seeing Revital cheerful and confident greeting 
women in the back of the Sephardic synagogue but that day she was quiet and reserved 
as if she felt alienated from the Ashkenazi service. She clearly felt more comfortable in 
a Sephardic synagogue and places where Mizrahiut (Easterness) was maintained. 
Although Revital preferred to attend a Sephardic Yom Kippur service, she was willing 
to compromise to please her children and their Ashkenazi partners. 
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 The street is named after the one-armed national hero and pioneer-settler Joseph Trumpeldor who fell 
in the battle of Tel-Hai in 1920, north of the Arab village of Khalsa.   
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Outside the religious domain of synagogues and the occasional reference to 
Mizrahi cuisine, Benny and Revital Chackotay avoided labelling themselves as Mizrahi 
and rather identified themselves with Persia and its particular traditions and practices. 
Indeed, I was struck by the family’s effort to distance themselves from the category 
altogether. The category still connotes lower economic status and might explain why 
themes of ethnicity are ambiguous and sometimes painful to discuss. The Chackotay 
family, who successfully climbed the social ladder with their children into the middle 
class, thus distanced themselves from the category.
77
 The avoidance of the category 
reflects the ambivalence of relating to a classificatory term traditionally used by 
Ashkenazi settlers as a colonial practice to control and racialise Jews with non-
European pasts. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Family tree for the Chackotay family.  
 
 I was invited to celebrate Sukkot
78
 with the Chackotay family. It is a mitzvah 
(commandment) to be hospitable during Sukkot and I felt that my presence was 
particularly welcomed this evening. Their business had gone well the week leading up 
to Sukkot and they had sold more than 120 etrogim (a lemon-like fruit over which 
blessings are said during Sukkot). All their children, along with their spouses and 
children, were visiting for the holiday. The men and children went to prayers in the 
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  The majority of Mizrahi scholars studying Mizrahim have rejected the negative connotations of the 
label and adopted Mizrah as a source of identification. However, this minority of activists does not 
represent the vast majority of Mizrahim.   
78
 Sukkot is celebrated on the 15th day of the month of Tishrei (late September to late October). 
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Moroccan synagogue, while the women decorated the sukkah
79
, a temporary hut, with 
bamboo-sticks, autumnal fruits, Judaic themes and a row of blue stars of David.  
Revital was in a cheerful mood preparing dinner for the festive occasion in the 
kitchen. While cutting vegetables she emphasised how Persian food tasted better and 
was healthier than both Moroccan and Iraqi food. During dinner the atmosphere was 
festive and humorous. Benny was full of praise for his wife’s culinary creations as 
Revital placed yet another dish on the table.  
 
 
 
Figure 10. The Chackotay family sukkah.   
 
Benny and Revital’s oldest son Doron, visited from Haifa with his Ashkenazi 
wife Anat and their three children. Like the other orthodox Jewish male members of the 
family he wore a knitted kippah. Anat covered her hair under a brown wig and wore a 
dress with sleeves below the elbow, the common custom for orthodox Jewish married 
women fulfilling the commandment of modesty.  She was of Polish decent and Revital 
reverted to a stereotype in reffering to her daughter-in-law as Ashkenazi.  
During dinner she uttered: “Look at you, Anat, you are eating like an 
Ashkenazi!” implying that she was being self-restrained and not appreciating the large 
meals of Mizrahi families. Anat smilingly accepted the description but then revealed the 
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 The halakha (Jewish religious law) says that all meals and sleeping should occur in the sukkah. 
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fact that Benny and Revital are cousins. “Their fathers were brothers! That’s why their 
children are a bit koko…” she laughed wholeheartedly. Revital instantly responded the 
until now hidden and perhaps stigmatised fact of parallel cousin marriage by 
defensively waving her hand in front of her while she somewhat embarrassingly said: 
“The Ashkenazim would have gotten strange children but we Parsim (Iranians) have 
strong genes.”  Avri, the next eldest son in the family raised his voice: “My wife is 
Moroccan. She is primitive, so I married her and made her cultured!” He lent back in 
his chair contently and his wife laughed at his joke and replied in a loud voice: “There is 
no smoke without fire. Take Anat for instance. She is from Poland and you know what 
they say about the Polish...that they are cold, and that is true!” At this point everyone 
around the table burst out laughtering. 
 At another family gathering, Revital made an explicit comment about her 
grandson Hilel who had an Ashkenazi father. Immediately after Benny had recited the 
kiddush (sanctification) over the wine, Hilel started to cry. Revital calmed him down, 
whereby he stopped crying. She shouted out in a loud voice clapping her hands 
together; “You, see! He is a real Ashkenazi!” She laughed and pointed towards her 
daughter Keren. “She used to be calm when she was a child. Just like an Ashkenazi. She 
likes rules and having organised surroundings. No wonder she married a yekke.”80  
She then turned to her grandson Hillel who was crawling towards the dinner 
table and mumbled: “He has a nice skin colour…I mean, what if he had turned out 
darker…” Revital asked me whether I preferred “chocolate” or “milk”, i.e., dark or 
white skin. Somewhat struck by the question, I replied that I found both beautiful. 
Benny seemed embarrassed by his wife’s explicit reference to skin colour and quickly 
said “that is not important.” These statements show that the family members were 
acutely aware of and central actors in race-making themselves, during the ordinary 
activities of everday life.  
Despite being surrounded by neighbours of Moroccan Jewish background and 
having a Moroccan daughter-in-law, Revital jokingly stated negative characteristics of 
Moroccans on several occasions. At the Jewish-Moroccan festival of Mimuna marking 
the end of Passover, I was sitting in her living room when an elderly Moroccan 
neighbour, wearing a traditional costume and jewellery-embroidered headscarf, visited 
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 German Jews are called “YEKKE-s” or “YEKKIM” (plural, Hebrew) an acronym for the phrase, 
“Yehudi Kshe Havana” (literally translated as “Jews who don’t get it”). Culturally translated, the 
acronym means “Jews who do not understand how to scheme.”   
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unannounced.
81
 Revital showed the expected hospitality, offering her guest tea and 
serving it in small hourglass-shaped cups, as was the Persian custom. Just after Revital 
had closed the door behind her neighbour, she turned to me and said slightly irritated: 
“You see, the Moroccans, they are so impulsive and emotional (regishot)!” She 
reinforced the stereotype that Moroccans were unpredictable and emotional, and as if to 
distance herself from them further, emphasised that Mimuna was a Moroccan and not a 
Persian festival. To prevent “stigma by proxy” in Erving Goffman’a terms, Revital 
distanced herself from those seen to be more eastern. 
These ethnographic vignettes are quite characteristic of the habitual joking and 
stereotypical descriptions of intra-Jewish ethnicised categories. Joking both in private 
and public can lift the bar on taboos and sometimes stigmatised identities, but they can 
also reproduce ethnic stereotypes and prejudice (Van Dijk in Lefkowitz  2001:179). 
Although the stereotyping around the dinner table was done humorously almost as a 
kind of game, it had the effect of reinforcing and strengthening the discursive character 
of ethnicity (Brubaker 2006:218).  
The members of the Chackotay family reinforced stereotypical concepts of 
ethnicity that largely corresponded to the ethnic hierarchy found in Zionist ideology. 
They differentiated themselves and Persian Jews from other Mizrahim by drawing 
attention to the differences in socio-economic status, educational attainment and 
personality. Failings or ‘uncivilised’ behaviour such as impulsiveness, uncontrolled 
temper and primitivism were associated with the imagined and stereotypical cultural 
characteristics of Moroccan others in particular. Equally, civilised behaviour was 
associated with the stereotypically appropriate behaviour of Persians and orthodox 
Ashkenazim.  
Several of their children had gone onto higher education, lived in the centre and 
moved in social circles where the Ashkenazim were numerically dominant. Their 
mobility in the ethnic hierarchy through education and intermarriage with Ashkenazim 
made the Mizrahi category less relevant. By associating themselves with Ashkenazi 
hegemony, they seemed to be trying to re-define creatively the basis upon which they 
were judged. They used positive stereotypes to challenge the position of their edah in 
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 The Moroccan Jewish Celebration of Mimunah
 
has been revitalised in Israel. It has become essential 
for every Ashkenazi prime minister or aspiring politician to participate in the celebration of this 
“Mizrahi” festive event. On this occasion, the media is full of reports of Ashkenazi politicians visiting 
Mizrahi homes and tasting the traditional bread (mofleta) baked by the women of the household.  
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the ethnocray. These categorisations and negotiations of status, although related to 
Zionist ethnic hierarchy, reflect situations in which nationhood was not a pervasively 
relevat social category. The many self- and other-identifications that were not 
nationalist, challenge Billig’s theory of nationalism that considers nationalism to be 
omnipresent.  
 
 
 
Introducing the Zakay family  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Family tree for the Zakay family. 
 
I first met the Zakay family at the very beginning of fieldwork in July 2008. 
Esther and Rahamim lived a five-minute walk from the town centre, and I rented their 
small basement flat. Rahamim had retired early for health reasons, and spent his days 
frequenting local cafes to meet friends, drink coffee and play towli (backgammon). He 
did not consider himself particularly religious but masoriti (traditional).
82
 Rahamim 
always wore a neatly pressed blue shirt, khaki trousers and leather sandals and kippah 
for Shabbat and the occasional visit to his local synagogue. Before entering a room, he 
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 The latest Guttman Report (Levy, Levinshohn and Katz 2002) found that 50 percent of all Mizrahim 
self-identify as masoriti whereas only 19 percent of Ashkenazim self-identify as such.   
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habitually touched the silver mezuzah to the right of the door. 
83
 He was a keen football 
fan and attended matches at the football stadium to support the local team he considered 
to represent the town’s “pride and culture”. Although frequently complaining about 
financial restraints, Rahamim and Esther invested a lot of time and resources in their 
two-story yellow concrete house. The house had a long garden with a vegetable patch at 
the back and a homemade birdcage adorned with patriotic blue and white flags housing 
five parrots. Rahamim had decorated the building and garden with colourful ornaments 
crafted out of metal and glass that he made himself. Framed mirrors, a large mermaid, a 
Star of David and a dozen colourful mezuzot on the doorways of the house made it a 
local attraction.  
The life history of Esther Zakay illuminates the inseparable connection between 
socio-economic and emotional landscapes and how they produce and sustain each other. 
Esther was born in Teheran in 1949. She lived with her parents, four brothers and three 
sisters in a sizeable house “not much unlike a hamola” (extended family structure). Her 
father bribed an army officer so that his sons would be exempt 
from serving in the Iranian army. The army authorities called him in and an officer 
wrote a number on his arm stating the date for his execution. “The number was similar 
to the numbers the Jews were marked with during the Shoa (Holocaust)” Esther said, 
comparing the Iranian Jewish experience to the experiences of European Jews in 
concentration camps. Faced with the threat of execution for national disloyalty, the 
Zakay family decided to flee to the newly established Israeli nation-state. The family 
left all their belongings behind and asked neighbours to look after the house, not sharing 
their intention to stay in Israel for good. Successfully avoiding conscription, they made 
it to Israel when Esther was three years old. In the summer of 1952, they were sent to 
the immigrant absorption camp in Kiryat Shemona. At the age of seventeen, Esther 
married Rahamim Zakay, whose family came from the city of Arbil in Northern Iraq. 
They had four children, three boys and a girl, all of whom studied in Kiryat Shemona 
and went to the army.  
After raising their children, Esther found work in a kibbutz nursery. During the 
‘good fence period’ (Geder HaTova), she was employed by the Gibor textile factory in 
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 A mezuzah is a piece of parchment inscribed with specified Hebrew verses from the Torah. Traditional 
Jews touch the mezuzah with their hand when entering or leaving a room.  
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Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon and was responsible for the Lebanese female 
workers commuting from Southern Lebanon. This period began when Israel opened the 
border fence in the Israeli town of Metula, north of Kiryat Shemona in July 1976, and 
Lebanese workers began receiving work permits to work in northern Israel. From the 
sealed border of early 1976, relations warmed considerably. Lebanese citizens who had 
relatives in Israel were allowed to visit them and commercial ties between Israel and 
Lebanon were established.  
Esther had fond memories from this period and talked warmly about her 
Lebanese colleagues. The women arrived in four buses every morning. Some of them 
spoke French, English and Arabic and they communicated in a mixture of simple 
vocabulary in Arabic and Hebrew. The workers were not allowed to bring goods in 
from Lebanon but Esther sometimes brought them bread from Kiryat Shemona, as it 
was cheaper. The ‘good fence period’ ended with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on 6th 
June 1982, in the military operation “Peace in the Galilee”. The northern border was 
closed and Esther was employed in the kitchen of a nearby kibbutz that offered her a 
higher salary than in the factory. Esther had few pleasant memories from the time she 
worked in the Kibbutz. The kibbutznikim (plural for someone from a kibbutz) looked 
down upon the inhabitants of Kiryat Shemona. “I remember when I used to work in the 
kitchen of Kibbutz HaGoshrim, they asked us to work all the time, and we were not 
even allowed to take a break. What is this? Work all day, without a break?” Esther said 
upsettingly. When I asked whether she thought that the relationship was better today 
than it used to be, she promptly replied: 
 
It is worse! They are even nastier today. They still have their noses in the air. But now 
the kibbutznikim are also facing difficult times due to the economic crisis. Finally they 
also have to work as we have done our entire life. Finally they also feel what I have felt. 
 
Esther’s dismissive attitude towards the Ashkenazim and sometimes, her 
hostility, reflects the wide ethno-class disparity that developed between the kibbutzim 
settlements and development towns. None of the members of the Zakay family had 
Ashkenazi spouses or close friends. This might in part account for why being Ashkenazi 
was more frequently sited as a negative characteristic than in the Chackotay family 
where several members had intermarried. 
105 
 
The kibbutz structure used to be racist because Mizrahim and other peripheral 
minorites were excluded. In some Mizrahi circles, kibbutznik is shorthand for a racist 
(Shabi 2009:158). Although Esther disliked the kibbutznikim strongly, verging on 
resentment, two of her sons had moved to a nearby kibbutz to raise their families in a 
“better environment”. The original kibbutz structure was that of a collective community 
based on agriculture. In the last decades, most kibbutzim have become privatised and no 
longer practice such communal living. Once considered the elite group of Israeli 
society, they are today perceived to be more closely aligned to the development towns, 
although the economic dependence between the towns and the neighbouring kibbutzim 
still generates resentment (Tzafadia 2007:99).  
The breakdown of the original socialist structure of the kibbutzim and the 
decline in their status has brought the kibbutzim and Kiryat Shemona closer in 
economic terms.
84
 Special neighbourhoods in kibbutzim have been constructed allowing 
non-members and outsiders to rent housing. The acceptance of outsiders into a radically 
changed kibbutz structure seems to have changed attitudes among younger generations 
towards the kibbutzim.  
Esther and Rahamim’s attitude towards Ashkenazim surfaced during a 
discussion surrounding their children’s weddings. The first month I stayed in Kiryat 
Shemona Esther and Rahamim’s youngest son got married to a local girl whose 
Moroccan-born parents were veterans of the town. The traditional wedding ceremony 
was held in a Sephardic synagogue with hundreds of guests. Going through the wedding 
photos a couple of weeks later, I asked Rahamim what he would have felt if one of his 
sons had married an Ashkenazi woman. “I would have had a bit of trouble with that 
idea. HaMentaliot shonot (the mentality is different)”, he claimed. At this point, Esther 
quickly interrupted her husband. “That is not true. I would not have a problem with that. 
Love is enough. And that she is Israeli.”85 As with Benny’s embarrassment over 
Revital’s references to skin colour, Esther seemed uncomfortable about her husband 
admitting a preference for Mizrahi spouses.  
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 In 2009, the Mayor of Kiryat Shemona, Nissim Malka and the head of the Upper Galilee regional 
council, Aharon Valency, agreed that the two authorities should cooperate on issues such as recycling and 
regional youth leadership in order to bring down the wall that had separated them historically (Haaretz 
20/01/12). 
85
 Esther would use the term Israeli interchangeably with Jewish. When Israeli Jews refer to their “Israeli 
identification”, they are usually referring to their commonality with other Jewish citizens of Israel and not 
to the legal notion of citizen which they share with non-Jews (Ben-Rafael & Porat 1991:239). 
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Until recently, the only member of the Zakay family practicing religion and 
wearing kippah on a daily basis was their oldest son. However, a year ago their only 
daughter had hazara be-tshuva (penitence), embracing a strictly orthodox religious 
lifestyle. Her return to religion came after a decade being employed by a high-tech firm 
travelling the world. The only trip Esther had ever made abroad was to the former 
Yugoslavia, accompanying her daughter on a three-day business trip. Esther and 
Rahamim often told stories from their daughter’s previous middle-class life-style and 
sometimes they screened pictures on their computer from her travels. It seemed as if 
they longed for the opportunities and the increase in status their daughter’s abandoned 
career had given them. Esther complained that she had to make an extra effort to satisfy 
their daughter’s strict Halakha (Jewish religious law) lifestyle. In addition, she was 
deeply worried that at the age of thirty-eight she was still not married. While Esther 
previously had said that she would not mind if her daughter found an Ashkenazi man, 
her view changed the following month. Her daughter Tamar had been proposed to by an 
Ashkenazi man but she was unconvinced whether he was the right man to marry. Esther 
shared her stereotypical characteristic of Ashkenazim: 
 
Both his parents are lawyers from Poland. They are very cold people. They don’t like 
big families, many children or the joys of life. All they think about is work and money. 
They don’t like spending time with the family. We are together at least every Friday, 
sometimes Saturdays as well. We like loud music and big families, but the Ashkenazim 
don’t like joy. They are always cold  and serious. 
 
Esther portrayed the Ashkenazim as emotionally cold and alienated from 
traditional family values and more career-oriented. This rather negative sterotypcial 
description of potential in-laws were atypcial. There is a typical Hebrew saying that 
describes a marriage enagments into a dual-income, professional Ashkenazi family is 
like “winning the lottery”.  Esther did not tell me the reason for why Tamar and the 
wealthier Ashkeanzi man did not marry. However, her invokation of classical sterotypes 
towards Asheknazim was perhaps used to comfort herself after another, yet failed 
attempt, to regain some financial status and standing.    
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Racialisation and discrimination 
 
Although Esther felt resentment towards Ashkenazi “snobbishness” based on a long 
history of felt inferiority, particularly in work contexts, she was very concerned with 
presenting her grandchildren as European-looking. As in the Chackotay family, 
racialisation occurred routinely. The Zakay family often gathered for Shabbat dinners or 
picnics next to the Jordan River. Esther’s eldest son was married to a Moroccan woman 
but in contrast to other family members, their children were blond, a fact Esther had 
stressed on several occasions as she showed me family photographs. Once more, at a 
family gathering she admiringly emphasised how her two grandchildren looked 
European in contrast to the rest of the family members. She was also curious to know 
whether all Norwegians were blond, clearly stereotyping my ‘Scandinavian’ looks. 
Looking at another family photo I told Jonathan, the youngest son in the family, that he 
resembled his sister Tamar and he jokingly replied: “You mean that I am shachor 
(black) like her!”   
Jonathan was aware of the derogatory term black as an ethno-racial construction 
and used it jokingly in self-description. Israeli nation-building has fused racism with 
orientalism. Over generations, both Arabs and Mizrahim have suffered under a dual 
oppression racialised by Ashkenazim as both black, oriental and eastern with non-
European pasts.
86
 The anthropologist Raphael Patai catalogued the ethnic stereotypes 
associated with Oriental Jews in the early 1950s and made a list of traits: “Instability, 
emotionalism, impulsiveness, unreliability, incompetence, habitual lying, cheating, 
laziness, boastfulness, inclination to violence, uncontrolled temper, supersititousness, 
childishness, lack of cleanliness” (Patai in Shabi 2011:49). All these traits show how 
Mizrahim were orientalised as primitive and culturally inferior. By the 1970s, prejudice 
had become asymmetrical and Ashkenazim had greater negative attitudes towards 
Mizrahim than the reverse. Mizrahim also internalised the negative stereotyping of 
themselves (Smooha 1978:55).  
Racialisaton of Mizrahim is not just a historical colonial practice but continues 
today. A wide range of demeaning ethno-racial stereotypes of Mizrahim circulate in 
Israeli public discourse and cultural production. A schoolbook recommended for nine-
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 It was this racial nickname that disenfranchised Mizrahim who appropriatedit  as a tool of political 
empowerment in the 1970s when they named their group the Black Panthers, inspired by the African 
American movement of the same name (Zohar 2005:312). 
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year old children by Government authorities in 1997 has in it a story about “a dark and 
skinny Moroccan boy”, who looks different from the other children and eats like a small 
bird. He comes from a land far, far away, and dwells in one room with his goats, and his 
Jewishness is in doubt (Jacob 1997:60).  
 The aspiration towards white western-ness is particularly evident in the Israeli 
advertising industry. Mizrahi actors in television commercials are frequently ascribed 
stereotypical traits of character as dumb, short-tempered and uneducated. Mizrahim 
often appear in advertising for products such as detergents or air conditioning, whereas 
models with distinctly European looks are used for more “intelligent” products 
(Dönmez-Colin 2007:2006). In the dominant racialised discourse, the Israeli of highest 
status is white and Ashkenazi-looking. It is not unusual for Mizrahim to be worried 
about being mistaken for Arabs or non-Jews and wear the Star of David around their 
necks for nationalist rather than religious motives. The representations of Mizrahiyut 
(Jewish Easterness) are shifting, contradictory and influenced by history. They do not 
only emerge from Ashkenazi-dominated society but circulate amongst Mizrahim 
themselves. My informants’ frequent references to skin colour reflected the deep 
racialisation inherent in the Zionist ethnic hierarchy.  
When I visited Esther’s son Jonathan at his workplace in the community centre, 
he spontaneously made a comment about his own and his colleague’s skin colour. 
“Look,” he said pointing towards the other. “He is from Morocco but he still has blue 
eyes, pale skin and blond hair like you. I am shachor (black) in relation to him, 
although we both are Moroccans.”87 The joking invocation of the category of blackness 
show the profound internalisation of racialised categories that have been used by 
Ashkenazim to control both Palestinians and Mizrahim.  
   The local souk was open on Tuesdays and Thursdays and located a short 
distance from rechov David Shimoni where the Zakay couple and I lived. It was a 
shaded and cool market featuring alleyways of stalls packed with vegetables and fruit 
from the surrounding orchards, clothes and household merchandise. I frequently went 
shopping with Esther and benefited from her good bargaining skills. One afternoon we 
went to the souk looking for something appropriate for me to wear to her daughter’s 
Tamar wedding which was being held the following month. It would be a strictly 
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 Hebrew for black is shachor while white is lavan. The word lavan is not as frequently employed in 
social hierarchies in Israel as shachor. The implied racial opposite of shachor is Ashkenazi.  
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orthodox wedding and required a knee-length skirt and a top with sleeves covering the 
arms to below the elbow. Esther walked over to a rack of clothing and began rifling 
efficiently through it. She took a long blue dress off the hanger and asked a salesman to 
show it to us. The Mizrahi salesman sat alone on a wooden stool, his hands resting on 
his knees, looking tired as the souk was about to close. He turned to us while replying, 
slightly irritated: “It’s not mine! It belongs to the kushi (nigger) over there!” He nodded 
in the direction of an Arab salesman who was packing up his merchandise. The racist 
slang word for Arab did not seem to register with Esther, who resolutely hurried to the 
other stall. I felt uncomfortable and frustrated witnessing such outright racism. That an 
Arab was racialised with the derogatory term kushi seemed to be a ingrained  rhetorical 
habit. Mizrahim, who have been subjected to the same term, also used it in their 
description of Arabs, in order to emphasise this group’s inferior position in the  
ethnocracy.  
Several residents told me that they had been subjected to negative stereotyping 
and structured exclusion because of their ethnic background. A Mizrahi friend with 
Yemeni parents once asked me to enter a nightclub in front of him  because he was not 
sure that he would be allowed entrance. In multicultural Israel, being a soldier does not 
guarantee the right to enter nightclubs if your skin colour is non-white. Racial 
discrimination is also concealed under the argument of culture. Jonathan Zakay said that 
he was discriminated against in the labour market when an Ashkenazi manager hired an 
Ashkenazi worker with lower qualifications. Later he explained that the exclusion had 
“some basis in different culture”, implying that though he found it hurtful, he did not 
want to make an issue out of it. “After all, we are all Jews.”  
These examples show that my informants had suffered from colonial racism and 
exclusion inherent in the Zionist ethnic hierarchy that continues to influence their  
classification of self and others. However, these racialised negotiations and 
identifications, although influenced by the Zionist ethnic hierarchy, were not nationalist. 
The nation, although implicit, was not pervasive at all times and in all situations.  
 
Challenging ethnic boundaries  
 
In Israel, children and grandchildren of Mizrahim have dispersed throughout Israeli 
society, not least through intermarriage with people of Ashkenazi origin. Intermarriage 
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is challenging the boundaries of ethnic categories, but can be a sensitive issue 
(Schellekens & Anson 2007:148).  
 
The Israeli film Ahava Colombianit (Colombian Love, 2006) dramatise 
Ashkenazi/Mizrahi clashes of cultures and generations. A young couple is planning 
their wedding, but not without complications. The parents of the bride are descendants 
of Hungarians and Russians while the groom’s parents are Moroccan. The couple 
decides to have an informal wedding without convention of shaking the parents’ hands 
at the entrance, which is the traditional Moroccan custom. The wedding DJ is instructed 
not to play any Mizrahi music. As a consequence, the father of the groom feels that his 
honour is insulted. “For us, family comes first”, says the father in an emotional scene 
where he furiously demands his son to divorce the woman he has married an hour ago. 
After the confrontation with the father, the young couple decide to arrange a second 
ceremony, one that satisfies her father-in-law’s wishes and reinstates his pride. The film 
demonstrates that although inter-marriage can be an emotional and cultural challenge, it 
can work with prosper respect and sensitivity.  
Eran, a single Ashkenazi student at the University of Haifa expressed reluctant 
attitudes about Jewish ethnic inter-marriage. He was born and raised in a northern 
Kibbutz and thought his parents would object if he wanted to marry a Jewish girl of 
non-Western background.  
 
I think it is connected to values and land, and that we are so used to looking after each 
other.  In my kibbutz there are only Ashkenazim who came from Germany, Poland and 
Russia, from more civilized countries. My family’s neighbour in the kibbutz survived 
the camps and the torture of the Nazis. Some only speak Polish today. My grandmother 
came from Poland, and if you talk to her in Hebrew, she will most likely not 
understand. My grandparents on my father’s side speak German. If I introduced a 
Yemeni or Ethiopian girl to my parents, my father would not appreciate that. I think it 
would be difficult for them to understand the culture and mentality of a Mizrahi family. 
They (Mizrahim) lived next to Arabs for many generations and they caught their habits. 
I know that he would grow to love her, but it would be a challenge initially. But of 
course this is changing. 
 
From Eran’s explanation, it seemed that he would most likely end up with an 
Ashekanzi partner. Subtle pressure from his Ashkenazi surroundings in the kibbutz and 
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a prejudice towards the Mizrahi category seemed to inhibit the prospects for 
intermarriage.   
 The Chackotay family stressed ethnic origin as irrelevant in comparison with 
shared Jewishness. However, such inter-marriage should not be treated as self-evident. 
It is important to note that usually mixed marriages in the orthodox and ultra-orthodox 
communities are between various Mizrahi communities, or between various Ashkenazi 
communities. Research has shown that intermarriages between orthodox Ashkenazim 
and Mizrahim occur rarely (ICB 2004).  The marriage between Revital and Benny’s 
daughter, Keren and the “yekke”, German-descended Oshri, was thus one atypical.  
Marriage patterns governing orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jewish marriages are 
markedly different from the marriage patterns of more secular, or Masorati 
(“traditional,” or “semi-observant,” Hebrew) Jews. Orthodox and ultra-orthodox Jews 
marry via arranged marriages set up through paid matchmaking service providers, 
through networks of rabbis and rabbis’ wives, or by personal or familial networks, and 
only a fraction are non-arranged marriages based on dating, romance and falling in love 
prior to the marriage ceremony itself.  
According to Keren, she was introduced to Oshri by a common friend (not a 
matchmaker) when they were students in Haifa, and not by a traditional matchmaker. 
During fieldwork, and also in the time after, I have not felt comfortable with asking how 
Oshri’s parents reacted to their initial romance and subsequently agreed that he 
“married downward” with a Mizrahi family.  However, I know that not only the young 
couple, but also the in-laws met regularly, thus perhaps indicating a mutual approval of 
their marriage.
88
  
 Revital and Benny Chackotay encouraged their children to intermarry with 
orthodox Ashkenazi Jews, as an avenue to upward social mobility and for the 
Ashkenazification of the Mizrahi mate.  On Erev Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement) 
October 8
th
 2008, I witnessed how Revital half-jokingly tried to introduce her unmarried 
son, Tal, to a young Ashkenazi volunteer from Jerusalem.
89
 We were gathered for the 
last meal before the Yom Kippur fast and the family members (along with the 
                                                 
88
 Contact with Mizrahi extended family tends to be limited to family visits on Shabbats and the holidays. 
Regular contact with Ashkenazi extended family may be more frequent, as they often provide monetary 
aid to the young couple. Children of the married couple may grow up unaware of Mizrahi rules of 
propriety and extended family gender dynamics in favor of Ashkenazi chutzpah (or a sense of uncritical 
entitlement) and Ashkenazi gender dynamics. 
89
 As an alternative to army service they volunteered in various social programs, receiving the same 
benefits as regular soldiers. 
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researcher) were dressed in white garments.
90
 Three religious eighteen year old girls 
volunteering in town were invited as honorary guests. The aroma of roasted fish filled 
the living room and the discussions were lively. Revital turned to a young redhead 
(gingi) volunteer and suggested she would be a suitable spouse for her son. The young 
girl blushed with embarrassment while Tal excused his mother’s bold proposal. “I have 
been told to marry an Ashkenazi with a rich father,” he laughed. Still, it was clear from 
the comment that Revital was acutely aware of the prestige associated with light skin 
and Ashkenazi marriage partners. In the Chackotay family, two out of the four children 
had married Orthodox Jewish Ashkenazim, and  Revital was encouraging her unmarried 
son to do the same.
91
   
At a family gathering one shabbat, I met Revital’s Ashkenazi sister-in-law, 
Tammy. She was born and raised in an Orthodox Jewish family in New York and her 
parents were third generation American Jews from Poland. To settle in Israel was an act 
of fulfilling the meaning of her Jewishness. She felt that life as a Jew in Israel was more 
complete than the life of a Jew in the United States. Marriages between American 
orthodox Jews and Mizrahi orthodox Jews are almost always arranged, but in the case 
of Tammy, she met her husband when she volunteered in a in a kibbutz close to Kiryat 
Shemona. She came to Israel as a dedicated Zionist and her ultimate goal was to find a 
man and do aliyah as a married woman. She met Dan from a Persian Jewish background 
and her family had always accepted their marriage and her decision to live in Israel. 
Although she married outside her class and ethnicity, their common Zionist-religious 
identity was more important for them and their families.  
Ashkeanzi orthodox Jews from the United States are more likely to marry 
Mizrahi orthodox Jews, in contrast to Ashekanzi orthodox Jews from Western Europe 
or Israel.  This difference between orthodox Ashkenazim from the U.S. and those from 
Israel or Western Europe may be because of the more diverse nature of American 
society. Generally, American Jews are more open to diversity issues than those from 
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 According to Jewish tradition, God inscribes each person's fate for the coming year into a ‘book’ on 
Rosh Hashanah and waits until Yom Kippur to ‘seal’ the verdict. All religious and many secular Jews fast 
and attend synagogue. There are no radio or television broadcasts and even non-observant Jews are 
expected to respect the holiness of the day by not driving or eating in public. 
91
 Revital’s wish for her son to marry an Ashkenazi corresponds to several studies conducted in the 
1960s, that found out that not just Ashkenazim, but also Mizrahim (after their own community) preferred 
Ashkenazim to Mizrahim as neighbours and spouses (Ben-Rafael 1991:34). 
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Western Europe and Israel. Thus, American Jews tend to exoticize Mizrahim and more 
often act on their intra-Jewish inter-racial erotic desires. 
Later that night we discussed the American presidential election. The candidacy 
of Barack Obama, whose father was black and mother was white, highlighted the 
subject of intermarriage. Although everyone believed that the Republican nominee John 
McCain would provide stronger support for Israel, Tammy commented positively on 
Obama’s background: “He is half white, half black, half Muslim and half Christian. He 
truly represents the melting pot. Not unlike Israel.” Tammy drew a noteworthy parallel 
from her own experience to Obama’s background. Being married to an Israeli 
categorised as Mizrahi was unproblematic and she claimed that their children did not 
suffer discrimination as ‘products’ of a mixed marriage. 
Nir, a twenty-five year old student at the Tel-Hai college portrayed a more 
complex situation. Nir’s mother was Moroccan his father Polish. Both his looks and 
European surname offered a clear cue to Ashkenazi ethnic category membership. 
Having been born and raised in Kiryat Shemona, in a Mizrahi environment, this was 
more a source of frustration than pride.  
 
 
I wish it could be enough to say I am Israeli, but it is not. People always ask where your 
parents are from. I hope that in ten more years it will be enough to say I am Israeli. I 
have an Ashkenazi sounding surname, Bernstein, after my father’s family. The name is 
a clear advantage for me; it is easier to get a good job. A Mizrahi name will probably 
mean that you will have a harder life. That is not fair. But it is sad in a way. People 
think that I look Ashkenazi because of my fair skin and blue eyes but the truth is that I 
am not. Most of my friends today are Mizrahim. I also find the Mizrahi women more 
beautiful than the Ashkenazim.  
 
Nir hoped that, in time, a common Israeli identity would emerge. The tension 
generated because of his Mizrahi and European background was also the subject of 
casual joking. One day we chatted in the waiting room of the beauty parlor where his 
girlfriend Tamar worked. We sat down on the worn leather sofa, a popular place of 
relaxation for his group of friends. The buzzing sound of a hair dryer accompanied loud 
music from the popular IDF radio station Galagalatz.  A friend entered the salon and 
Nir greeted him with a firm handshake and the words “what’s up habibi” pronounced 
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with an Arabic accent. “Hey, my blue-eyed man!” the friend replied jokingly. Although 
the Arabic word habibi has become a word of everyday parlance in Israel, in this 
specific situation Nir used it as a subtle ethnic idiom to assert a common tie as Mizrahi. 
The joking comment about the colour of his eyes played on the incongruity between 
Nir’s European appearance and the Mizrahi context of the beauty parlor.   
The manager of a centre for youth in distress, Irit Aloni (36) illustrated another 
experience when we met in her office in November 2008. Like many young and 
educated Israelis who have been integrated into the mainstream of society, she felt that 
the ethnic divides in Israeli society had gradually decreased and used her own life 
history as an example. Coming from a poor Moroccan background she had successfully 
acquired status and income associated with the middle class. She had married a Russian 
immigrant; a relationship that she said would have been an exception a generation 
earlier. For her, intermarriage to a white man had been a way to resolve social and 
cultural exclusion. They had moved from Kiryat Shemona to a nearby kibbutz where 
they raised their children “in a better environment”.  
In David Grossman’s book (2010) “Sleeping on a Wire: Conversations with 
Palestinians in Israel,”a  Palestinian boy reveals his attitudes about intermarriage. He 
admires his uncle who succeeded in marrying a Jewish Mizrahi woman and he proudly 
says that his goal is to marry an Ashkenazi woman, demonstrating the social status he 
attached to the category. For the Palestinian boy, marriage with an Israeli-Ashkenazi 
included access to a package of resources and not necessarily the sentiment of 
emotional attachment to Israel. 
For some Israelis, marriage is seen as a genetic/cultural way to make the ‘ethnic 
problem’ disappear. Many other young and educated Israelis I encountered in the major 
cities of Tel-Aviv and Haifa believed that ethnicity was an issue that concerned their 
parent’s generation or the poorer segment of the population. In short they believed that 
Israelis on the same socio-economic level tend to think and behave in the same way, 
irrespective of their ethnic origin. Cross-ethnic friendships, mixed marriages and 
neighbourhoods seemed to be considered the rule, not the exception.   
The previous examples of attitudes towards and experience of intermarriage, 
confirm the data from the Israeli census (2004) and show that the proportion marrying 
out of the Mizrahi category increases with education, while amongst Ashekanzim, the 
higher the education, the lower the rates of ethnic intermarriage. If less-educated 
Mizrahim and highly-educated Ashekanzim do not  marry otuside their groups, they 
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reinforce ethnic continuity. At the same time, polarisation continues to emerge as inter-
marriage reinforces the ethno-class overlap (Wistrich 2005:136). In this sense, the 
educational selectivity of ethnic intermarriage in Israel may paradoxically represent one 
of the structural conditions that reinforce ethnic categories and the continuity of ethno-
classes.  
   
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown the various situations in daily life when ‘everyday nationalism’ 
was not pervasive. Members of the Chackotay and Zakay families did not frame all their 
cares and concerns in nationalist terms. My informants’ self-identification as cultured, 
Persian, Western, religious and traditional were equally important categories of 
identification. The many different situational self-identifications also challenge macro-
theorisations that envelope all Mizrahim under one category. The socio-economic or 
class distribution of the ethnic categories, whether measured by income, occupation or 
education, no doubt account in part for the differences in ethnic status and prestige that 
are attributed to the categories of Mizrahi and Ashkenazi. Statistics on income and 
occupation from the Israeli Bureau of Statistics show that ethno-class disparities 
between the centre and peripheral development towns do exist. However, the socio-
economic picture reflects the overall state of the town’s residents without revealing any 
internal differences and hierarchies. My informants were divided by strength of 
religious belief, occupation, immigration histories and income. Accordingly, there were 
varying degrees of ethno-classism in town. Attitudes towards categories of belonging 
considered culturally distinctive such as Moroccan, Persian, Iraqi, Mizrahim and 
Ashkenazim differed, even within families. Throughout my fieldwork, the category of 
Mizrahi  was rarely invoked explicitly, but was more often implied. Outside the domain 
of synagogue, food and stereotypical descriptions of difference, people that I knew 
refrained from using these categories. Various Jewish ethnic categories were not 
expressed in a separatist fashion but became a point of negotiating the ethnic hierarchy. 
Ethnic divisions were shaped by a settler colonial society but they were also produced 
and reproduced through the ordinary everyday activities of the households in Kiryat 
Shemona.   
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Chapter 4 
 
 Peripheral Nationhood: Fear, faith and strength in a border town 
  
The ideal is no longer peace, but the absence of war.  
The late poet Yehuda Amicahi 
 
The residents’ shared experiences of common threats and largely shared ethno-
economic class have created a clear sense of belonging to Kiryat Shemona that is 
distinct from the centre. I suggest that the emphasis on ‘strength’ as a spoken and 
behavioural code has emerged to reconcile the tension between the Zionists’ esteemed 
value of frontier settlements and their actual deprivation. ‘Strength’ was applied in 
practice and discourse to cope with borderland anxieties and their structurally entrapped 
position within the Israeli ethnocracy. As a both locally and nationally esteemed value, 
‘strength’ allowed my informants to negotiate nationhood from the periphery. In the 
build-up to war Mizrahim, who were at the geographical and socio-economic margins 
of society, were nationalised by politicians and media as essential members of the 
nation and key actors in the moral legitimisation of war. Self-nationalisation processes 
intensified in the build-up to and during war and helped make my informants forget or 
avoid their structural entrapment and feel valued and central.   
  
Existential insecurity as an ordinary situation  
 
Several scholars of nationalism argue that the production of national sentiments can be a 
strategy to counter fear and sources of moral grounding. Hastings argues that nationalist 
sentiments arise chiefly when and where a particular ethnic or national group feels that 
its character or importance is being threatened, for instance through external attack or 
an imagined threat or grievance (Hastings 1997:198). According to Giddens, the 
psychology of nationalism is that of an extraordinary emotional mood that occurs when 
ordinary life is disrupted (1985:218). National sentiments rise up when the “sense of 
ontological security is put in jeopardy by the disruption of routines”. In these 
circumstances, “regressive forms of object-identification” tend to occur with the result 
that individuals invest great emotional energy in the symbols of nationhood and in the 
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promise of strong leadership (Giddens quoted in Billig 1995:44). Myths founded in 
religion might also gain more support in a country whose population are faced 
periodically with similar challenges to their physical survival (Hutchinson 2000:661). In 
the context of an Israeli border town, ordinary life was affected by nationalist 
sentiments because conflict was not a relatively transitory condition but perceived as a 
permanent condition. The residents shared a perception of common dangers and threats 
that made existential insecurity an ordinary situation.  
The Israeli State is involved in an intense conflict with its neighbours and is 
anxious to secure colonial control over Palestinian territory and its population, as well 
as contested territory and the Arab national minority. The Jewish-Arab Palestinian 
conflict has, most of the time, been understood as “routine, immutable, an 
uncontrollable given, an eternal fate” (Kimmerling 2008:156). Major human, emotional 
and material resources are invested and recruited for national security concerns to 
construct and reproduce a society that is ready to mobilize from war to war 
(Kimmerling 2008:163). The army and security apparatus are persistent features of the 
public sphere. In my daily life, I found myself surrounded by an endless number of 
security measures. Guards were deployed at the entrances to malls, restaurants, public 
buildings and sometimes even synagogues and weddings. On my trips in and out of 
town, the buses were usually filled with solders in uniforms with M16s slung diagonally 
over their shoulders. The army and security networks are used to protect ‘normal’ life 
and to create a sense of safety for citizens. However it also reinforces a sense of living 
in fear, in suspicion of every unfamiliar person. A frightened civilian can identify a 
stranger by their ethnic traits. Under these conditions, one becomes more susceptible to 
stereotypes and those who match the profile of a suspected person (i.e., Arab looking) 
will suffer.  
Ochs notes how suspicion is one of the primary modes through which Israelis 
engage with Palestinians in their daily lives (2011:84). Sitting on the train from Tel-
Aviv to Haifa, I witnessed such habitual suspicion when an Arab-looking passenger left 
his blue plastic bag unattended for a brief moment. Within five minutes,  two armed 
security guards evacuated the passengers to the next wagon, only to confirm that the bag 
was filled with vegetables and beer cans. Profiling is a key part of the security system, 
in the streets and at the airport. When I arrived in Israel with a passport filled with 
stamps from countries considered enemies of Israel, such as Syria and Yemen, I was 
detained with other individuals classified as suspicious, most of them were Arab-
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looking. I was already used to the ‘security routine’ at Ben-Gurion airport after several 
trips in and out of Israel. Even with two passports and a statement from University of 
Haifa I was interrogated, body searched and given a personal escort through customs. A 
young American student of Indian background was a first-time visitor to Israel and 
more confused. He was on his way on a three-days pilgrimage in the Bahai Garden in 
Haifa and did not understand why he was not allowed entrance immediatly with his 
American passport. Althoug the official answer he was given was that it was for 
security concerns and therefore necessary, it was evident that his dark skin 
automatically put him under suspicion. This demonstrates how profiles and practices of 
suspicion are central domains in which racial categories are assigned and 
simultaneously national solidarity and Israeliness are upheld.  
 
 
                          
 
Figure 12. Guards following the ulpan class on an excursion to Metula in 2006. 
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Fear and traumatic memory 
 
Kiryat Shemona is a relatively short journey from Tel-Aviv, only a two and a half hour 
drive. However, viewed from the centre, the town is seen as a distant, deprived and 
unsafe place. It has been the frequent target of Katyusha rockets, particularly during the 
2006 Lebanon War when more than 1,000 Hezbollah-fired rockets hit the town.
92
 My 
informants’ social experience was partly formulated in terms of fear, hostility, strength 
and survival. Memories from war and past rocket attacks were frequent themes of 
conversation and part of collective memory. Several residents told me that they knew of 
children that wet their beds at night, a manifestation of their fear and anxiety. 
 
When I first met my neighbour Esther Zakay she welcomed me mockingly to the 
Kiryat Katyusha (the Katysha town). On arrival, we walked in their neighbourhood and 
she painstakingly pointed towards places that had been hit by Katysha rockets during 
the Lebanon war in 2006. As we had lunch in the garden, she nodded towards the 
corners of her house while explaining how they had been damaged by rocket shrapnel. 
During the war she had, like others who remained in town, spent long hours in bomb 
shelters.
93
 Touching an empty aquarium, she explained in a sentimental tone that her 
two goldfish had died from shock. I remember thinking the mourning of a fish to be odd 
in contrast to all the human causalities. But for Esther, who took their death so heavily, 
they seemed to have symbolized a peaceful time.  
After the war, Esther had participated in a research project at the Stress 
Prevention Centre at the Tel-Hai College and had been diagnosed with post-traumatic 
stress syndrome.
94
 She regularly expressed anxiety about Katyusha rocket attacks. 
While eating lunch with the Zakay family one September afternoon we suddenly heard 
a loud noise. Esther jumped in her chair; she held her breath before shaking her head. 
“Oi va voi, I thought for a moment it was a Katyusha rocket!”  Opening the door of the 
house, we found out that the sound had come from a garbage truck. After the incident, 
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 In 1981, PLO -fired Katyusha rockets hit the town and an attack in March 1986 killed a teacher and 
injured five others. After the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000 and until the Israeli war 
on Lebanon in 2006, the residents of the region enjoyed relative peace, although every few weeks there 
would be loud explosions due to Hezbollah anti-aircraft cannons firing at IAF planes flying across the 
Israeli-Lebanese border. 
Nine Katyushas have struck northern Israel since the Second Lebanon War in 2006, however the 
Lebanon-Israel border has been largely quiet ever since. 
93
 There are two hundre public bomb shelters in KS according the municipality.  
94
 This project was led by Professor Mooli Lahad, director of the Stress Prevention Centre at the Tel-Hai 
College.  
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Esther said that she had learned to live with this uncertain situation. “It has become like 
a habit. Whenever a Katyusha falls you go to the shelter, then afterwards life continues. 
You can’t be afraid all the time.” Judith, the ulpan teacher, recalled a story of how her 
family had been interrupted by a sharp sound during a Shabbat dinner, in the midst of 
the kiddush. The children immediately hid under the table out of fear. During another 
dinner with Judith’s family, I witnessed a similar situation when we heard a passing 
aircraft. Immediately she put her cutlery down and said that this might be the start of an 
attack.  
In another situation,  I traveled by bus to Tamar Chackotay’s wedding in Safed. 
All the guests were dressed in their best clothes. Colourful ribbons were displayed all 
over the bus, making the atmosphere festive. The busdriver had turned up the music on 
the radio. Suddenly the music stopped and a somber voice said something I did not hear 
properly, so I asked Keren sitting next to me. “It is about the war. They say, and I am 
sure rightly, that there will soon be a war. There is a word you need to know to live in 
Israel. Balagan (mess). There is always balagan,” Keren said sarcastically. The news 
seemed to have put a momentary damper on the festive mood. The driver switched the 
radio off.  It was quiet as we drove on through the night. 
The future was perceived as highly insecure in the town. Some of my informants 
said that knowing that war was inevitable was a great hindrance in planning for their 
future. Oshri Chozev (29), the Chackotay couple’s son-in-law, was a soldier in the 
paratroopers, an elite unit of the IDF. He remembered sleeping with his boots on and 
worrying about his friends during his military participation in the Lebanon war in 2006. 
When I met Oshri in October 2008, he did not hide his fear for future conflict.   
 
I will not even make plans for the summer. Who knows what might happen? It is 
important not to panic or lose control but I feel like the situation is out of control. It 
feels like another war is around the corner. I am back home but I do not feel safe. When 
I feel like this, it is difficult to move forward in life.  
 
Breaking with the ideal of the fearless solder, Oshri admitted that he was 
anxious and felt fear. Evidently he could not conceptualise peace, only interwar periods 
in a society on constant military alert.  
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The national idealisation of border towns 
 
The ‘border’ represents the dynamic aspect of processes of becoming and negotiations 
over meanings of nationhood. 
 
Borders are the legal borderline which simultaneously separate and joins state: the 
physical structures of the state which exist to demarcate and protect the borderline, 
composed of people and institutions which often penetrated deeply into the territory of 
the state, and the frontiers, territorial zones of varying width which stretch across and 
away from borders, within which people negotiate a variety of behaviours and meanings 
associated with their membership in nations and states (cf. Martinze 1994:5, Prescott 
1987, Herzog 1990:16 quoted in Donnan and Wilson 1998:12).  
 
Despite living far from the centres of national governance, border populations are an 
integral part of the nation-state’s imaginary (Johnson 2010). Long before statehood, 
Israel’s frontier settlements have been idealised and encouraged to create a unique 
social and moral identity, mobilise support and serve as a vital tool for nation building 
(Yiftachel 2006:108). However, unifying icons and rationales for frontier settlements 
have also worked to gloss over and conceal the inequalities and divisions created by 
state practices controlling territory and peripheral populations. The idealisation of the 
peripheral communities continues today, particularly during wartime. Two months 
before IDF’s massive military attack on Gaza on September 23th 2008, Israel’s former 
Prime minister, Ehud Olmert visited Kiryat Shemona. The purpose of his visit was not 
only to gather political votes, but to idealize the role of the town in providing security 
for the centre. Olmert had a meeting with the Mayor, Sami Malul, and members of the 
Kiryat Shemona City Council at the Ironit football stadium, where he praised the role of 
development towns in providing regional development. His statement “your patriotism 
is a source of security for all of us” shows how he revalidated the role of the Mizrahi 
ethno-class in the national ethos. The government moved Mizrahim from a stigmatised 
periphery to a national frontier where they were needed for the state’s defence and 
territorial control. The state glorification of the periphery took place in an overall 
context of a society united under threats, real or imagined, from its Arab external and 
internal threatening others.  
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Figure 13. The state idealisation of the peripheries: Ehud Olmert visited Kiryat Shemona September 23th 
2008. 
 
My informants had mixed feelings about Olmert’s visit. On the one hand they 
were excited because their town was in the national news but on the other hand, they 
frequently complained about his corruption, weak leadership and neglect of the 
periphery
95
.  They were deeply disillusioned with their government and felt that their 
elected officials lacked accountability. Esther shared her mistrust and frustration with 
greedy and corrupted politicians stealing money from the state, “putting it in their 
pockets” and neglecting the people. She once illustrated her dissatisfaction with 
contemporary politicians by showing me an issue of the local newspaper Ideot Kiryat 
Shemona. The front page pictured the seven candidates for the upcoming elections for 
new mayor in November 2008. She pointed at the different portraits and said: “This is a 
thief, this is a thief and this is a thief.”  
Several residents described Olmert’s predecessor in Kadima, Tsipi Livni, as a 
weak leader. The former foreign minister framed the election campaign in 2009 as “a 
choice between a Jewish State and a bi-national State”. “Will we be a state of fear or a 
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 During his three years in office, he was plagued by a series of corruption scandals, which played a 
major part in his eventual resignation. 
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state of hope?” Livni rejected the idea of a national unity government with the Likud 
promoted by the party’s hawkish wing, despite polls that showed a significant increase 
in the latter’s electoral strength (Mendilow 2010:82).  
“Is she strong enough?” was Likud’s election campaign title for the national 
elections questioning Tsipi Livni's capability for providing security. The campaign 
implied that security and military strength was first and foremost a masculine quality. 
The regional web site for Kiryat Shemona and the northern region, featured satirical 
images of politicians. An adverstisment portrayed Livni and Olmert in a treee 
accompanied by the text “a celebration in the jungle”, clearly mocked the Kadima 
politicans for being weak and disorganised (readme.co.il, accessed on 13
th
 November 
2008).  
 
               
                                     Figure 14. “A celebration in the jungle.” 
 
By contrast, Livni’s main rival in Kadima for the candidacy to become Israel’s 
next Prime Minister, Iranian-born Shoal Mofaz, was referred to a strong and particularly 
popular with members of the Persian Jewish Chackotay family.
96
 The former IDF chief 
of staff and defence minister represented military power over ‘softer’ diplomacy. 
Several of the residents of Kiryat Shemona believed that the IDF was the only 
governmental body that provided them with a real sense of security and protection and 
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 Shaul Mofaz lost to Tsipi Livni’s bid for leadership in Kadima after Ehud Olmert.  
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the importance of strong leadership before an upcoming war was mentioned as crucial. 
By framing the perception of threats, political actors attempted to depict 
themselves as the best providers of collective protection in order to gain popular support 
(Béland 2005:3). The right-wing party Likud contributed to the building of collective 
anxiety as national ideologies of threat and defence and exaggerated strategic concerns 
in the “war on terror” in their policy agendas (Ochs 2011:14). The election campaign of 
Israel’s current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu focused on military strength and 
his strong leadership, a powerful formula for the residents of Kiryat Shemona who felt 
under threat. Likud invested almost half of its electoral budged in the development of 
TV and online campaigns in Hebrew and Russian. In one of Likud’s election videos, 
Netanyahu spoke from the top of the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem. His message to the 
public was that strong leadership was needed to face the “security and economic 
challenge” (www.haaretz.com, 18th December 2008, accessed on 21st August 2011).   
Voters of  Likud supported militaristic ethno-nationalism in the exchange for the 
promise of well-being and security. The overwhelming majority of residents in Kiryat 
Shemona cast their vote for right-wing parties such as Likud (33%) or Yisrael Beiteinu 
(23%), whose effort to fan anti-Arab sentiments won growing popularity before and 
during the War on Gaza (www.readme.co.il, accessed on 20
th
 May 2009).  
  
Gilad Shalit is still alive 
 
With the demystification of Hebrew myths and disillusionment with contemporary 
politicians, a new national icon emerged during fieldwork, that of Gilad Shalit, the 
solder who was abducted by Hamas militants on 25
th
 June 2006 and kept in captivity for 
five years.
97
 During Gilad’s years in captivity he shifted from a soldier in distress to an 
Israeli national symbol and icon of patriotism. To keep their son’s name in the public 
consciousness, the Shalit family established “Gilad’s Army of Friends”, a grassroots 
campaign of volunteers, advertising executives and public-relations strategists. National 
and international awareness campaigns produced billboards, banners, flags, pins and 
dog tags with his face printed on them in using national colours and symbols.
98
 His 
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 Gilad was released from Hamas captivity Tuesday 18th October 2011 as a part of a prisoner exchange 
where a total of 1026 Palestinian prisoners were released from Israeli prisons. 
98
 The online edition of major Israeli newspapers such as Haaretz.com and Maariv.co.il exhibit electronic 
banners and links to information and videos of Gilad Shalit. In 2008, the pop singer Aviv Gefen wrote a 
song dedicated to the soldier called “Everybody’s Child” (Hayeled shel kulano) which invoked the 
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image was displayed and waved daily and had become firmly imprinted in the national 
consciousness.  
Flags from the nation-wide campaign for the return of Gilad Shalit were waved 
as a daily reminder of what was publically perceived as an unfinished war. It is a core 
doctrine of the Israeli Defence Forces not to leave a soldier behind in the field, and the 
dominant public sentiment was that the government did not do enough to secure his 
release.  Gilad Shalit came to embody the sentiments of many Israelis, the perception 
that in the area of security the government was not doing enough to safeguard the 
country’s residents.  
 
           
Figure 15. “Gilad is still alive” banner hanging from a private home in Kiryat Shemona. 
 
During and after the Second Lebanon War in July 2006, the Mizrahi population 
in the Northern region felt abandoned by the state.
99
 The residents of Kiryat Shemona,  
brought into the spotlight by international media, complained about economic hardhsip 
and called into question the ability of the government to provide security. Esther felt 
that the municipality managed the aftermath of the war on Lebanon in 2006 poorly. It 
was only when volunteers from the army arrived with food and assisted with cleaning 
that she felt someone cared about them. After this Lebanon war she had contemplated 
                                                                                                                                               
kinship terms that are frequently used in nationalist discourse. Gilad’s supporters planted a tent outside 
Netanyahu’s office in Jerusalem and a billboard was displayed for months across IDF’s headquarter in 
Tel-Aviv.   
99
 To read analysis of the Israel-Lebanon war 2006 in relation to Mizrahi read; Smadar Lavie & Reuven 
Abariel: ‘Operations 'Summer Rains’ and 'Adequate Pay’’ - yet other acts in the Mizrahi-Palestinian 
tragedy. Jordan Times, 27 July 2006. 
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not flying the Israeli flag on Yom Haatzmaot (Independence Day), since it was difficult 
to feel patriotic when they had had such a terrible year. However, the strategic position 
of the border Mizrahi ethno-class within the military state and political culture can be 
said to have strengthened post-Lebanon 2006. 
 
Making the margins central  
 
In the months leading up to the Israeli War on Gaza in 2008/2009, political and 
religious leaders, as well as the media, created a strong public awareness of Mizrahi-
dense border towns facing the rockets in a manner that validated their place in the 
Zionist ethos and army. The Mizrahi ethno-class at the geographical margins of the state 
became central actors as they temporarily were considered crucial in the national and 
moral legitimization of war.  
Media aligned the border towns with the centre which was being encouraged to 
show solidarity with the peripheries and in particular the ‘Southern Front’. The Yeshivat 
Hesder in Sderot, launched a nationwide campaign in 2007 to raise awareness of the 
situation in the South and reclaim what they described as Israel’s lost self-respect. One 
of the leading rabbis in the religious Zionist movement, former Member of Knesset 
Rabbi Hanan Porat, established a group called ‘Raising the Flag for Sderot’. He blamed 
the government for not taking effective measures against Hamas, and by doing so 
“desecrating God”. Porat argued that we “must lead the nation into standing erect, and 
that attacks in Sderot were not the problem of the residents alone, but everyone’s 
problem” (Jerusalem Post 27th May 2007, accessed on 14th September 2009).  
Visits by international politicians increased media attention and this 
campaigning contributed to transforming Sderot into a world symbol of Israeli suffering 
and the threats posed to the Jewish nation. 
100
 Barak Obama visited the town as the US 
Democratic presidential candidate on 23rd July 2008. At the press conference towards 
the end of his visit, he received an “I love Sderot” t-shirt depicting a heart pierced by a 
rocket through from the town’s mayor, Eli Moyal (Yediot Aheronot 23th July 2008). 
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 In addition to frequent visits of high-profiled politicians to Sderot, other initiatives from below put 
Sderot on the national and international map. In August 2008, Israelis from the centre went solidarity 
shopping in Sderot in order to show their support for the residents. The organisation ‘Standing Together’ 
organized a campaign to order challah (bread for Sabbath) from bakeries in Sderot.  
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The Israeli consulate in Los Angeles arranged a “live4Sderot” campaign including a 
concert to raise awareness for Sderot.
 
The live-concert was held at the Wilshire Theatre 
in Los Angeles which the presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, John McCain and 
Barak Obama attended in support. The director of the Foreign Ministry’s public affairs 
department said that the concert, along with videos launched on You Tube, “was part of 
a systematic campaign to raise awareness of what Israel is facing and how it is dealing 
with Hamas terrorism” (Jpost 29th January 2008).  
Just a few days before the Israeli war on Gaza, on 21 December 2008, Benjamin 
Netanyahu visited the southern border town of Sderot, a town structurally similar to 
Kiryat Shemona, and gave an emotional speech which was broadcast on television. He 
blamed the situation in the south on the government’s lack of action and said that 
Kadima, the political party in power, was responsible for their suffering. He promised 
that Likud leadership would provide bitachon (security) and support military operations 
over soft diplomacy. By appropriating the concept of security, he revalorised the role of 
development towns in defending the nation.  
Little was heard about the several Ashkenazi-dominated settlements surrounding 
the towns. The shouting and suffering came largely from the Mizrahi-dominated 
communities representing the poorest segment of Israel’s Jewish population. In contrast 
to the national image of self-sacrificing and strong Ashkenazi kibbutznikim, the 
Mizrahim were portrayed as passive victims of conflict in need of a paternal army and 
national support. This representation fed into an already existing image of development 
towns as impoverished and neglected places. Even though portrayed as victims of geo-
political conflict, the residents of Sderot were moved from the margins to the centre of a 
national frontier, thus blurring the image of a periphery. 
 
Self-nationalisation as strong and steadfast 
 
Analyzing the situation of Mizrahim in development towns, Yiftachel argues that the 
Mizrahi residents in Israeli frontier towns are left in a metaphorical and ambivalent 
‘twilight zone’ entrapped between integration and alternatives (Yiftachel 2004:204). His 
approach highlights institutional discourse but does not account for the role of personal 
agency. Herzfeld argues in his study of bureaucracy and statehood, that studies of 
nationalism from above fail “to recognize the role of the ordinary person in taking the 
grand images by the leadership and recasting them in the more familiar terms of local 
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experience” (1992:49). Nationalism can be projected onto ordinary people by pervasive 
national (ist) elites and leaders. In this way subjects may appear as nationalised, but 
they are stripped of their agency to appear as (self)-nationalising subjects. Jean-Klein 
defines ‘self-nationalisation’ as: “A process wherein ordinary persons fashion 
themselves into nationalised subjects, using distinctive narrative actions and embodied 
practices that are woven into the practice of everyday life” (2001:90).  
Placed at the geographical and the socio-economic margins of the collective, my 
informants claimed not only to be victims of pervasive nationalism, but were also co-
authors in the construction of national identity, or what I have termed ‘peripheral 
nationhood’. I suggest that “strength as a spoken value and behavioural code” (Sa’ar 
2006) was a key element of the self-nationalisation processes in Kiryat Shemona. 
Residents fashioned themselves into strong citizens to cope with borderland anxieties 
and as a way to fashion themselves as vital actors in Israeli nation-building.    
Steffen Jensen (2008) shows in his ethnography that amongst the colored people 
of the Cape Flats, some were able to turn their ability to endure violence into a sign of 
heroic stoicism. In Kiryat Shemona, the public discourse of development towns as 
deprived places contradicted their self-identification as strong and capable of enduring 
hardship.  The geographic proximity to a perceived hostile border combined with lack 
of employment has contributed to a relatively high turn-around of residents. Several 
residents I met expressed a wish to leave their town, but most of them were structurally 
without sufficent finances and networks to establish life elsewhere. They thus created a 
local identiy around heroic steadfastness in contrast to those who had left town. 
Although several Mizrahim continue to suffer from multiple forms of exclusion (such as 
colonial racism and labour discrimination) they challenged their position in the 
ethnocray by emphasizing local identities.  
In June 2008, I was having lunch with a friend in West-Jerusalem. A Palestinian 
man drove a truck into a crowded street, killing one person and injuring several others. I 
was only a few hundred meters away from the event but felt composed and finished my 
meal before we continued to wander the streets of the Old town.  By then, the incident 
had reached the news but life seemed to go on as normal. The exception was the 
nervous chattering of a group of American tourists, clearly upset by this dramatic event. 
Later that week, I discussed my emotional response with Maya, a Jewish Israeli friend 
from Kiryat Shemona.  
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Your reaction means that you are on your way to becoming Israeli. You become 
tougher, stronger, and get thicker skin. You learn to deal with the situation and move 
on. You can’t retreat to your own room and be depressed and alone, you need to 
continue with your life. 
 
 Maya commented that my calm reaction during this critical event meant that I 
was developing unique Israeli qualities of strength. I had heard this sort of analysis 
several times: “We have learned to live with the situation, we have gotten strong.”  
Countering his wife Esther’s narrative of trauma and anxiety, Rahamim 
fashioned himself and the town’s residents as strong.  
 
I don’t mean to brag, but I was not too afraid. A new war will face those with weak 
nerves. I am no hero, but it is important to remain strong. There’s no city in the world 
that will stand tall in times of hardship like Kiryat Shemona. And as for the next war- 
we will stand tall then, too.  
 
Although suffering from traumatic memories, Esther was proud that she had 
lived through the hardship of several wars and that she had not fled the town. Esther laid 
claim to Israeliness by self-fashioning as strong but also used ethnic categories to make 
this point. She applied the local value of ‘strength’ to distance herself from the 
Ashkenazim and argued that those with weak nerves (not necessarily wealth) had left 
town. She did not explain the disproportionally high exodus of Ashkenazi residents as 
related to financial means but according to their coping capabilities.  Esther did not 
compare their suffering with that of their Palestinian neighbours, but with the rest Israel 
and particularly the centre. The centre referred to Ashkenazim who reproduced socio-
political norms and had access to symbolic capital and material resources. Ashkenazim 
in Tel-Aviv or in the wealthy suburb of Ramat HaSharon were ignorant and not aware 
of life in the north. In the centre, people were colder and only concerned about money. 
People in Kiryat Shemona were warmer and more welcoming. She compared the 
experience of living in Kiryat Shemona with life in Sderot. She identified with the 
population there but expressed envy of how frequent the town occurred in media during 
the build up to war. One evening I watched the commercial Channel 2 with the Zakay 
family. A nationwide TV campaign asked the population to express solidarity with the 
population in the South. The campaign was called Ha Darom Shelli (My South) and 
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showed famous Israelis greeting, praying and singing for the inhabitants of Sderot. The 
campaign led Esther to wave her hands in frustration. “The Qazzam rockets they 
receive in Sderot are nothing compared to the Katyusha rockets in the north!” Her 
annoyace revealed a commonly held sentiment in Kiryat Shemona of being forgotten 
and neglected by the centre between wars.  
The ulpan educator, Judith and her husband Avri, claimed that only devoted and 
strong residents had remained in Kiryat Shemona. Even though they had the financial 
means to move elsewhere, they were proud of what they saw as their national 
contribution. All their old friends from their school days had “fled the Katyushot”. 
During the war with Lebanon in 2006, almost half the city’s residents left the area. Avri 
remained in town even though he had the opportunity to evacuate. Sitting on his 
balcony, Avri recalled the war and his strong connection to the town. “I had to stay. I 
felt like I was part of a national mission.”  
Before Avri became a wealthy factory manager, he had been discriminated 
against by his Kibbutz employer due to his Mizrahi background.
101
 Like other 
Mizrahim, he was largely marginalised within the national settlement ethos, even if they 
populated the same regions and were employed in typical ‘pioneering’ work. By living 
in Kiryat Shemona and remaining in the town during rocket fire, he felt that his 
contribution to the security of the state was finally acknowledged. Peripheral 
nationhood had thus become a strategy to include himself in the national ethos from 
which he had been excluded from at one time. 
Sylvia Parto, the former principle of Dancinger High School , welcomed me at 
her home in March 2009. 
102
 From a Moroccan Jewish family, she had been born and 
raised in Kiryat Shemona and her living room was adorned with decorations, including 
a huge painting of the four-fingered hand of Fatima. Although she had lived in Kiryat 
Shemona her entire life, she had never gotten used to war. “Children should get used to 
ice-cream, but not to rockets,! she said energeticallly. She was very proud and strongly 
identified herself with Kiryat Shemona and had realized that not all Israelies could live 
in the centre. Living in the Galilee had, for her, become an important part of practicing 
Zionism, a view that was shared by several other residents. Maintaining a strong Jewish 
presence in the Northern region was key in order to prevent the Arabs from taking over 
the land. It was important to remain strong and patriotic, otherwise Jews might be 
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 See the first chapter about his experiences with racism in Kibbutz Kfar Sol.  
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 Dancinger is the largest High School in KS.  
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confined to the Diaspora again. Sylvia appeared dedicated to her career path and had 
clear suggestions about what was needed to facilitate attachment to the town. The 
economic deprivation and many rocket attacks, combined with stigmatisation, had made 
Kiryat Shemona a particulary challenging place to grow up in for young people. She 
taught schoolchildren a strong national spirit (roach etnam) which they could use as a 
coping strategy for living in a border area under the constant threat of attack. Sylvia 
believed that the centre could learn much from the population in Kiryat Shemona about 
strength, particularly since the frontier had moved further south during the war with 
Lebanon in 2006, during which rockets hit Haifa. “When you’re in a survival mood, you 
don’t fall apart.” For Sylvia, it seemed like the very process of talking and teaching 
about koach (strenght) had enabled her to develop a distinct sense of local attachment to 
the town. Both Esther, Avri and Sylvia  rejected the negative images commonly 
generated about their town by the general Israeli public. By highlighting the unique 
qualities of its strong and resilient residents they countered the stigmatised images of 
place while empowering themselves as central actors of the national Jewish collective.   
 
The fighting rabbi 
 
In this section we will consider how the IDF serves as an important site for the 
reproduction of national unity and divisions in Kiryat Shemona. Within Israeli society, 
analysts have generally emphasised how political and professional careers are linked to 
military service. Those placed on the lower rungs of the ethnic hierarchy can increase 
their opportunities for careers and social climbing through military service. Levy 
maintains that the Israeli army up to the end of the 1970s reproduced and legitimised 
social inequalities (1998:884). The elite soldier was typically a white middle-class 
secular Ashkenazi Jewish man who was identified with the status symbols of the 
warrior. The soldiers who were confined to the margins of the army with lower ranks 
and most often sent to the frontline of battle, were Mizrahim and Arabs (Yuval-Davis 
1997:94).
103
 Ashkenazim were considered historically to have contributed more to 
‘national redemption’ than Mizrahim.  This situation legitimised their inferior position 
in the social hierarchy and ruled out social protest by Mizrahim against the practices 
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 The groups at the economic and geographical margins of the state, such as the Mizrahim, Druze, 
Russian immigrants and Ethiopians have formed the majority of IDF (Israeli Defence Force) causalities 
of the al-Aqsa intifada since October 2000 (Lavie & Abariel 2006).  
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that reproduced the ethnocray. The rise of neo-liberal values of individualism in the 
early 1990s changed the role of the IDF for the kibbutznikim and Ashkenazi upper-class 
circles. More Ashkenazim are choosing not to be combat soldiers and this has led the 
way to more mobility and equality for Mizrahim within the army. Netanyahu’s promise 
of an attack on Gaza and the rebuilding of trust in the IDF resonated well with residents, 
for which the IDF was still the main lever of social mobility. Soldiers from the Mizrahi 
ethno-class can change their loyalty to the army in the hope of socio-economic equality.  
Religion can also provide crucial organisational and ideological resources for 
nationalism and the institutionalised expressions of collective identity (Hearn 
2006:217). Catarina Kinnvall has demonstrated how ontological insecurity played a key 
role in the resurgence of “religious nationalism” in India among Hindu and Sikh 
populations. Kinnvall argues that religious collective identities can help individuals who 
feel vulnerable and who experience existential insecurity. Religion, like nationalism, 
gives answers to the individual’s quest for security by providing a picture of totality, 
unity and wholeness.  That God has set the rules, and made them difficult to contest, 
relieves the individual psychologically from the responsibility of having to choose 
(2004:759). 
Mizrahim along with Orthodox Jews are the new elite soldiers in Israel’s 
military and according to Levy, a central factor in the militarisation of Israel (Levy 
2007). Military service, through a religious Yeshivat Hesder, allows a recruit to spread 
his three years of conscription over six years, alternating between a semester of study at 
a religious academy and a semester in uniform (Antoun & Hegland 1987:183).
104
 The 
Hesder Yeshivas, which were largely set up in the mid-1970s after the Yom Kippur 
war, represent a national-religious commitment to Greater Israel.
 105 
The curriculum in 
the Yeshiva includes nationalist and religious indoctrination that is rife with 
fundamentalist ideas about "redemption" and "wars of commandment" aimed at 
ensuring "ideological resilience" (Ben-Eliezer 1998:334). The graduates, many of 
whom become senior officers in the IDF, are influenced by the authority of rabbis who 
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 Usually the term yeshiva is related to religious seminaries for unmarried young men. After marriage, 
men go to Kolel.   
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 The ethno-religious neo-Zionists
 
advocate an exclusive Jewish State that incorporates the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. The belief in territorial expansion originates from the concept of Eretz Yisrael or 
‘Greater Israel’ which believes that the land is granted to Jews by God.  Such dangerous aspects of 
modern nationalism have their roots in the Christian assumption that there can be only “one fully elected 
nation, one’s own, the true successor to ancient Israel”  (Hastings 1997).  
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relentlessly preach a messianic doctrine holding that the State of Israel is sanctified and 
is watched over by Divine Providence (ibid:335).   
The chief rabbi of Kiryat Shemona, Zephaniah Drori, is a leading scholar of the 
religious Zionist camp and plays an instrumental role in the militarisation and 
sacralisation of the periphery. Rabbi Drori established the Yeshivat Hesder in 1977 and 
today it has an enrolment of around 400 students.  In a video called ‘In the Footsteps of 
Heroes’, the Yeshiva states its ethno-national position very clearly. It starts off with a 
Talmudic phrase “the guardians of Israel neither slumber nor sleep…”  
 
Kiryat Shemona is on the frontline of battle for Israel’s survival and Yeshivat Hesder is 
the heart and soul of that community. The self-sacrifice exhibited on a daily basis, to be 
that safety zone, to be that buffer from its Arab enemies that would like to see Israel 
wiped off the face of the map, is a normal way of life. You’re three kilometres away 
from Hezbollah. You can look at the Golan Heights, it is a foremost position to 
safeguard Jerusalem. Kiryat Shemona is what keeps Ahmedinedjad and Assad out of 
Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem. The students are Israel’s secret weapon. They are ready to put 
down the book and pick up the gun (http://wn.com/Kiryat Shemona, accessed on 11th 
November 2011).  
 
 This statement raises the importance of the border town as a guardian for the 
whole country to the level of a sacred mission.  The rhetoric of a ‘safety zone’ as a 
‘normal way of life’, resonated both with Zionism’s hegemonic proto-idea of settlement 
and security and its residents’ self-identification as strong and steadfast. While the 
Mizrahi ethno-class was largely excluded from the Zionist secular pioneering ethos, a 
religious leader incorporated them into the sacred duty of protecting national territory. 
Members of the Chackotay family perceived it as their ideological and sacred obligation 
to stay put in the north and to protect national territory.  They argued that if everyone 
left, the land would be taken over by Arabs: “Medinat Yisrael (the nation of Israel) 
needs us here!”  
The existence of external and internal enemies was central to their sense of self 
and community. Their negotiation of Jewishness was not only restricted to their status 
as religious Orthodox Jews protecting a national territory from Arabs, but to their role in 
protecting the ‘West’ more generally against Islam. The belief in the Eurabia conspiracy 
theory, allegding Arabisation and Islamisation of Europe, strengthened their perception 
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of the threat posed by Muslim others in the region.
106
 Benny Chackotay, who had never 
been outside of Israel’s border since his arrival as a child, believed that the Turks would 
soon outnumber the Germans and that the Moroccan and Algerian communities were a 
threat to France. He wanted to know the size of the Muslim population in Norway and 
whether my country was aslo in danger of Islamisation. By believing in a radical 
external Muslim enemy, the threats, from domestic differences and anxieties such as 
ethno-demographic fears realting to the presence of Palestinians or non-Jewish citizens, 
can remain in “their place” (Ram 2009:18). The perceived threats to European and 
Western values resonated amongst my informants, many of whom remained strongly 
attached to their Arab or Muslim homelands in practice.    
I spend the holiday Tisha B’ Av (the ninth day of the Hebrew month of Av) on 
the 9
th
 of August 2008, with the Chackotay family. Tisha B’Av commemorates the 
destruction of Jerusalem and the Holy Temple and is observed by means of a fast, 
lasting from one sunset to the next (Taus 2008:170). For the Chackotay family, it was a 
day of fasting and prayer in which to reflect upon the destiny of the Jewish people.  
After the prayer, Benny linked the destruction of the two temples, and past attempts to 
destroy the Jewish people, to the threats posed to Israel by its Arab enemies. He 
believed that the struggle for survival continued and that the IDF was instrumental in 
protecting the sacred territory of Eretz Israel granted to Jews by God. The Chackotay 
family fashioned themselves into guardians of national territory and their strength of 
belief became a resource for negotiating their position within the ethnocracy. For them, 
the sacred obligation of remaining steadfast provided them with a claim to national 
belonging and a sense of worth.  
Benny and Revital Chackotay’s youngest son, Tal (24) was enrolled at the local 
Yeshiva Hesder. I never followed him to the Yeshiva but its concept of sacred defence 
was brought into everday life. Except during his periods of army service in Sderot, he 
had lived in Kiryat Shemona his entire life. In October 2008, he had just returned from 
two weeks military service in Gaza and like the general public he was convinced that 
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 Giselle Litmann (who writes under the pseudonym Bat Ye'Or or Daughter of the Nile) argued in 
Eurabia: the Euro-Arab Axis (2005) is a secret project exists between European politicians and the Arab 
world for the 'Islamisation of Europe', the purpose of which is to destroy America and Israel, along with 
Europe, is a doomed continent on the brink of cultural extinction in the face of a relentless and 
coordinated campaign of domination by Muslims to transform it into an Islamic colony called Eurabia. In 
this colony, Europeans would be turned into the slaves of Muslims and forced into a state of 'dhimmitude' 
or subject status - in accordance with the 'dhimmi' or treaty enforced on the 'Peoples of the Book' during 
the Islamic caliphate” (irr.org.uk, accessed on 12th November 2011).     
135 
 
another war was coming soon. When I asked precisely when, he said that within the 
next year there would be “another tough war” as a direct response to the threats posed 
by Hamas and their allies in Ahmenadinejad’s Iran. As if to remind us all that the 
seeming normality around us was fragile and might be broken soon, he said laughing: “I 
am ready to fight again!” Turning more serious he said: “We have gone through several 
wars and difficult times. My family coped well during the war since we stayed together. 
The residents here are very strong and resilient.”   
In different situations I spent with Tal and his family other advantages of 
military service surfaced in their talk than national ideology and patriotism. These were 
more oriented towards the realisation of one’s potential or pride in ther participation in 
elite units. “In the army you get friends for life, you learn expressions and slang you 
will not learn elsewhere. I pity those who don’t get the opportunity to serve in the army 
for religious or other reasones. It is not so cool to do the alternative civilian service,” 
Tal explained to me.  
However, on another visit to the Chackotay family, during the build- up to the 
war on Gaza, his identification with the army seemed to have hardened. I asked Tal 
about the possibility for future peace and he burst defensively into a ten-minute 
uninterrupted praise of the IDF and adopting the stereotypical media image of 
Palestinians as terrorists. He claimed that the IDF had never initiated a war, just 
responded to real attacks and threats. As long as the Palestinians and Arabs were not 
willing to make real peace, there would be none. “How can you talk to terrorists, to 
people who blow themselves up? We are the Israel Defence Forces. Hagana (defence) 
is our mission, to protect our people and land. There is no alternative (ein breira),”  he 
said with the affirming and standard voice of a conscripted soldier. Tal’s fixation on 
innocence was striking. He reproduced a friend/enemy division within Israel, in which 
he accused anyone criticizing military action against Hamas or Hezbollah as an enemy 
within. He portrayed Arabs as enemies and Israel wholly part of the West, its vanguard 
in the Middle East.
107 
Tal seemed to imply that only I as an outsider could have asked 
such a naïve and ignorant question about peace. The discourse of terror was clearly 
influenced by Yeshivat Hesder where he had learned that military values combined with 
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The promotion of Western superiority or cultural intolerance is observably not unique or case-specific 
to Israel. The same concepts governed the British Empire and dictated relations between the French and 
its colonies in North Africa and Lebanon. It is also an underlying concept of the modern day constructed 
“clash of civilisations” thesis: the assertive promotion of the modern, secular West versus the backward, 
religious-fundamentalist East (Shabi 2010:22).   
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religious beliefs were conducive to a secure and orderly society. Tal’s support for 
colonial practices of occupation and warfare became an expression of national loyalty 
and an aspiration to upward social mobility.  
In regard to the Galilee region, previous anthropological research has 
approached the subject of local identity through the analysis of local symbols and sacred 
rituals (Ben-Ari and Bilu 1997). Sosis and Handwerker (2011) show how religious 
women who remained in northern Israel during the Lebanon war in 2006, coped with 
the stress of war and its terrors by reciting psalms. What I witnessed in the months 
preceding and during the War on Gaza suggested that religion not only played an 
important role in reducing anxiety but was also used as a source of strength for Israelis 
from various backgrounds. In between wars various populations held competing claims 
for Israeliness, while during war, religion was used as a unifying factor in order to instill 
hope and strength.  
In October in Kiryat Shemona, Yeshivat Hesder arranged a processional 
presentation of a Torah scroll in memory of Liran Saadia and David Amar, two soldiers 
from Kiryat Shemona who were killed in the Second Lebanon War in 2006. I went 
outdoors with Rahamim and Esther as the procession passed by their house. Rahamim 
put on his kippah and hugged and kissed the Torah scroll as it was passed around the 
crowd. In addition to members and relatives of the bereaved families and locals from 
Kiryat Shemona, secular kibbutznikim and soldiers posted in the north also joined the 
procession. The procession united members of the diverse frontier population to cope 
with the existential anxiety that arose during  uncertain conditions before a war. The 
memory of the two dead soldiers was used to strengthen the spirit and steadfastness of 
the entire frontier population. By linking personal loss to the central myths of heroic 
sacrifice and national regeneration, the residents of Kiryat Shemona and the Northern 
region moved themselves from a stigmatised periphery to a national frontier. The 
commemoration of the dead in the build up to war, allowed people of the region to 
ignore, avoid and forget the issues that divided them. Residents of Kiryat Shemona saw 
themselves as united with Israelis of various backgrounds and the uncomfortable reality 
of their structurally stuck position in the ethnocracy was temporarily irrelevant. The 
notion of siege, perpetuated by the state, deeply resonated in times of geo-political 
unrest, and provided the social cohesion necessary for war. 
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Figure 16. Public procession of a Torah scroll in Kiryat Shemona October 2008. 
 
National unity during war 
 
The Israeli government said the need to defend its citizens in Sderot was the motive for 
launching aerial and ground attacks on Gaza on December 27
th
 2008, the first major 
Israeli military offensive since the Second Lebanon War in 2006. During wartime, a 
heightened sense of national unity was felt nationally and in the town and reisdents 
invested more emotional energy in the symbols of nationhood.
108
 Both individuals and 
representatives from the municipality decorated the town with banners with slogans 
such as “We are all IDF” and “We love Tzahal” (Hebrew acronym for the IDF) 
idealising the warrior image of the soldiers and boosting their morale.  Blue and white 
Israeli flags were flown on balconies, streets and in social media profiles.  The local 
value of ‘strength’ was now more intensely performed in self-nationalisation processes 
where Kiryat Shemona residents demonstrated their support for the nation.  
Chief Rabbi Drori held a public prayer for soldiers serving in Gaza. Members of 
the Yeshivat Hesder moved their prayer ceremonies from the synagogue to the public 
city square so that residents could join. A 20 meter green banner divided the square 
between the praying congregation and the public. Benny, whose son Tal was serving in 
Gaza, stood in the midst of the crowd murmuring and praying and putting on the tefillin, 
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winding the black leather thongs around his left arm. The rabbi underlined the strategic 
importance of Kiryat Shemona as an outpost against hostile Arabs, and encouraged the 
listeners to strenghten their religiousity and observance and remember Jewish sacrifice 
and heroism of the past. He finished with a special prayer for Gilad Shalit, thus 
elevating him from his status as a regular soldier to an almost divine status as a Zionist 
symbol.   
Early on the morning of January 14
th
 2009, I was awakened by the siren alert for 
incoming rockets, the tzeva adom (red code). Immediately understanding that it was a 
serious situation, I stayed in my bedroom which was the fortified room of the Zakay 
house. It was built from solid concrete with a tiny window at the top and gave a false 
promise of protection. Shortly after, I heard a large sound of rockets followed by distant 
explosions. Feeling upset and anxious, I turned on the television to listen to the latest 
news. I heard a voice calling from outside and someone knocking at the door. It was 
Rahamim who said that I could no longer stay in my flat but that I had to evacuate to 
their basement which was a proper bomb shelter. The young couple from upstairs had 
already joined them. The floors were covered with rugs and some green plants were 
placed in the corner. It was clear that they had spent time in this room before. Esther 
was clearly upset and so was their neighbour’s wife, shaking and hugging her husband 
who tried to calm her down. Like in southern Israel, life was heavily disrupted by rocket 
fire. All schools, businesses and factories closed shortly after the sirens sounded. 
Although I had prepared myself for a ‘situation under fire’, I had conflicting 
feelings about the situation I found myself in. I was in Kiryat Shemona as a civilian and 
now I felt the fear that my informants had talked about so many times. I knew that there 
was a chance an attack could happen, especially after the massive military attack on 
Gaza. The rockets landing near Kiryat Shemona were described as a solidarity attack by 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Esther and Rahamim were curious to 
know my reaction and they sought sympathy for their attitude. “You see, you never 
know with those Arabs!” Esther said. They agreed that I was very strong, like an Israeli, 
since I had not panicked. After an hour of silence, we went back upstairs and watched 
the latest news coverage. The sounds we all had heard were when the IDF had 
responded by firing six artillery shells. We all remained indoors that day, watching the 
news. A local reporter broadcasted live from the main street of the town. Although 
presented as helpless and passive, the residents felt that the government was finally 
putting their suffering on the national agenda. “We are the news”, Rahamim said 
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excitedly. “Now, we feel like we are a part of the nation”.  
I was surprised by Rahamim’s excitement during this highly stressful event. It 
seemed like he enjoyed being at the centre of public attention, even if the occasion was 
tragic and it meant staying in the bomb shelter. Paradoxically, it was media coverage 
pointing towards the vulnerability of the Mizrahi border towns which made the 
residents feel stronger and more valued. Although the focus was mostly on Sderot 
during the War on Gaza, residents in Kiryat Shemona felt empowered by the increased 
public attention given to the border towns. They supported the war and fighting despite 
the suffering they faced because it momentarily blurred the image of a stigmatised 
periphery and enhanced the perception that they were a central frontier.  
 Being at the frontier rather, than a periphery, can also generate material 
benefits. During the war, tens of millions of shekels were distributed to local authorities 
in border regions. However, the estimated cost of Operation Cast Lead was 500 million 
NIS for each day of fighting. This required budgetary cuts elsewhere, including those 
aimed at developing the infrastructure in the northern and southern peripheries. Thus, 
despite the communal attempt of avoiding the image of a periphery during wartime, the 
economic cost of war further marginalised the peripheral population (Tzfadia 
2011:118).  
 
The online battlefield  
 
In the early years of the Internet, it was believed that it would contribute to the 
fragmentation of populations and breakdown of stable national identities. However, the 
Internet has also emerged as a major medium for the flagging of nationhood. The 
online, social networking website Facebook has become a key arena for demonstrating 
one’s national sympathies.  Posting a political message or exhibiting a nationalist 
symbol as one’s profile picture is a frequent phenomenon. The users of Facebook can 
chose to share information with the public or restrict it to their network of friends. I 
have been registered as a user since 2007, and during this time I have witnessed how 
national identities have been fixed and become fetishised online, particularly during 
times of crises.
109
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 The day after the massacre and bombings in Oslo by a white anti-Islam extremist on 22th July 2011, 
more than half of my Norwegian Facebook friends changed their profile picture into an ‘I love Oslo’ 
logo. The use of Facebook helped to conserve and strengthen the concept of regional and national 
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During the war on Gaza, supporters of Israel posted Israeli flags, whereas 
supporters of the Palestinians posted a candle or the message "We are all-Gaza". Shortly 
after the Israeli invasion of Gaza in December 2008, nationalist gestures and reactions 
increased on Facebook. The power and immediacy of the online battlefield became 
particularly evident as profile pictures of flags and various slogans were uploaded. 
Supporters of the Palestinians posted profile pictures of Palestinian flags or slogans 
such as “we are all Gaza” or a stroller symbolizing children being attacked by the Israeli 
military.  
 
Figure 17.   Facebook campaigns and slogans against the Israeli military offensive in Gaza.  
 
During the Israeli war on Gaza, a female informant aged 25 from Kiryat 
Shemona, uploaded a satirical image on her Facebook site. Israel’s national emergency 
service, The Red Star of David (Magen David Adom) was changed into a red national 
flag accompanied by the words “the Red Army”. The rhetoric reflected the view that 
only the Israeli Defence Forces can prevent emergency and disaster. Militaristic ethno-
nationalism was promoted even through images that mocked official discourse.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
identity, while having a unifying effect for a grieving nation. 
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          Figure 18. “The Red Army.” 
 
Another patriotic Israeli initiative was the “qassamcount” 
(http://apps.facebook.com/qassamcount/). Those wanting to help raise awareness about 
Hamas- fired rockets hitting Israel were encouraged to donate their Facebook Status. 
The statuses were automatically updated with the number of Qassams hitting Israel
110
.  
Nationalist gestures on Facebook and reactions to them increased during the 
War on Gaza. My personal Facebook page became the site of much heated 
conversation, as friends of both Israeli-Jewish and Arab backgrounds were involved in 
mutual accusation and blame. A colleague from the LSE posted a critical comment on 
my 'wall' condemning the war on Gaza. Within a few hours the list of counter 
arguments had grown very long.  A middle-class friend from Tel-Aviv, a lawyer and 
IDF soldier, wrote in response that "we have the right to defend ourselves", invoking 
the theme that the war was nationally justified as a response to an existential threat. A 
girl I knew from KS wrote that the army should “finish the job no matter how long it 
would take”. A few of the Jewish American students I had befriended in the Haifa ulpan 
were concerned for my personal safety and posted “come south!” reflecting the 
perception that only the border areas were unsafe.  
On the 25
th
 of June 2009, I noticed that the majority of my Israeli Facebook 
friends had replaced their profile pictures with photographs of the abducted Israeli 
soldier Gilad Shalit and had changed their status updates to add the text: “…has been 
waiting for Gilad Shalit for two years.” More than 85,000 Facebook users changed their 
profile photo and status. A Facebook search for 'Gilad Shalit’ a year later in 2010, 
unearthed more than 200 results. “Gilad is still alive” one group stated, borrowing the 
main slogan of the Gilad campaign. “Bring Gilad Shalit Home!” another group 
demanded. 
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 By Friday 9
th
 January 2009 the application had 163,291 registered users. 
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                             Figure 19.  "Gilad Shalit is still alive.” 
 
When I asked an informant why he had changed his profile picture to that of 
Gilad, he said that he felt it was his duty as a former Israeli soldier. “I served in the 
Lebanon war and Gilad could have been me. As a soldier, you want to be sure that the 
government will be behind you. I think that they are not doing enough to bring the 
soldiers back. This group will also send signals to Israeli society,  that we have to fight 
together.” Yiftach identified himself as a soldier and for him it was that link which 
allowed him to claim an ‘us’. 
An extensively planned hasbara (propaganda) campaign of public advocacy 
started in the months leading up to the war. The Israeli government established a Sderot 
Media Centre with the stated purpose “of uncovering the voices of a population 
marginalised by the conflict: the residents of Sderot and the Western Negev who suffer 
daily from the terror of Qassam attacks.”111 During the war itself, the media centre and 
the IDF effectively silenced other narratives and controlled the public interpretation of 
the war. In order to prevent leaks from soldiers and officers, the IDF ordered a ban on 
cell phones. Reporters from all major national and international networks broadcast 
from the hilltops and streets of Sderot but with few images to show the world.  
The Israeli media contributed to the construction of crisis and collective anxiety. 
They fed the public with terrifying reports and security analyses about the arms build up 
by Hamas and Israel was presented as in danger of annihilation. At the same time, 
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 Today, the Sderot Media Centre claims to represent “close to one million people living in southern 
Israel under the threat of Gaza rockets.” (http://www.sderotmedia.com/, accessed on 16th March 2009). 
  
143 
 
media channels limited reporting on the suffering in Gaza. The major rightwing daily 
newspaper Israel HaYom reported how the IDF made every effort not to hurt civilians 
and reported that Hamas was using Palestinians as human shields. The front page 
showed a photo of soldiers preparing for war and “working like slaves” (Israel Haiom, 
08/01/09). According to a study of the first days of media coverage of the war by a 
liberal but non-partisan group called Keshev, the Center for the Protection of 
Democracy in Israel, the Israeli news media was filled with “feelings of self-
righteousness and a sense of catharsis following what was felt to be undue restraint in 
the face of attacks by the enemy” (Nytimes accessed on the 13th January 08).  
During the war, I watched news coverage on Channel 2 with the Zakay family. 
The reporter standing in Kiryat Shemona said that the residents were prepared for the 
worst. Kiryat Shemona was portrayed as a war zone, when it in reality was a normal and 
mundane day. It compared the population in Sderot with the past sufferings in Kiryat 
Shemona. Journalists from Ashkelon and Naharia sent back reports of Qazzam and 
other rocket attacks and how many people were being treated for shock. The only image 
broadcast from Gaza was of a demolished minaret immersed in grey smoke. 
The war, referred to as the Gaza Massacre by Palestinians, caused outrage in the 
Arab world. It received international condemnation and criticism for the  indiscriminate 
firing and civilians casualties that occurred on a massive scale. However, this did not 
influence the general public view of the moral righteousness of the military 
campaign.
112
 In my ulpan class, a fellow student referred to Norway as a antisemitic 
country since two Norwegian doctors working in a hospital in Gaza at the time reported 
what they were witnesseing. The Israeli State accused the international media of just 
showing the Palestinian perspective. A frontpage headline in Yediot Aharonot, the 
country’s largest selling daily newspaper, expressed very well the popular view through 
the intentional misspelling of a Hebrew word, which turned the headline “World 
Media” into “World Liars”.  
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 A minority was openly against the war from the start. The columnist Gideon Levy wrote in Haaretz 
that “Not since the summer of 1967, have we had such a uniform, brainwashed chorus, and back then it 
was not so nationalist and bestial, insensitive and blind”.  
144 
 
‘X-plain’ moral righteousness 
 
Humour and satire were also part of the media strategy to deal with the War on Gaza. 
The tremendously popular satirical TV show Eretz Nehederet (A Wonderful Country)    
on Channel 2, is presented as a news show that summarises the events of that week in 
Israel. The rap duo ‘X-plain’ satirised the country’s efforts to explain to the world its 
position during the war on Gaza.
113
  
 
 
Figure 20. “I wake up in the morning and suddenly fall on me rocket.” 
 
This video became wellknown amongst my informants.  The ‘victims’ from the 
periphery were half-naked women and the rappers were racially stereotyped as “arsim”. 
This Hebrew slang term illustrates a negative stereotype related to lower class Mizrahi 
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 “I wake up in the morning and suddenly fall on me til (rocket) - explain- how would you feel if 
someone throws on you til (rocket)? Not for this did we built a Jewish homeland, the children in the 
South sit in MMD (acronym: shelter) can’t go to (grocery store) can’t go to school, but you don’t 
understand because you live happily in hul (abroad). How would you feel, if in Paris they throw on you 
til? You ask for a croissant, but instead they throw on you til! Our army is the most moral army in the 
world, well at least one of the five most moral of them all, if you push us, then maybe…we can reach a 
compromise on the “most moral army in the region”. They throw on us (rockets) so we come with 
(airplanes), but remember who started to shoot on ezrahim (civilians) how would you feel if in London 
they shot on civilians? You want to cruise in the Thames but instead they shoot on civilians. If you ask 
why we fight we say they started. If you ask why we bomb, we say they started. If you ask what we want 
we say…erm. It’s so hard when there is “red alert” (code signal for incoming rockets) we have to give 
shelter to (female) refugees from the south. They go naked in the house; they are so (poor) because a 
rocket has hit their closet room. Support us, or we take (back) Israeli football player from Liverpool. 
Take Bar Rafaeli (model) leaves Leo with nothing, let’s see him dating with Um Kul Tum (old Arab 
singer). Look on us, look on them. Who is more similar to you? Us! We have McDonalds and soon H&M 
they don’t even have (subway type chain). If you won’t support us, you leave us with no choice, we’ll 
remind you what took place in the European past. “Fire, brothers, fire!” (Famous poem about the 
Holocaust). I think we made our point clear, I hope you know how it feels when someone throws on you 
til. Yo, yo, explain, Support US, Hate Them.”  
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Jews, usually of Moroccan, Persian or Yemeni descent.
114
 The ars wears a ‘wife beater’ 
t-shirt and golden chains, he listens to muzika mizrahit (literally oriental music which 
draws on Arab melodies) and typically votes for right wing parties. The loud arsim 
belong to the lower socio-economic rank or they are ‘nouveau riche’ able to 
demonstrate wealth through consumption, but lacking a proper education and cultural 
capital.   
The video satirised how mainstream Israeli media presented border Mizrahim as 
passive victims and how arsim temporarily became the national symbol for 
steadfastness in Israeli society.  It jokes about how the vulgar suddenly become the 
civilised. It can also be analysed as a satire of peripheral nationhood and the 
simultaneous aspiration towards Western values, symbolized by McDonalds and H&M. 
However, the use of humour and stereotypes can also reinforce a feeling of both 
national and Ashkenazi self-righteousness. Satire during war times becomes a part of 
the mainstream media strategy, rather than playing the role of criticism.  
The front page of Yediot Aharanot on 18
th
 January 2009, showed how the public 
had regained new faith in the strength of the army through the war on Gaza. Israeli 
soldiers in a tank returned from Gaza accompanied with the word ‘victory’ in bold 
letters. The frontpage of the free daily newspaper, Israel HaYom, on the same day also 
showed returning Israeli soldiers waving the Israeli flag.
115
 The bold title reads 
“finished and not fulfilled”. Olmert referred to the twenty-two day long war as “a 
brilliant operation”. A picture of Gilad accompanied by the question “and what about 
Gilad?” reinforced the perception that the war was not over.     
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 Mizrahi men prominently play roles of violent and criminal characters in Israeli cinema. They are also 
stereotypically constructed as quintessentially emotional: on the one hand violent and criminal and on the 
other warm, familial and affectionate (Shoat 1989:122). 
115
 In 2009, Israel HaYom, a newspaper with a rightwing pro-Likud profile, had the second largest daily 
circulation in Israel.   
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Figure 21. Front Page of Israel HaYom 18/01/09. 
 
Tal had doubted the national leadership after the ‘failure’ in the Lebanon war in 
2006. When he returned from Gaza, he told me that previous disappointments over the 
army had faded and he confirmed the unifying function of war. “This war made us 
believe in our country again.”  
  
Conclusion 
 
Existential insecurity was an ordinary situation in the context of an Israeli border town. 
Whereas my informants expressed great mistrust in their elected officials, the Israeli 
Defence Force (IDF) was praised as the keeper of the Israeli future capable of reducing 
fears.  Politicians, army officers and religious leaders exalted in the courage of the local 
residents who stayed in their towns and thus felt that they had a moral right to continue 
fighting. The media aligned the border towns to the central regions and portrayed the 
peripheral Mizrahim as key members in the moral legitimisation of war. The residents’ 
local sense of place was narrated and experienced, particularly in relation to the centre. 
Placed at the geographical and socio-economic margins of Israeli society, they utilised 
the concept of ‘strength’ to deal with borderland anxieties. Self-fashioning as strong 
balanced the tension between the esteemed role of the development towns in the frontier 
ethos and their actual deprivation. By arguing that a sense of strength in Kiryat 
Shemona was different from other regions and countries, they created a distinct local 
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and moral identity for themselves while simultaneously supporting national unity.  
Peripheral nationhood is reflected in the practices and narratives by which 
peripheral communites consolidate a sense of collective local belonging through 
juxtaposing their own histories, affiliations and sentiments with official state discourses. 
In Kiryat Shemona, this was done by envoking notions of ‘strength’ and supranational 
civilizations. Self-fashioning as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim also linked them to the 
globalised West fighting the evil of Muslim terrorism. Remaining in town during war 
became an act of pioneering patriotism, not only an expression of  ethnocratic 
exclusion. The border Mizrahim appeared as central members of the nation during 
wartime. Their desire to inhabit a frontier strengthened militaristic ethno-nationalism 
and settler-colonial control over territory and peripheral minorities. Warfare and an 
imagined ‘horizontal comradeship’ became a temporary way to undermine the 
ethnocracy symbolically. A comparison can be made with the empowerment of women 
during the Second World War. The conscription of men into the military services made 
it necessary for women to leave their homes and replace or supplement their men as 
breadwinners. When the war was over, the traditional gendered division of labour 
resumed and the women returned to their subordinate position. In the aftermath of war, 
the Mizrahi ethno-class faded from the national agenda and sank back into their 
multiple and competing loyalties of family, class, religion and region. The Mizrahi 
ethno-class paradoxically benefit from a permanent situation of warfare and the 
increased militarisation of Israeli society.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Threathening Others: the Dynamics of  Prejudice in Everyday Life 
 
This chapter elaborates further on the process of marking boundaries and categories 
from the perspective and daily experience of Mizrahim. The Euro-civilisational 
discourse that stresses the relevance of a shared Western culture in relation to national 
identity profoundly shaped how Mizrahi residents differentiated themselves from 
Russian and Arab others in narratives and practice. The Mizrahim, having suffered 
under a lack of public recognition for their Judeo-Arabic identity and culture, re-
deployed the oriental stigma and colonial racism in their descriptions of Arab and 
Russian others. As such they were reproducing the ‘quasi-western’ character of 
Israeliness as defined by Ashkenazim. However, they were challenging the secular 
character of dominant Israeliness, by identifying themselves as traditional and doubting 
the Jewishness and morality of Russian others. By rejecting the secular identity that is 
shared by most Israelis, religion and morality became an effective path to negotiate their 
position in society. There were differences in the stigmatised reaction to an internal 
other (the Russians) and external others (the Arabs). Russians were included as essential 
members of the Zionist nation-building and vital for Israel’s future existence as a Jewish 
state, but the Russian’s Jewishness and morals were the object of doubt. Attitudes and 
stereotypes directed towards non-Jewish Arab others, despite individual friendships and 
relations, were characterized by feelings of suspicion and superiority, racism and 
exclusion.  
 
The absorption of FSU immigrants and their challenge to Mizrahim 
 
Israel loves immigration, but does not like immigrants. (Israeli proverb) 
 
The Israeli State was based on an immigrant settler society and is engaged in the 
settlement process to this very day (Kimmerling 2008:176). The story of Exodus as a 
story of moral ascent continues to resonate as aliyah or ‘ascension’. It is the foundation 
of the national claim and the  founding myth that Jews were returning to their ‘historic 
homeland’. The Law of Return states that the entire Jewish collectivity, non-residents 
149 
 
and non-citizen Diaspora Jews included, are entitled to settle in Israel and obtain full 
citizenship rights.  
Since the late 1980s more than a million Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union (FSU) have made aliyah. Their arrival brought about a 
significant change in Israel’s demographic landscape and today they make up about 
17%, or nearly one-sixth of the Israeli population (Central Bureau of Statistics 2005).
 116
  
The Israeli elites have welcomed mass immigration as a valuable demographic 
contribution to the Zionist goal of maintaining a Jewish majority over the Palestinians, 
of preserving a secular majority over a growing ultra-Orthodox population, and of 
reinforcing the aspiration for a European dominated culture (Tzfadia & Yiftachel 
2003:47). The Law of Return has likewise been used to restrict the migration or 
settlement of undesirable non-western or non-white migrants, often without making 
explicit mention of race or specific ethnicities (Veranachi  2006:22).
117
 The 
predominately Western (white) character of Russian immigration to Israel resulted from 
the fact that there was no strict policy governing those who  were suspected of not being 
properly Jewish.  
Israel’s preference for Russian Jewish immigration was already evident in the 
1970s when the immigrants were offered financial and social benefits to ease them into 
Israeli life.
118
 This contrasted sharply with the neglect of Mizrahim in working-class 
towns and neighbourhoods. Unlike the Soviet immigration to Israel in the 1970s, the 
FSU immigrants of the 1990s were not motivated by Zionist ideology or by any 
particular desire to live in Israel for religious or other reasons. They were primarily 
driven by pragmatic rather than ideological considerations, and by push rather than pull 
factors. The push factors included the drastically worsening economic, social and 
political conditions and the increase in the open expressions of anti-Semitism with 
Russia upon the collapse of the USSR (Remenick 2007). Generally speaking the 
Russian emigrants of the 1990s were highly educated and mostly secular (Al-Haj 2004). 
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 The largest aliyah occurred between 1990-1996 when over 600,000 immigrants arrived.  
117
 Ethiopian Jews immigrating during the early 1990s were generally treated much harsher. Families 
were separated and only those recognised as Jewish were granted citizenship. Ethiopian Jews have been 
forced to undergo acts of symblic re-circumcision in order to be recognized as Jews according to the 
halakhic defintion of Jewishness (Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis 1995:309).The failed attempts of the Igbo 
people of Nigeria to be recognised as Jews by the Israeli rabbinate illustrate a group who currently are 
excluded from aliyah rights (Bodenheimer in Haaretz 31/12/11, accessed on 3th January 2012).  
118
 The immigrants were enthusiastically greeted by Prime Minister Golda Meir. “Once again, real Jews 
are coming here. These are people of a superior caste who will give us heroes,” she reportedly said on 
national TV (Shabani 2009:197). 
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Many preferred emigrating to the West, preferably to the United States. The US 
restricted post-cold war Russian immigration to 50,000 a year, and most emigrants were 
directed to Israel (ibid: 311).  
The Ashkenazi establishment, who once had labelled Jews from Arab and 
Muslim countries as Mizrahim, ascribed an ethnic label to the Russians, who emerged 
as a distinct ethnic category characterised by a shared language. In contrast to the 
neglect of Mizrahim in the 1950s, starting in 1989, the Russian newcomers received an 
aliyah package of financial benefits for a limited period to cover all social and housing 
needs. The process of de-Arabisation and Judaisation, is preserved and reproduced 
today in the manner of settlement by immigrants. Russian immigrants obtained cheap 
housing in the Galilee and Negev where they were exploited by the state for the project 
of Judaisation (Tzfadia 2011:42).
119
 The process to colonise Palestinian land was also 
strengthened as immigrants could gain access to settlements established in the occupied 
territories. This demonstrates how the dominant ethno-national community used 
immigration policies as a colonial practice to maintain or achieve territorial control. As 
such, there are clear continuities between the historical practices of settler-colonial 
Zionism and settler-colonial forms of control today. 
Around 130,000 Russians, especially from economically disadvantaged 
backgrounds, settled for cheap public housing in peripheral development towns (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 1998). The FSU immigrants found themselves in development 
towns and working-class communities on the lower tiers of the Israeli structure where 
they typically met people from other disadvantaged groups such as Moroccans, 
Yemenites, Ethiopians and less-educated Ashkenazi Jews (Rebhun & Waxman 
2004:65). The immigrants often held higher-status occupations in their country of origin 
than the average Jewish population in Israel. Now they had to compete with these 
groups in the labour market for scarce jobs and most of the immigrants experienced 
some downward occupational mobility (Smooha 1993, Tzfadia 2000). 
Unemployment and economic hardship were less spectacular sources of 
insecurity than unsettling rocket attacks and war but were still great worries in town. 
Labour competition was intensified by a sense of relative deprivation and neglect 
amongst Mizrahim, both in relation to the Ashkenazi elites and to the Russian 
newcomers. The withdrawal of the welfare state has increased competition for between 
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 The Likud government under Ariel Sharon’s leadership spent $ 5 billion on the construction of 
140,000 apartments, mostly on  state peripheries. 
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the underprivileged for status, recognition and rights. In a context of increased 
competition for scarce jobs, categories of belonging such as Jewishness, Israeliness and 
Mizrahiut (Easterness) become consequential when linked to the politics of 
redistribution (Belbard 2005:4). Israeli citizens, who are vulnerable to the impact and 
disappearance of the welfare state are particularly opposed to the dilution of the 
religious and national components of Jewish identity for the state and its citizens 
(Lehmann & Siebzehner 2006). 
 
Russian pride and Arab stigma  
 
The FSU immigrants arrived in Israel when neo-liberal policies and values were on the 
increase. The socio-economic transformation created some acceptance for alternative 
visions of national identity (Ram 1998, Shafir & Peled 1998). The norms were different, 
but not contradictory to the core Zionist ideology that aspires to have a single, modern 
culture among the Jews and to combine secular Jewish heritage with Western culture 
(Smooha 1993:71). In the Zionist discourse on national identity, the Russians (even 
non-Jews) are considered culturally closer to Ashkenazim than Mizrahim.  
The klita (absorption) of the Russian immigrants was successful according to the 
Zionist goal of ‘ingathering the exiles’, but it did not succeed in instilling a homogenous 
culture. Though interested and often ready to adopt Israeli habits, culture and values, the 
Russian Jews did not give up their own. There is still a strong ethnic attachment among 
Russian communities that challenges the very logic of mono-cultural hegemony 
(Kimmerling 1999:64). They have their own thriving press, access of Russian TV, 
conduct after-school classes to teach Russian and live in predominantly Russian 
neighbourhoods (Golden 2001). They seem eager to preserve their Russian identity, 
which makes them feel a part of the country’s Western-oriented Ashkenazi elite 
(Remenick 2007). In contrast to Mizrahim who were forced to distance themselves from 
their Arabness, FSU immigrants regard their Russian origins as an immense advantage 
and seek through their pride in Russian language and culture, to higher status and 
power. The founding and success of two immigrant parties with a clear Russian 
character, the right-wing parties Yisrael b’Aliyah (Israel in Immigration/Ascendance) 
and Yisrael Beitenu (Israel our Home), further reinforces the ethno-cultural boundaries 
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around a constructed Russian community (Shafir & Peled 2002:317).
120
  
The mass immigration of Russian-speaking immigrants, Ethiopian Jews and 
several hundred thousand foreign workers has led to a growing acceptance of 
multilingualism and challenges the hegemony of Hebrew. The Russian immigrants of 
the 70s felt the need to hide their mark-of-origin accents when speaking Hebrew. This 
has changed significantly during the last two decades. When I conducted fieldwork in 
there existed one commercial Russian TV channel, one public service Russian radio 
station, two commercial Russian radio stations, and around ten Russian-language 
newspapers.
121
 Several Russians I met from an older generation said that they preferred 
to go to Russian-speaking dentists, doctors or hairdressers. In Kiryat Shemona, 
literature evenings were arranged at the community centre and Russian bookshops 
flourished as they do elsewhere in Israel. Many help-lines, such as those for national 
travel information, had recorded menus in three languages: Hebrew, English and 
Russian. Cyrillic scripts were seen alongside Hebrew on ingredients lists and instruction 
leaflets for household items (Shabi 2009:134). The demand for recognising Russian as a 
third official language, alongside Hebrew and Arabic, has already been voiced.
122
 Many 
former or recent FSU immigrants are convinced that European, and especially Russian 
culture, is vastly superior to Israeli culture.
123
 The success stories of members from the 
Russian communities in politics, science, high-tech and sports give credence to this 
conviction (Shafir & Peled 2002:320).  
Musical tastes are part of an elaborate hierarchy of symbolic capital that 
represents and reinforces social divisions in Israeli society. In the local ulpan, Russian 
students were taught countless Israeli songs as part of the process of learning the 
language and to nurture national sentiment. When Judith sang enthusiastically at the top 
of her lungs, the musical score was solely Eastern European and mostly modernised old 
Russian, Polish and Yiddish tunes. A Russian student in class was thrilled to recognise 
an old Israeli lullaby that turned out to be translated from Russian into Hebrew. We 
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They have provided a swing vote in several national elections since their arrival since they tend to vote 
for right-wing parties and candidates (Horowitz 2003).  
121
 The Russian TV-channel is called Israel Plus and the radio station Reka. The Russian newspaper, The 
Courier, is published daily.  
122
 Russian cultural commentators say that, aside from the sheer size of this community in Israel, one 
potential reason for this strong linguistic tradition is the reliance on newspapers and the dramatic arts, at a 
time when mainstream Soviet sources were rigidly conformist (Shabi 2009:134).  
123
 The achievements were frequently highlighted in national media throughout my fieldwork. During the 
Beijing Olympics in 2008, nearly half of Israel’s Olympic team were immigrants from the former Soviet 
Union. An advertisement for an immigrant organization showed the Israeli kayak rower, Michael 
Kalganov, originally form Uzbekistan, accompanied by the Israeli flag. 
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were not only singing the nation-state into existence, but also reinforcing Israel’s 
cultural hierarchy by singing songs composed for the tastes of the Ashkenazi founding 
pioneers. The Eurocentrism of Israeli popular culture was an obvious paradox in Kiryat 
Shemona where muzika mirahit (literally ‘oriental’ music), which draws on Arab 
rhythms, melodies and styles, was enormously popular. 
All this public display of Russia and its political power is a reflection of pride in 
this community. Such public confirmation is glaringly absent in the Arab-language 
sector, even though Jews of Arab background are a larger community than the Russians. 
A population that ought to treasure a strong linguistic tradition openly, which is praised 
by intellectuals for its depth and scope, does not feel able to do so in the Jewish State 
(Shabi 2010:134). When Zionism was forming its collective memory, Judeo-Arabic 
culture and Arabness were deemed inferior, not part of the Jewish nation. The new 
Sabra Hebrew was de-Semitised in accent and rhythm, illustrating the settlers’ 
Eurocentric biases (Shoat in Lavie 1996:67). Mizrahim were forced to suppress their 
Arabic language because it was considered uncivilised by the Ashkenazi elite. Many 
Mizrahim themselves share this dominant, pejorative view of the Arabic language and 
have actively chosen not to teach it to their children. In Kiryat Shemona, older Mizrahi 
residents spoke Hebrew with an accent closer to its original guttural sounds, a strong 
reminder of the resemblance between the two Semitic languages. Arabic is the official 
language alongside Hebrew but it functions as such almost exclusively at the declarative 
level. As the prime identity marker for the Palestinian minority and Arab nationalism, it 
plays a minor role in the national Hebrew-dominated public sphere (Amara 2006:3).  
The marginalisation of the Arabic language and culture reflects the Zionist aspiration 
towards a European and Western nationality.  
However, Russian otherness has developed into many pejorative stereotypes that 
are widely used in formal and informal discourse. Examples are pork-eaters, sausage 
aliyah, AIDS-carriers, alcoholics, Mafiosi, prostitutes, parasites and even Bolsheviks 
(Prilutskii 2003 in Fialkova & Yelenevskaya 2007:3). The stereotype of the Russian 
with blond hair and blue eyes painfully resonates with the way Russian-speaking 
immigrants are depicted sometimes in the Israeli media as ‘too white’, that is, non-
Jewish or not Jewish enough (Golden 2003:161). Paradoxically, some of the attitudes 
towards Russian immigrants in Israel resemble the precarious status of Jews in Russia 
as mistrusted others (Remenick 2007:9).  
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The image of Russian others in personal narratives  
 
The factors mentioned above have contributed to the exclusionary attitudes my Mizrahi 
informants often expressed against Russian-speaking Israelis. Many felt that the 
Russians undermined the Mizrahi majority and posed a threath to the traditional 
character of the town and put at risk their social position and political control. The 
newcomers were ignorant of existing values, culturally different and represented an 
economic burden to an already neglected city. The Russians were accused of ‘sticking 
to themselves’ and of having a weak emotional attachment to the place. Mizrahi 
informants criticised the Russian community’s lack of religious observance, in contrast 
to their own more traditional (masoriti) religious lifestyle.
124
 They emphasised the 
importance of strong ties with the extended family and respect for traditional gender 
roles, both of which were considered weaker amongst the Russians (and Ashkenazim). 
Many complained about the ‘noise’ and the foreign language they did not understand. 
Even in the context of the rise to power of the ultra-nationalistic political party Yisrael 
Beitenu, Russians were accused of being untrustworthy Zionists with suspicious 
motives for doing aliyah. My ulpan teacher Judith confirmed this commonly held view 
when she once told a story about Russians who had benefited from financial assistance 
through aliyah programs and then returned to Russia in order to join in that economic 
rise as an example of weak national devotion. When immigrants returned to Russia or 
moved elsewhere, they rejected the future of the Jewish nation and were thus conceived 
as disloyal national subjects. 
Story-telling, stereotypes and narratives of prejudice and exclusion can be 
analysed as elements of what Billig (1995) has termed banal nationalism or taken-for-
granted views about specific nations and their representatives which are constructed and 
reproduced in everyday life. The very banality of stereotyping and story-telling as part 
of nationalism means that it is rarely openly confrontational. Nevertheless, such 
practices may serve to establish or conceal relations of power and dominance between 
the interlocutors. 
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 Although religious tradition is considered a way of life, many Mizrahim are pragmatic in their 
interpretation and observance of strict prohibitions and they watch television or drive after attending 
synagogue on the Sabbath (Smooha 1993:167). 
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Playing the religious card 
 
In daily practice and conversation, my informants laid claim to Israeliness and 
challenged the Israeliness and Jewishness of differentiated others. Rahamim bitterly 
explained his sense of neglect and resentment when we met at a local café.  
 
In general I would say that we are happy that new immigrants would like to come and 
live in Israel as we need them. But lately there are people coming to Israel for the 
wrong reasons. They want to convert to Judaism, but just for financial benefits. It is 
sometimes hard for us when we see the new immigrants, many of them not even proper 
Jewish, receiving everything. When I served the army in the seventies I received 
nothing (klom)! Now the new immigrants get all kinds of benefits and special 
treatments. Those who came first leave Israel to make a better future for themselves in 
the US or other places, and the new immigrants receive all the national benefits. It is not 
fair. 
 
Rahamim expressed frustration because of the benefits and financial assistance 
the Russian newcomers had received, resources that he believed rightfully belonged to 
those who had made a national sacrifice. His narrative, laced with hostility towards the 
Russians, was still supportive of the well-reagarded Zionist valuation of immigration. 
However, like many others, he doubted the Russians’ claims to Jewishness and 
motivations for converting to Judaism. Comparing his own experience with immigrant 
absorption, he mocked their sense of hardship. Elaborating in detail on his military 
service, he claimed that he had made a long-standing sacrifice to the nation-state, which 
many of the Russian newcomers had not.   
Itzik Zagory, in his mid-60, emigrated from the city of Mogador in Morocco to 
Israel when he was sixteen in 1963. His brother had already arrived in Israel in 1956 as 
a part of the aliyah ha-Noar (youth aliyah). Not having seen her sons for seven years, 
his mother convinced the rest of the nuclear family to emigrate. Itzik’s uncle did not 
want to immigrate to Israel and left for Montreal, Canada instead, where they live today. 
Despite not being enrolled in a formal Hebrew program, Itzik quickly ‘picked’ it up on 
the streets.  He went to high school in KS and took a course in electronics. Like the vast 
majority of Israelis of that time, he served in the army and  the military reserves for a 
shorter period every year as required by Israeli law. He married a local Moroccan 
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Jewish woman and had three children. He found a job in an electronics store and in the 
late 1980s he founded a music shop where he has been self-employed ever since. Like 
the Chackotay family he had acquired middle class membership by establishing a small 
business.
125
 
His shop used to be popular but now most of his customers were from the 
surrounding kibbutzim or soldiers staying temporarily because ‘few people in town had 
money’. During the Lebanon war in 2006, he maintained his work routine in his shop, 
which was located on the main street, nicknamed ‘rocket alley’ during the war. He 
believed that the economic development and creation of new jobs would improve 
people’s coping capabilities. “People who are working have less time for worrying.” He 
had recently paid for the wedding of his son and worried about the economic future for 
his family. His economic worries can explain why he was suspicious about the 
Russians, who were potential competitors in the labour market. This concern can be 
illustrated by a conversation that unfolded at his store one October afternoon. 
Itzik was sitting contentedly in a large armchair behind the counter with his feet 
propped up on a smaller chair, watching television. I knocked on the wall and he walked 
up to me and smiled, clearly glad that I had interrupted his idleness. Drinking coffee and 
chatting about his day, I asked if he could share his views on Russian aliayh. Like 
Rahamim, Itzik expressed his concern for the Russians’ weak Judaism, claiming that 
only a minority of the immigrants were properly Jewish. He jokingly said that the 
Russian immigration had made Israel less Jewish religiously and more Christian. He 
contrasted their weak Jewishness with his own strong Jewish roots, tracing his lineage 
back more than 200 years. He claimed that the descendants of Jews who had mixed with 
and married Arabs in Palestine throughout centuries would refrain from throwing stones 
during the Palestinian Intifada because there was “some Jewish blood and roots in 
them.”  
Itzik, like the majority of Israelis, neither practiced nor believed in a religion. As 
secular, he was a keen fan of hard-rock, chain-smoked cigarettes and drove on Shabbat. 
However, like both religious and secular Jews, he emphasised a common Jewish 
identity (Ben-Rafal & Sharot 1991:252). He applied Jewishness as a symbolic resource 
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 Middle class membership through small businesses is usually open to men reliant on extended family 
finances as seed money as collateral for bank loans, or reliant on loans from the Ministry of Commerce. 
Women have much less access to such family money or loans due to Israel’s emphasis on child rearing 
and the high costs associated with childcare. 
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for his exclusion of the non-Russian newcomers he perceived as a threat to the 
traditional Mizrahi character of the town. He argued that Mizrahim, and even Arab 
descendants of Sephardic Jews, were closer to Judaism and hence naturally closer to the 
Jewish State than non-Jewish Russians.  
Much more than among veteran Israelis, Russian-speaking Israelis do not define 
their ethno-national Jewish identity in religious terms.
126
 Although the arrival of 
Russians has contributed to the ethno-national and the religious definition of Jew 
becoming somewhat relaxed, Itzik’s narrative shows how Jewishness became an 
effective resource in negotiations of social positioning. A more western category, that of 
the Russians, while strengthening the westernisation project of Zionism, threatened the 
claims to Westerness and civilisation made by Mizrahim and thus their status in the 
ethnocracy. Both Rahamim and Itizk created a powerful counter-discourse to the 
Russians in town by paradoxically playing the religious card in the guise of upholding 
national unity and thus including themselves in the nation.  
  
Defending a moral community   
 
In George Mosse’s book,  Nationalism and Sexuality, he shows how sexual and moral 
values have come to be allied with nationalism. Nationalism has put every person in 
their place: man, woman native, foreigner, etc. This fixed hierarchy makes it easier to 
denounce those who stand apart from the norms of a group or from the nationalistic 
goals of dominant society. In his study of the sexual guidelines of respectability among 
the bourgeoisie of Europe, he argues that the specific situation or sexual act of a person 
was not judged, but rather his or her ‘general behaviour’. Behaviour frowned upon was 
the result of an immoral education and an irreligious background (Mosse 1985:16). The 
exclusion of a category of people often entails the attribution of unique erotic qualities 
of the women of that category (Edelman in Siegel 1998:138). In my female informants’ 
narrative Russian women were commonly portrayed as foreigners who had emigrated in 
order to disrupt the commonly used and accepted norms of conduct.  
Judith, a woman of Iraqi Jewish origin in her mid-50s expressed her assessment 
of Russian influence through the lens of sexuality and immorality. Revital had warmly 
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 In 1993, 64 % of the Russian-speaking immigrants who were Jewish according to halacha identified 
themselves as secular, compared to 21% among the Jewish population of Israel as a whole (Shafir & 
Peled 2002:318).  
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introduced me to her friend who was employed in a small textile shop across from the 
Kol-Bo-Tal store. I met Judith alone in the store which displayed   colourful fabric and 
clothes. When I asked about her view on Russian aliyah, she laughed, repeating my 
question aloud and told me that she knew of several local men who had divorced their 
wives after the arrival of Russian women. “They were crazy about blond hair,” she said 
flippantly and confirmed the stereotype of Russian women as husband ‘stealers’. “One 
man left his wife for an awfully ugly woman who was thin as a skeleton with crossed 
eyes.” Judith drew her checks together to demonstrate how thin she was and then 
laughed heartily. She continued with a story that illustrated her view of Russian morals. 
Once, a Moroccan man stole an expensive leather bag from a customer and gave it to 
his Russian girlfriend as a present. Two weeks later, the Russian woman entered the 
store carrying the bag. Revital told this woman that the bag had been stolen by a 
married man with four children; the woman was embarrassed and returned it. Judith 
modified her harsh judgement somewhat by saying that there were nice Russians in 
town as well. Her son-in-law was Russian but even he referred to the Russian women as 
prostitutes. 
Judith’s stereotypical view of the ‘promiscuous’ Russian female other illustrated 
how she degraded the moral character of secular Russian women. The Moroccan man in 
the story, who was acting immorally by committing adultery and stealing, was merely 
portrayed as a victim of the Russian woman who was stereotyped through the prism of 
the ‘femme fatale’. Judith used this example to generalise about the immorality and 
sexuality of all Russian women. However, the Russian men were largely excluded from 
accusations of sexual immorality, thus showing an example of the esteemed value and 
role of women in reproducing the nation. In her narrative, the discourse of Israeliness 
was interwoven with both religion and gender.  
Figures of women frequently embody nations the world over (Benei 2008). In 
Israel, the presence of numerous non-Jews amidst the former FSU immigrants 
contributed to a growing tension between Jewishness and Israeliness (Shafir & Peled 
2002:308). Women’s bodies and reproductive potential are places where  ‘demographic 
contests’ between the Israeli Jewish and non-Jewish other, particularly Palestinians, is 
played out (Kaneeh 2002:23). Jewish women’s bodies are deeply etched out as 
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procreators of the Jewish nation, as Jewishness is transmitted through the mother.
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Israeli-Jewish women have the responsibility for securing the Jewish majority by 
‘birthing the nation’. Non-Jewish women are thus conceived as a potential ‘threat’ to 
the Jewish nation, particularly if they are unwilling to convert to Judaism.   
According to women I knew, mothers were  are also responsible for teaching 
their children Jewish values, traditions and morality and for ensuring that these 
teachings were passed down through generations. In the face of wide-ranging social, 
economic and demographic change many felt the need to defend the ‘national’ and 
‘moral’ community. In particularly, older Mizrahi women filled family-centred roles 
and were dependent economically on their husbands’ or children’s income. Stories of 
Russian ‘husband stealers’ thus became a stereotype used as a warning for the possible 
break up of traditional family ties. The Russians, both secular Jews and non-Jews, were 
perceived as posing a threat to local stability, morals and traditionalism. Judith, along 
with other local women, fashioned themselves into ideal ‘moral’ and national subjects 
by highlighting the immorality of Russian-speaking female others. 
 
Being civilised and rejecting Arabic 
 
Orientalistion has been a method for the exclusion of both Mizrahim and non-Jewish 
Arabs (Shoat 1988). In the first chapter, I demonstrated how Zionist ideology, infused 
with Orientalist stereotypes associating Arabic language and culture with backwardness 
and primitive behavior, forced and encouraged Mizrahim to embrace the Western, 
European and civilised version of Israeliness. The concern about being civilised was a 
recurring theme among my informants. This value relied heavily on what were taken to 
be Western or European norms of propriety. My informants seemed to have internalised 
the Oriental stigma of Zionism which placed both Arab and Judeo-Arab culture on the 
lower rungs of the cultural hierarchy. Although I knew from interviews, and 
overhearing conversations, that some of my older informants used Arabic as a 
community language, they seemed to avoid it in public. Tal said the following when we 
discussed the topic.  
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 According to Israeli law, a person is considered Jewish if either their mother, grandmother, great-
grandmother and great-great-grandmother were Jewesses by religion or if the person has converted to 
Judaism in accordance with Orthodox Judaism (Shahak 2002:5). 
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I don’t think it is necessary to learn Arabic. I was stationed in the army in the south with 
some Bedouin soldiers, and they all knew Hebrew. I learned some phrases in Arabic 
like “iftah al-bab” (open the door), but Hebrew is the official language of the state. I 
mean, why shall that change? 
 
 Rahamim saw no reason why Arabic should be spoken in Israel, even if his 
grandmother spoke it at home during his childhood. “I can understand Arabic, but I 
don’t see any reason why we should speak Arabic in Israel. We should talk Hebrew, 
English or even Norwegian for that sake.” Rinat on the other hand felt a sense of loss 
for not having been taught Arabic. 
 
Whenever our parents spoke Arabic, we knew it was secretive. I think it is sad they 
chose not to teach us Arabic. But on the other hand, they also had to learn Hebrew. It 
was difficult for them, and perhaps they would like to give their children an easier time. 
 
These comments reflect the stigma attached to Arabic as a cultural marker of 
Jews from Arab lands that became the language of the enemy in the Israeli State. They 
also demonstrated the success of the Euro-civilisational discourse on culture and 
identity, which had managed to shape the self-image of Mizrahim as inferior to a 
Western self. 
Haim Elias, the museum manager, was one of my informants who was 
concerned with presenting himself as Western and civilised. Both he and his wife were 
employed at the local high school. On the weekend, Haim invited me for lunch at their 
house. He introduced me to his wife, two daughters and son, before he gave me a tour 
of the house. Walking through their living room he commented on their Western style 
of furnishings. From the conversation with family members, it was clear that all their 
children were contemplating leaving Kiryat Shemona. The youngest daughter was 
applying for a scholarship to study abroad and Haim proudly told me that the oldest 
child was going to the United States to work, selling products from the Dead Sea 
region.  
In contrast to the aspiration towards the West presented in their domestic space, 
public space represented an arena for competing morals. For Haim, rude and 
misbehaving Israelis of all backgrounds contributed to the moral lassitude of the town. 
Walking along the streets from the Kiryat Shemona museum to their house he pointed 
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towards garbage that was lying in piles next to the street. He was clearly irritated and 
started to remove plastic bottles with a wooden stick. “Look how the youth are 
vandalising the city with alcohol and garbage. They don’t respect it or care for the 
environment here.” He shook his head and said nothing for a while, then he suddenly 
remarked.  
 
To tell you the truth, I don’t really like Israelis either. I mean, their rudeness, their way 
of behaviour, the noise and all the balagan (mess). No, I prefer the European culture. I 
am sure that you (I was classified as European) are more quiet and organised.  
 
During another visit to their house, Haim accused the Russians of contributing 
to the problems of the town.  
 
The Russians brought with them a lot of problems. They don’t have any culture. They 
drink heavily, and look at the zonot (prostitutes)! We did not have these problems 
before they arrived. Many don’t want to be a part of Israel, they just stick to themselves, 
their own shops and friends. And the Ethiopians…only a minority have successfully 
integrated in society. We came for the love of Judaism. The Russian immigrants came 
for the money! They come here and eat pork and most of them are not even Jewish! 
 
This outpouring of concern may reflect deeper frustrations which derive from 
rapidly socio-demographic change, economic hardship and perceived threats to the 
Mizrahi position in the ethnocracy. Haim could not afford to leave the town but dreamt 
of better lives for his children. Self-fashioning as Western and civilised was thus a 
strategy for potential social mobility. Haim countered the chaotic and polluting forces 
by asserting his civilised status, distancing himself from ‘all other noisy and rude 
Israelis’. Simultaneously, he embraced local notions of propriety and moral 
righteousness where threats to Jewish Israeliness were factors such as being non-Jewish 
or of doubtful Jewishness, eating pork, drinking alcohol and sexual immorality. He 
accused the Russians, and especially the younger generation of having a weaker sense 
of local and national belonging than the veteran families and sabras (a term used to 
describe native born Israelis), thus adding a veteran-newcomer rift to the existing 
political, religious and ethnic tensions. By defining the features of differentiated others 
as undesirable, Haim implicitly defined the desirable features of those who belong. 
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Redeploying the Oriental stigma 
 
The exclusion and subordination of Arabs in Israel rests, at the most fundamental level, 
on the ideology or basic orientation of Israeli Jews. Discrimination towards Muslims, 
Christians, Bedouin and Druze has been the inevitable consequence of institutions and 
practices that serve the Eurocentric ideological imperatives of Zionism, such as the 
ingathering of the exiles and Jewish settlement of the land (Ben-Rafael & Sharot 
1991:237). The Zionist settlement project has dispossessed and excluded Palestinians 
whenever possible from control over the various resources of the country and the state. 
The Jewish Nation Fund (JNF), that holds ownership of most of the land in Israel, 
enables continuous discrimination against non-Jewish citizens. It prohibits Arab 
settlements and its stated goal is to ‘redeem’ the land from its Arab owner and ‘return’ it 
to the Jews. The notion of ‘redeeming’ was, and continues to be, a central component of 
colonial consciousness. In the name of ‘redeeming’, policies of closure, confiscation of 
land and settlement, and cultural suppression of whatever was described as Oriental 
have continued uninterruptedly (Stasiulius & Yuval-Davis 1995:293). 
In Kiryat Shemona, the ultra-nationalist party Yisrael Beitenu, which openly 
advocates the expulsion of Palestinians, received 23% of the votes at the national 
election in 2009. The leader, and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Avigdor 
Lieberman’s campaign used the sentiment of fear of the “disloyal” internal Arab other. 
Their slogan ‘no loyalty, no citizenship’, called for Israeli Arabs to sign a loyalty oath 
as a condition of citizenship. The growing success of the right-wing parties in Israel 
corresponds to trends in Europe where these parties are also gaining support. Anti-Islam 
rhetoric is no longer considered extreme or far right but part of the established political 
landscape.  
While much scholarship has been devoted to Jewish-Arab relations, there has 
relatively little attention given to relations between Mizrahim and Arabs. At the time of 
my fieldwork, only a few Arab families were living in town. There was a small Arab 
minority, mostly Christian Lebanese from the South Lebanon Army (Tzava Drom 
Levanon, Tzadal) or Druze men who had married Russian women. A large percentage 
of the male members of the Druze community have served in the IDF and many of these 
soldiers have been sent to serve in the occupied territories. In Kiryat Shemona, both 
Sadalnikim and Druzim were employed by the security service. Their military 
employment and cooperation has contributed to the deepening of the existing mutual 
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distrust between the Palestinians and the Druze/Sadalnikim but has simultaneously 
increased the trust of Jewish-Israelis (Firro 1999:193). Other Palestinian Israelies from 
the surrounding towns and villages were employed in local industry, construction 
projects and factories. Although Mizrahim receive benefits in direct competition and 
association with Arabs, they suffer from the same underclass position in a welfare state 
that is transforming into a neo-liberal one (Ben-Elizer 2008:6). 
Relationships developed between Jews and Arabs in Kiryat Shemona quite 
frequently on impersonal levels, at work and in public facilities. Daily encounters 
invariably occurred in the shopping malls where both Arabs and residents from the 
surrounding Kibbutzim came to spend their time for lack of comparable services in their 
own communities. Rahamim always went to get cheaper services at an Arab gas station 
and his sons went to Arab villages to eat the ‘real’ hummos or shawirmah. However, 
many of these encounters took place within the framework of Arab-Jewish power 
inequalities and perceptions of Israeli Arabs as others. With few exceptions, the 
majority of my Mizrahi informants seemed reluctant to develop close relationship with 
Arabs.  
 Walking home from a synagogue service, we passed a construction site with 
Arab workers. Revital pointed towards the workers, half whispering: “You see, they are 
Arabs. No one else would work like this on Shabbat!” Her daughter Keren divulged that 
although she often saw Arabs, she could never have Arab friends because their 
“mentality was so primitive”, an expression that often seemed to be used to legitimise 
prejudice.  
Some of my informants, who had suffered under the colonial Euro-civilisational 
idea of cultural primitivism through social exclusion and discrimination, referred to this 
stigma in their stereotypical description of Arab others. The following ethnographic 
vignette from my time with Esther Zakay shows how she repeatedly drew on the 
orientalist framework to differentiate herself from Arab others. One December 
afternoon, I was listening to Esther’s well-worn list of complaints over a cup of coffee. 
The neighbours were dropping by constantly, interrupting her afternoon sleep and her 
children, too, were demanding. She grumbled about the students who lived in the 
apartment above and played loud music and she worried over medical bills. Her blood 
pressure was high and she was anxious about another rocket attack. She had to clean 
and cook and her husband did not “even know how to cut his own fingernails”! I asked 
whether she had been to the market, pointing towards the green plastic bags filled with 
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fruit and vegetables. She smiled contently when she told about the good deal she had 
made. “I bought all these apples from a Druze salesman. The Druzim are good people, 
although they are primitive.” According to Esther, although Druze men who married 
Russian women were banned from their families in the Golan, at least the Russian 
women taught them to be more civilised and cultured. She saw the Russian women as 
bearers of civilisation and culture as opposed to violent and primitive Arabs.  
Although I never saw Esther together with an Arab friend or acquaintance, she 
developed situational friendships with Arabs. Esther had Lebanese colleagues when she 
was employed at the Gibor textile factory, and emphasised how the Shiim (Shia 
Muslims) were more difficult to work with than the Christian Lebanese. A few years 
ago, Esther and Rahamim had enlarged their house with money received from their 
oldest son and they had rented out a room to a young Arab couple that they described as 
very nice and calm. “Not all Arabs are bad, the problem is that many hate Israel.” Esther 
considered Arab men to be good workers and capable of doing avodah aravit, but they 
were not to be trusted in an intimate relationship.
 128
  
When Esther was employed in a nearby kibbutz, a female Arab co-worker 
complained about her husband’s abusive behaviour, but would not dare go to the police. 
She cried that she was too afraid to leave her husband and so continued suffering. 
Esther explained the moral of the story: “Arabs don’t know how to love their wives 
properly but luckily it is changing. Slowly the Arabs learn from us Israelis.” Esther 
compared her friend’s abusive husband to their Jewish neighbour, aged seventy-two, 
who had killed his wife a couple of months earlier. On Sunday morning, 12
th
 August 
2008, he had attended Tisha B’Av morning prayers at his synagogue and returned home 
to bludgeon his wife to death with a rock.  According to Esther he had been beating and 
assauling his wife for years. Having put up with her husband’s brutality, she was 
planning on leaving him, a decision that resulted in the murder. Looking down to the 
floor Esther mumbled, partly commenting on her own situation. “You see, men cannot 
live on their own. They are lazy and don’t know how to clean. And the Arabs…they can 
have four wives. You can’t live in the modern world with four wives! That is 
primitive!” 
In the case of the Arab wife beater Esther stereotyped all Arabs as inherently 
more violent. In the case of the Jewish, far worse abuser, she did not use an ethnic or 
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 Avodah Aravit (Arab work) has long been an Israeli idiom connoting work that was so demeaning that 
only an Arab would do it or the work had been so poorly done that only an Arab could have done it.  
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national category, merely ‘men’ in general. Esther had been an involuntary target of 
negative attitudes or behaviours, suffering under the Oriental stigma attached to being 
an Eastern Jew, experienced through discrimination and a sense of inferiority in relation 
to the Ashkenazim. In orientalising Arabs, Esther applied the stereotype of 
primitiveness that Ashkenazim had used to exclude her and applied the same in her 
description of the Druze and Shia Muslims.  
 
Racism and ritualised xenophobia towards Zionism’s external other 
 
In November 2008, I agreed to do an interview with the local newspaper Meidat 
Shemona after the journalist Orna Rein contacted me several times. I thought it through 
and asked for advice, knowing that a portrait sharing my academic interests would 
create curiosity. The freely distributed newspaper was very popular and contributed in 
creating a sense of local pride and identification with a place usually portrayed by 
national media in relation to economic hardship and war.
129
 The article was titled “A 
question of identity” and highlighted that I had moved “from Damascus to Kiryat 
Shemona.”  
            
  
 
Figure 22. “A Question of Identity”- Interview with the anthropology student. (Rein in Meidat Shmona 
17/10/08).  
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 A standard issue typically covered local and regional topics such as elections, cultural and sporting 
events, in addition to advertisements and  notices of marriages and deaths. 
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Upon learning that I had lived and worked in Damascus, both friends and 
strangers approached me to ask about life on the other side. “Were you not afraid?” 
Esther asked me. She seemed to imply that I, as a Western, unmarried woman should be 
wary of living in an Arab country. The ambivalent responses registered disbelief at my 
choice to be surrounded only by Arab others. Alongside expressions of rejection and 
prejudice towards Arab others existed an attraction, with memories and fascination 
about the countries they had left. For many, the ties to Arab homelands were dual 
sources of both stigma and pride.  
The mass immigration of FSU immigrants has led Israeli Jews to realise that 
Israel is becoming more and more a multiconfessional and multicultural state. This has 
not necessarily modified their perception that to be Israeli and to be Arab are two 
irreconcilable identities. Most of my informants expressed concern about the 
‘demographic threat’ the Palestinians in Israel posed to the Jewish State.  “We would 
not be surprised if the town became Muslim in the future” was a standard phrase I often 
heard. 
 
We don’t want this to happen to Israel, we want the country to remain ours, to remain 
Jewish. If we move, the following day they’ll (the Arabs) want the rest of the country as 
well, from the North to Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem.  
 
These comments show how Arabs were portrayed as posing a cultural threat to 
the Jewish-Israeli nation  (Allen 2010:10). Stereotypes, where my informant represented 
themselves or other Jewish groups, were more benign that stereotypes aimed at 
representing non-Jewish others, particularly Muslim Palestinians, who were the frequent 
subjects of everyday racism.  
One day I joined the Zakay family at the large indoor swimming pool of Kibbutz 
Hagoshrim. Esther’s cousin Avri was employed as a lifeguard in the hall and had 
arranged discounted admission for everyone. During my stay in Kiryat Shemona, I often 
went to Hagoshrim to exercise and had noted that Avri always had friends visiting or 
was chatting to visitors who congregated around his lifeguard stand. Avri had spent 
most of his adult life on a kibbutz, although he was originally from Iran. The Saturday 
we were visiting, a group of approximately 40 Arab tourists entered the hall in bathing 
suits, the women were covered in T-shirts and shorts. Avri started to utter racists 
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remarks, but not so loud that they could hear them. “Look at those Arabs, they make so 
much noise. Many of them can’t even swim.” He studied them with suspicion  as they 
entered the pool. Rahamim nodded in agreement and said: “It’s really a shame that you 
can’t deny them entrance.” Their expressions of resentment surprised me. 
Uncomfortable with the explicit racist comments, I told them that I had met several 
friendly Arabs in the souk at the weekly Thursday market. On expressing his surprise at 
my reaction Avri shook his head and lifted his arms up in a futile gesture and tried to 
convince me further. “Yes, you are referring to the Druze. They are alright, but these 
Arabs are Muslims, the worst sort. They are savage and zevel (garbage). Really, look 
how they behave, like haiot (animals).” The admission of Muslim Arabs into the 
swimming pool of a Zionist kibbutz settlement created a high level of ambivalence for 
Avri. Contrary to the ordered and disciplined Zionist body, the Arab Muslim body 
represented fluid and polluting substances, posing a threat to the integrity of the Zionist 
“self” (Yosef 2004:43). The mixing of bodily fluid in the pool seemed potentially 
polluting. Racism thus became central to the demarcation of Zionist boundaries and the 
policing of social and ethno-religious hierarchies.  
Later that week Rahamim seemed eager to clarify his view. His serious facial 
expression and tone of voice conveyed that this was a sensitive topic to discuss.  
 
I don’t consider myself an extremist like Lieberman (the leader of Yisrael Bietenu). 
Arabs are parents too, but they (the Arabs) are becoming more dominant. I will tell you 
an anecdote to highlight my point. I was following a sick friend to the hospital. There 
was a framed tablet with the names of the financial donors in the reception. Next to me 
was an Arab sitting and you know how people chat while they’re waiting. So I turned to 
him and said, You see there? This hospital was built with money from Jews abroad, and 
they still help you. It was important for me to tell him, that he enjoys the services of the 
Jewish country. 
 
Both Rahamim’s story and Judith’s comment were demonstrations of their sense 
of privilege and assumed superiority over the Arabs who were considered second-
degree citizens and free-loaders of the Israeli welfare state. In order to be accepted, they 
were expected to be ‘quiet’ and loyal. The Arabs who were ‘noisy’ and visible, such as 
the Muslim Arabs in the public swimming hall, were viewed as a cultural and ethno-
religious threat to the nation.  
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What Yiftachel calls the Israeli ethnocracy (2002:42) not only grossly 
discriminates against its non-Jewish citizens but seems to construct a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Categories and individuals marked as anti-national are marginalised and 
oppressed and if they resist or behave to ‘loudly’ they are condemned as ‘disloyal’ and 
thus further excluded. In this view, those Arabs living quietly and who are not 
criticising the nation-state out loud are considered more loyal and easier to socialise 
with that those who were potential protesters.  
 In contrast to muted racism in the public sphere, the football field provided an 
arena for openly channelling racist attitudes and anti-Arab resentment out loud. Football 
was one of the most popular activities amongst the men of the working-class 
community. Rahamim stated that Kiryat Shemona would have been a deadly boring city 
without football. He was a devoted supporter of the town’s great pride, the football team 
Hapoel Ironi Kiryat Shemona. Bale has written that the football stadium can be seen as 
a place where “strong positive identification with…locality, region and nation is 
perhaps best generated” (1988:513). The stadium was an arena for displaying oneself 
not only as a fierce supporter of the local team but also as a nationalist subject and 
patriotic citizen.  
In November 2008, I attended a football match between Hapoel Ironi KS and the 
Arab Bnei Sachnin (Sons of Sakhnin) at the local Ironi stadium.
130
 The vast majority of 
the Hapoel supporters were from Kiryat Shemona .
131
 I recognised several familiar faces 
and found a seat next to Rahamim Zakay and his two sons. The atmosphere was festive 
with the core group of supporters banging on drums and waving Israeli flags or the club 
emblem. The majority of the Bnei Sakhnin fans were Arabs but some of its supporters 
were also Jewish Israeli fans from the neighbouring kibbutzim. The Sachnin supporters 
on the opposing bleachers did not fly any Palestinian flags, but waved a gigantic flag of 
Che Guvara. The icon associated with revolution and resistance to colonialism is 
tremendoulsy popular amongst Palestinians fighting against oppression. At kick-off, 
fans on both sides were singing and waving their flags intensely, jumping up and down 
in unison. When the Arab team performed better, the Ironi supporters chanted racist and 
derogatory sentences such as “we hate the Arabs”. After Sakhnin scored, Rahamim was 
singing happily: “This is the Jewish state, we hate all Arabs!” The collective ritualised 
                                                 
130
 Sakhnin is the most successful Israeli Arab club and they won the State Cup in 2004. 
131
 Kibbutznikim from Kfar Blum and Lehabot Habashan are stars on the Ironi soccer team. 
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chanting of blatant racist remarks seemed to be an accepted norm in the context of a 
soccer match.  
 Demonstrating anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments in speech and practice 
seemed to be a nationalistic act for the residents of Kiryat Shemona that I knew. In 
social practice, it was clear that cooperation and friendship existed but in discourse 
sharp boundaries were drawn around the Jewish collective, thus confirming the 
dominant national dichotomy where Jews opposed Arabs. 
 
Russocentric prejudice against Mizrahim  
 
Over the last two decades many FSU immigrants have embraced a strong Zionist and 
anti-Arab position in political voting and public rhetoric. There are several reasons that 
account for why the Russian immigrant communities are particularly prone to anti-Arab 
racism. Israel was for many FSU immigrants their first time abroad and they were 
shocked to see that Jews came in every possible colour and appearance. Negative and 
xenophobic sentiments towards the Islamic religion were well rooted in Russia (e.g., 
towards Chechens, Tatars or Kazakhs) before emigration to Israel. An Orientalist 
discourse, with regard to the native of the Caucasus and Central Asia, also circulates in 
post-Soviet Russia, in both literature and press. The immigrants could thus deploy a 
‘Soviet-made’ orientalist framework to intepret a new reality (Shumsky 2004). 
However, Shumsky underemphasises the position USSR immigrants received in the 
Israeli ethnocracy viv-a-vis the Israeli centre. The anti-Arab and anti-Muslim stance 
frequently displayed by Russian-Israeli politicians, intellectuals and media  link them to 
the Israeli hegemonic identity as western, Ashkenazi and Eurocentric. At the same time, 
this orientalism can also be a challenge to the Israeli establishment, since it emphasises 
the national over the religious.  Also, countering the suspicion that they are not Zionist 
or Jewish enough, the immigrants might identify with the more secular Zionist elements 
of society in order to gain their acceptance (Shafir & Peled 2002:319, Gitelman 1995). 
This issue of ethnic prejudice is ideologically loaded, making it difficult to talk 
about. It is also difficult to elicit frank responses in surveys (Remennick 2007:67).  
Even so, according to one survey by Feldman (2003), 30 % of Russian immigrant 
respondents consistently admitted to harbouring prejudice against Moroccan or other 
Mizrahi Jews, 40 % expressed negative opinions about Ethiopians and over 80 % 
strongly disliked the Arabs. Pejorative attitudes towards Mizrahim were also revealed in 
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anecdotes and personal narratives about adjusting to life in Kiryat Shemona. Although I 
spent considerably less time with Russians in Kiryat Shemona, two  Russians I got to 
know stereotyped themselves as superior Westerners and projected Mizahim as inferior 
and Arabised.  
Alec had left Irkutsk in Russia when he was six years old with his mother, and 
they received cheap housing in Kiryat Shemona as a part of an aliyah package. Like 
many others from the younger generation he complained about the lack of relevant work 
in town, and he planned to leave as soon as he could. He had served the army, but said 
that he had little in common with other Israelis. Sharing the army service did not mean 
that he shared their values or interests. Although he grew up in Kiryat Shemona, he had 
few non-Russian friends and he preferred to be surrounded by Russians.  
I spent one evening with Alec and his friends on a Shabbat in October 2008. We 
met at the town’s public square and the atmosphere was lively. Alec had prepared for 
Friday night by buying a bottle of Vodka and handed out plastic cups to his friends, a 
considerable cheaper alternative than buying expensive drinks in the kibbutz pub. 
Psychedelic Trance by the Israeli group Magic Mushrooms blasted from the car stereo. 
A crowd of Mizrahi-looking youth was gathered outside. I asked him whether these 
youth was going to the same kibbutz that we were. Alec burst out: “Ma pitom? What do 
you mean?” He pointed directly towards a tall thin young man with black hair. “They 
are arsim (the term comes from the colloquial Arabic word for pimp and is used to 
stereotype low-class Mizrahi men with bad manners). I hate arsim. I don’t need them.” 
He was clearly offended by my question intimating that I would expect him to be 
friends with such people. 
Later that night, one of his friends drove us home. We parked outside a gas 
station to get some fresh air. I noticed that the phrase Am Israel Hai (The people of 
Israel lives) was sprayed in blue letters on a stone. The words are from an Eastern 
European Hasidic song that has become a patriotic nationalist Israeli song. I had seen 
the words on several public walls in town. I asked Alec why the graffiti appeared on this 
particular surface. Lifting his shoulder in a shrug he said loudly: “They are barbarim 
(barbaric) here in Israel. They like to vandalise and mess things up, they don’t have any 
culture. Israelis don’t think before they do anything!” He kicked the stone with his foot 
and pointed towards his head, “they don’t think”.  
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                                   Figure 23. “The Nation of Israel Lives.” 
 
Alec held a Russocentric view about Mizrahim in general and the Mizrahi 
character of Kiryat Shemona. He dismissed the patriotic spray as vandalism and seemed 
to imply that he would refrain from Mizrahi and Israeli “barbaric behaviour” because he 
viewed his Russian-European cultural identity and education as superior. Alex affirmed 
his self-identification as Western, while rejecting the Arabised Mizrahim who he 
blamed for not being cultured and European enough.    
One day in February 2009, I visited Mila (38), a Russian Israeli that lived in a 
mixed neighbourhood. Her flat was sparsely furnished, and decorated with crystal vases 
and books in Russian. Speaking Hebrew with a heavy Russian accent, Mila shared her 
life story. She made aliyah with her husband, son and parents when she was 20 years 
old. Her eldest brother had emigrated a couple of years earlier and they decided to join 
him. The prospect of living in a Jewish nation-state, and providing her son with a better 
future, were some of the other motivating factors for Mila’s move to Israel. They 
emigrated from Saratov, a major city in Southern Russia with almost one million 
residents and settled directly in Kiryat Shemona. Mila divorced her husband after he 
adopted an orthodox lifestyle. After the divorce, she worked as a physiotherapist in the 
army for seven years, before she took a course in reflexology at the Tel-Hai College. 
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She set up a small business from her flat in Bialik Street where she had been self-
employed ever since. It had been hard to live under Communism as a Jew but she also 
had difficulties adjusting to life in Israel. First, she felt alienated and explained this in 
relation to labour competition, jealousy and cultural differences.  
 
I did not have high expectations about life in Israel. The Moroccans were afraid that we 
would take the jobs from them. Some told me that I would get a hard time, just like they 
had when they made aliyah in the 1950s. Several people in Kiryat Shemona became 
jealous. We had higher education, but were willing to take on simple jobs. You would 
have doctors cleaning the floors, without complaining. 
 
 Mila drew a parallel between her previous socio-economic situation and that of 
the Arabs, saying that “she used to get paid like an Arab”.  Her parents held good 
professional positions in Russia, but once they moved to Israel, they lost their status and 
became depressed. “They were treated poorly, like effes (zero)!” Since they had 
difficulties learning Hebrew, Mila had to act as an interpreter. Mila had also suffered 
under the suspicion of being a non-Jew. “In Russia we were constantly reminded that 
we were not Russian, and here in Israel we are accused of not being Jewish enough!”  
As a rule she did not treat Arab customers in her practice. “I know it is a racist 
thing to say but the Mizrahim were mentally close to Arabs,” she grinned 
apologetically. She held similar attitudes to Alec about Mizrahim, when she somewhat 
embarrassingly admitted that she hoped that her only son would marry an Ashkenazi 
girl that had a ‘similar mentality’ and closer affinity to Russian culture. Her problem 
with admitting that she held racist attitudes is indicative of the majority embarrassment 
tied to racism. However, like many others, she largely concealed her racism in 
arguments of Oriental ‘mentality and culture’, and viewed herself within the 
Eurocentric Ashkenazi component of Israeli society.  
 
Friendship with a loyal Druze  
 
While Mila openly discriminated against Arabs, she had a Druze friend, and like Esther 
she seemed to treat the Druze as another category. In contrast to Arab Muslims, Druze 
in the region demonstrated their loyalty through army service and married within their 
own religion, and so were perceived as less of an internal threat to the Jewish character 
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of the state. “The Druzim live quietly in the mountains not causing any trouble,” Mila 
said. She invited me to visit Nadi, her much younger former colleague, in the Druze 
village of Mas`ada, located deep in the northeastern corner of the Golan Heights, 
bordering Syria and Lebanon.
132
 In relative terms for Israeli distances, and Kiryat 
Shmona are quite far apart. During the 30 minute drive towards the village, Mila’s 
fingertips were tapping nervously on the steering wheel of the old Volvo.  She revealed 
that she would not have planned this trip if I not had come along. She viewed her 
colleague as a trustworthy person, but did not know much about the community he 
came from.  
Mount Hermon loomed to the north and a few Israeli military vehicles passed 
us, a common sight in this border region. Following the directions of signs marked in 
Hebrew, Arabic and English, we passed through smaller villages. When we reached 
Masada, the Israeli flags had been replaced with the multi-coloured Druze flag. A few 
kites in the same colours were attached to the white and beige stone houses. Any 
remaining nervousness seemed to disappear quickly when we entered Nadi’s house. His 
mother, dressed in a long black robe and thin white shawl, greeted us in the hallway. 
She had prepared a meal for us which we enjoyed on the floor in his room. We spent the 
next few hours eating and going through photos. Mila was smiling while Nadi showed 
us pictures of his friends and family.  
After lunch, Nadi drove us to an apple farm nearby where his cousins were 
employed harvesting the apple orchards. I greeted the factory employees in Arabic and 
they were excited to hear that I had been to Damascus.
133
 One of his cousins had studied 
in Damascus and returned to the Golan afterwards. To demonstrate his hospitality, he 
gave us a box of apples to bring back to town. “They’re honest people,” Nadi expressed. 
 Nadi had lived and worked in Kiryat Shemona but had found work in a kibbutz 
closer to Masada. He much preferred the kibbutz and the apple orchards to the 
development town. His tone changed entirely when he shared his opinion about the 
town where Mila currently lived. 
 
                                                 
132
  Mas`ada’s Druze population, its relative proximity to the Israeli-Syrian 1967 Armistice Line, and its 
remoteness from the Jewish settlements of the Galilee are some reasons why Israel did not destroy the 
village or expel its population after 1967.    
133
 Some Druze are allowed to study at the University of Damascus and then return to the Druze villages, 
but for the majority of the population Damascus is distant and inaccessible.  
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The mentality there really stinks. People are into drugs and gangs. Of course not all of 
them, like Mila. But there are some really bad people there. This is my opinion, but they 
will never show their true face to you. I met a researcher from Scotland that came here 
to do a project on human rights. So I said to him, human rights, what is that? There are 
no humans here. Maybe you will discover this in Kiryat Shemona. But you have to 
discover it for yourself. That there are no humans there, just shit. The kibbutznikm are 
better.  They have thoughts, just like the Russians. They came from a big country with 
culture. They have thoughts. Culture, just like you people from Europe. 
 
I was struck by Nadi’s strong aversion towards Kiryat Shemona and its 
residents. However, Mila seemed to share his views. Having both experienced 
exclusionary practices and attitudes, they had developed an antipathy towards the town 
they both described as uncultured.  Mila said she would like to move away but that she 
could not afford to live anywhere else. 
One week after our visit to Masada, I visited Mila at her flat. She became upset 
as she told me how her solider-son, who had recently finished his army service, had 
become furious about her visit to the Druze village. “Do I look like someone who will 
hang out with Arabs?” her son had shouted in a tone of fury. Mila appeared 
uncomfortable about relating this confrontation to me. She seemed to imply that 
spending time with an Arab could be considered as an anti-national practice, even if this 
other was considered loyal to the Israeli State by the collective. Mila seemed uncertain 
and divided between her friendship with Nadi and her son’s accusations of her alleged 
friendship towards Arabs. Competing ideas about the limits for relations with non-
members of the Jewish nation were evident, even within a family.  
 
 
Teaching multiculturalism 
 
Despite ethnic tensions, it is important to note that there were several efforts of 
cooperation in town. When the Mizrahim lost their numerical strengths and their 
electoral power decreased, some local politicians created new cross-ethnic alliances. 
Identifying the tensions between Russians and Mizrahim a government initiative had 
been established to work with improving their relations. I met the manager of the 
counselling centre Hafoch Al Hafoch, for youth in distress. Irit Aloni (36) had set up the 
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programme which was aimed at getting locals to re-evaluate their attitudes and bridge 
the gaps that they felt separated them from the others. She explained that the 
relationships between the old Mizrahi families in town and the Russian newcomers 
were problematic due to cultural and religious differences, as well as shared prejudices. 
The centre had employed a diverse group of social workers and developed programmes 
to enhance the understanding between different immigrant groups. Speaking 
energetically and with a clear voice, she seemed unaffected by the tape recorder.  
 
We want to teach the youth that we are all together and explain to them about different 
cultures. One day we prepare Moroccan soup and the other day we bring Russian food. 
We learn about their holidays and they learn about ours and together we can come to a 
common understanding that the other culture is not too bad.  
 
The youth centre focused on how the two communities could enrich each other 
and overcome their differences.  However once again, culture was  encouraged only in 
folkloric’ forms, and the centre did not include ‘the elephant in the room’, to use a 
popular contemporary cliché. The state-sponsored youth centre did not talk about the 
more severe tensions and prejudices that existed between Jews and Arabs. 
Implementing a true multicultural project in the context of the Galilee, where a high 
percentage of the population is Arab, would entail including the experiences of Arab 
youth as well. The programme promoted inter-cultural understanding that was 
exclusively Israeli-Jewish and not inclusively multicultural. Because of this the 
possibility of creating a real multicultural space seemed difficult in a society based on 
strong ethno-national logic, such as appears in the case of ethnocratic Israel.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored how the colonial Euro-civilisational discourse influenced 
boundary making in everyday life in Kiryat Shemona. Racism was manifest in the many 
forms of everyday discrimination and prejudice, further exacerbated by the ethnocratic 
character of a colonial settler society. Both Mizrahim and Palestinian Arabs, in different 
measure, share the experience of socio-economic marginalisation and colonial racism. I 
have suggested that Mizrahi relations with Arabs continue to be driven by the Jewish 
reaction to an Oriental stigma rooted in Zionist ideology. Mizrahi residents redeployed 
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the Oriental stigma and colonial racism, thus reproducing the dominant tropes of 
identity as presented in Eurocentric Zionist ideology. Personal narratives and anecdotes 
shared by Mizrahi informants in everyday contexts revealed ambiguous attitudes 
towards the Russian communities. The fall of the USSR and the continued mass 
immigration, the rise of neo-liberalism and the competition for scarce jobs have 
adversely affected ethnic equality and assimilation and are some of the factors that 
influenced residents’ attitudes and experiences. These circumstances have resulted in 
the need to assert and re-shape identification, with consequences such as mutual 
antagonism. Creating a negative image of Russians served Mizrahim who felt 
threatened by various aspects of the Russian immigration. Some residents found 
justification for their prejudice against various threatening others in presenting 
themselves as guardians of faith and tradition. The success of Zionism’s Euro-
civilisational discourse was reflected in the major concern with being regarded as 
civilised. Being able to demonstrate civilised behaviour and Western cultural capital 
was a crucial factor in self-estimation and social demarcation and a boundary-defining 
device produced by both Mizrahim and Russian-speaking Israelis to distinguish 
themselves from each other. Mila and Alec racialised Mizrahim, portraying them as a 
cultural threat to European Israeli society where they placed themselves. Where Mizrahi 
prejudices towards internal Russian others showed competing claims for Israeliness, 
attitudes towards the Arab minority groups or Zionism external others, were 
characterised by suspicion and racism.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Longings for an Arab past and an American Future   
 
The more than half a century experience of  Mizrahim in ‘returning to a homeland’ not 
only provides an opportunity to explore how the immigrants were taught to become 
Israeli, but also how a ‘home-coming’ can produce new formations of transnational 
interests and identification. Mizrahim see the Israeli State as their homeland but many 
retain attachment of symbols of affiliation to a Judeo-Arabic culture and express 
nostalgia for a previous homelands outside Israel. This chapter examines my 
informants’ memories and current attachments to places outside Israel how these shaped 
their sense of belonging or not-belonging. Invoking an idealised Arab past or 
American/European future became a way to deal with disillusionment over life in a 
stigmatised border town. These symbolic attachments to other places and times 
challenge the image of rootedness emphasised in Israeli official nation-state rhetoric. It 
also challenges theories of nationalism that perceive the object of loyalty as singular and 
centred on the nation-state, such as that of Benedict Anderson’s famous work on the 
imagining of a sovereign national community as a “deep horizontal comradeship”. 
However, these connections, although transcending the nation, rarely broke with 
nationalist ideology but rather worked alongside, often meeting the demands of the 
nationalising discourse. Memory and a global orientation may facilitate greater 
belonging and re-enforce national boundaries to the current ‘homeland’ in a settlement 
context, even if these connections are not always recognized or valued by the dominant 
society. Hence, the aim of the chapter is to show how transnational orientation is not 
necessarily accompanied by the weakening of a national identity but rather by 
challenges to its dominant nature.  
 
Multiple homes and memories 
 
Central to Zionism and its political legitimisation is the idea of a shared Jewish heritage 
and destiny. This ideology implies that there is an unchanging, stable core of ethnic 
belongingness, which assures the individual an imputed continuity with the past 
(Eriksen 2002:92). Advocating an ethno-symbolist approach to nationalism, Anthony 
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Smith (2003) argues that although national communities can have profound roots in 
earlier ethnic communities, it is misleading to claim that there is an unbroken continuity 
from pre-modern communities or ‘cultures’ to the national ones. In his thought-
provoking book, The Invention of the Jewish People, (2010) Shlomo Sand shows how 
modern Israeliness is based on flawed interpretations of the past. However, the notions 
of shared history and continuity are powerful and pervasive. The concept of one people 
reunited in their ancient homeland has actively prevented any affectionate memory of 
life before the State of Israel, at least within the public sphere (Shoat 1997: 48). 
Immigrants of all background were expected to dissociate themselves from their past. In 
the last two decades there has been a deconstructive approach in critical scholarship 
about the unifying function of collective memory in scholarly works. Researchers have 
recognised that Israel’s various groups, both those belonging to the Jewish majority and 
those to the Arab minority, have a variety of collective notions of homogeneity, 
memory and national belonging. Despite the efforts undertaken by the agencies of the 
nation-state to assimilate them politically and culturally, they remain distinctive 
(Eriksen 1997:121).  
  This chapter will focus on transnational practices ‘unbound’ from the nation-
state to account for wider fields of action. Transnationalism is a process by which social 
actors sustain or forge social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders 
(Basch et al. 1994:8). Physical movement, nostalgia for other homelands and 
transnational connections challenge the connection between people and their place. 
Gupta and Ferguson state that “remembered places have often served as symbolic 
anchors of community for dispersed people…. ‘Homeland’ in this way remains one of 
the most powerful unifying symbols for mobile and displaced peoples” (1992:11). 
“Homelands bring together memory and longing, the ideational, the affective and the 
physical, the spatial and the temporal, the local and the global, the positively evaluated 
and the negatively (Rapport & Dawson 1998: 8).”  
Several scholars have shown how aliyah has resulted in the emergence of 
several new ‘homelands’ and diasporas. Anteby-Yemenis’s analysis of the Ethiopian 
Jewish aliyah shows how they, by moving to Israel, became part of the “Ethiopian 
diaspora” and more broadly the “Black diaspora”134 (Anteby-Yemeni in Levy & 
Weingrod 2005). Similarly, the Russian-speaking Jews in Israel became part of the 
                                                 
134
 More than 50,000 Jews emigrated from Ethiopia to Israel during the 1980s and 90s. (Levy:15)  
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“greater Russian diaspora”. Sapritsky shows how Jewish immigrants from Odessa were 
“able to test their status abroad while securing their status at home” (Sapritsky 
2011:252). A number of families from Odessa stayed in Israel for a period of time while 
maintaining strong material and communal links to home and other transnational 
destinations. Israel became a place of partial loyalty and belonging without fully 
accepting its status as their ‘homeland’. Disillusioned with the reality of life in Israel, 
many were able to maintain a more flexible ‘exit’ option for return than previous 
immigrants. The centrality of Israel was also challenged by the attachments that local 
Jews felt towards their life in Odessa and other locations (ibid:258). This shows that the 
relationship between ‘homeland’ and diaspora, and these classifications themselves are 
not fixed categories but flexible and multidirectional (Levy 2001).  
For many of the Mizrahi immigrants, the promised land of their parents and 
forefathers became a new exile, culturally speaking. The emigration to Israel marked an 
exile from an Arab-Muslim culture in which the Jews were deeply embedded and which 
helped shape their culture in a dialogical process that resulted in their specific Judeo-
Arab identity (Shoat 2001: 2). Their return to a ‘sacred homeland’ did not end affection 
for and suppress communal nostalgia for one’s former homelands. Mizrahim from the 
older generation, in particular, considered themselves as fully (or in exceptional cases as 
quasi-members of Israel), connected to their Arab countries of origin. Although 
Arabness was stigmatised by mainstream society, many residents in Kiryat Shemona 
maintained strong memories from their Arab symbolic homelands. Social and cultural 
processes that transcended the boundaries of the nation-state were part of social life. 
The numerous ethnic synagogues, the preservation of folk costumes, festivals and 
traditional weddings illustrated an allegiance to the ‘old ways’. 
Mizrahim entrapped at the geographic and socio-economic margins of Israeli 
society, have preserved and constructed transnational deterritorialised ethnoscapes. 
More well-off Mizrahim from Morocco can travel back to the places they previously 
lived as nostalgic tourists. However, the impossibility for most Mizrahim to go back to 
their parent’s country of origin makes the act of imagining the past and living memory 
crucial. Cyberspace also mediates between regional communities that otherwise cannot 
meet due to physical and ideological borders. Iraqis and Moroccans who grew up in 
Israel without the option of travelling back to their country of origin can do so via  
Internet (Naficy 1999: 230).  
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Food consumption is also a notable site for transnational embodiments and 
central in producing a sentiment of nostalgia. The most popular restaurant in the centre 
of Kiryat Shemona, Taamim, advertises with authentic Moroccan cuisine such as hamim 
(Moroccan Sabbath stew), thus ironically contributing in the exoticisation of Mizrahi 
culinary traditions. Crafts, souvenirs, spices, videos and music from Morocco that were 
displayed in households are now also sold in shops.  
    The Russian community, a fifth of the town’s population, had their own 
ethnic attachments.
135
 Russian-speaking Israelis maintain a wide network of contacts 
with other Russians outside Israel and often prefer the services and products of Russians 
to those of other Israelis (Remennick 2007:9). There were three, small bookshops 
selling only Russian literature and ‘Russian evenings’ were held at the community 
centre with public singing of sentimental folk songs evoking nostalgic imaginings of the 
homeland. Although these phenomena of nostalgia and the desire to retain ethnic 
attachments and practices are found among migrants to other industrialised countries, 
they are noteworthy in the Israeli context since they deviate from the mono-cultural 
ideal of Zionism that continues to stress the relevance of a shared Hebrew culture in 
relation to national belonging and citizenship.  
  Mizrahim have contributed to the more general Israeli-Hebrew culture with 
food, entertainment, ethnic literature and music (Smooha 2008:10), a process that is 
similar to that which Gilroy describes for Black cultural styles in England during the 
1960s and 1970s (1993).
136
 Although some Mizrahi traditions have entered into the 
mainstream, much is still presented as exotic and minor folklore ancillary to national 
Hebrew culture. In the dominant model of the Israeli Jew, the Mizrahi is an individual 
who can retain an attachment to symbols of affiliation but he or she is still expected to 
assimilate.  
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 Although the Russians came from a variety of subcultures, some from Asia and others from Europe, 
the great majority of the immigrants spoke Russian and tended to view themselves as belonging to this 
category. This is also how they are perceived and categorised by mainstream Israeli society. Since the late 
1980s, more than a million Soviet immigrants moved to Israel from the collapsed USSR. The largest 
aliyah occurred between 1990-1996 when over 600,000 immigrants arrived. 
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 Music from all over the Arab world, ranging form Umm Kulthum to ra´i with many local versions, is 
extremely popular in Israel. Even the intellectual Ashkenazi elite appropriated classical Arabic music 
during the Oslo boom (1993-2000) as a kind of cultural embrace for the “Peace Process”.  Unfortunately 
music, like food and folklore, cannot said to be a bridge between the Jewish society and the Arab world. 
Arabic music has no political implication for state-polices. Even right-wing parties play Arab music at the 
very rallies where they preach anti-Arab rhetoric. Similarly, the Gush Emunim radio station energetically 
broadcast Arabic music (Pappe 1997:61). 
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Nostalgia for a ‘lost’ homeland was a recurring theme from my informants. A 
connection was not only made in practice and at the level of embodiment but also 
through story-telling. Residents eagerly shared memories about the where and why they 
had come. They constructed a range of personal and collective pasts and futures that 
sometimes were in conflict with official narratives and overlapped with the goals of the 
nation-state. The nostalgic yearnings and transnational longings my informants 
exhibited in their stories were utilised to express flexible and creative emotions with 
multiple meanings. Sometimes transnationalist practices and longings were deployed 
strategically as a response to disillusionment with Israeli life. Halevi-Wise states that 
representation of memory, even when mythologised, can salvage a “damaged” sense of 
identity and re-territorialise Mizrahi experience (2001:2). Many of the people I got to 
know in Kiryat Shemona expressed deep disillusionment with the Israeli State. In 
contrast to citizens with dual passports and the financial means to social mobility and 
cosmopolitan life-styles, they were structurally stuck in the periphery, with few real 
alternatives and routes to take in life. Thus, they had an ambivalent relationship with the 
Israeli State which was responsible for their sense of loss and estrangement. It did not 
live up to the Promised Land but rather offered repetitive disappointments. 
Nevertheless, it was the main provider of a home and deserved sacrifice and 
commitment, especially during times of heightened conflict.   
 
Remembering Iraq 
 
At midday in late September, when the sun was blisteringly hot, Avri (72) and Judith 
Moshe welcomed me warmly into their  home. For a long time, Judith, my ulpan 
teacher, had wanted me to meet her husband because he “knew much about history”. 
Avri had taken an interest in my project and wanted to share his knowledge and 
memories of life in Iraq.  
Although they were not observant, their home was decorated with Jewish 
religious objects from Iraq.  He proudly told that  his mother had taught Judith how to 
prepare kibbeh, a dish made out of burghul, chopped meat and spices, even though she 
was Ashkenazi. It seemed important for Avri to emphasise that this ‘Iraqi’ food had not 
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only survived displacement, but was being passed on to other family members.
137
 “I 
love Iraq! If I could, I would go tomorrow! I am Iraqi. And my wife, although she is 
Ashkenazi, is Iraqi!” he laughed. In contrast to Jews from Morocco and Turkey that can 
visit these countries freely, a visit to Iraq, considered an enemy of Israel, was 
impossible. Judith placed pastries and lemonade at the table, then went indoors. Avri 
seemed unaffected by the presence of the tape recorder. He started speaking slowly and 
clearly, sometimes pausing for a moment to smoke a cigar.  
He remembered an easy and happy Iraqi childhood in Kifri, a Kurdish town in 
northern Iraq. He studied together with goyim at a Christian school and was exempted 
from the hours they were taught religion. On Friday evenings, Shabbat candles were lit 
and his family went to Synagogue. He studied Hebrew and read the Torah but he felt 
like an Iraqi boy. With great pride, Avri idealized the Jewish flourishing Jewish 
community that once existed in Iraq. Most Iraqi Jews were educated, literate and 
occupied high economic positions in Iraqi society. Jews formed a part of the Iraqi 
government and many of the wealthier families sent their children to study abroad.  
Jews and Jewish customs and holidays influenced Iraqi cultural and commercial 
life. The Iraqi Jews spoke Arabic and thought of themselves as Iraqis before Jews. “If 
you did not succeed in life, something was wrong”, Avri said convincingly, sipping 
lemonade. 
 
In our daily life, I hardly thought of who was Jewish and who was Arab. We got along 
fine, and some of my best childhood friends were Muslim or Christian Arabs. We had 
very good relationships with our neighbours in Iraq. It was only after the establishment 
of the Israeli State that all the trouble began. We set out from Kifri in a train bound for 
Baghdad. We slept in synagogues as if they were transit camps, while the Jews of 
Baghdad assisted us. Iraqi Customs went through our belongings at the airport. We 
stood naked in the sun for a long while without being able to go to the bathroom. 
Finally we took off for Israel.  
 
Avri recalled a secure and peaceful past living harmoniously with the Muslim 
majority and Christian minority, a relationship came to an end with the establishment of 
Israel. In March 1950, Iraq passed the Draft Law, which stated any Jewish citizen who 
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 In many relatively secular Israeli households internet resources are frequently used for cocking ideas, 
contributing to a variety of eclectic menus.  
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wanted to leave now could do so, but would then be stripped of Iraqi nationality. By 
July 1951, 90 % of the Jewish community, or around 120,000, had left Iraq on planes 
commissioned by Israel in what was named “Operation Ezra and Nehemiah” (Shabi 
2010:91).  
For Avri, the experience of aliyah had been characterised by dislocation, 
humiliation and downward social mobility. He retained childhood memories of 
harmonious co-existence with Christian and Muslim Arabs but in Israel non-Jewish 
Arabs had become the enemy within. He claimed that there had been a ‘population 
exchange’ between Arabs and Jews. Since the Arabs had so much land and Jews only 
Israel, he meant that the Palestinians in Israel should voluntarily move to the 
neighbouring Arab countries.
138
  
Avri’s present-day attitudes towards Palestinians and Arabs were characterised 
by suspicion and prejudice. The week after interviewing Avri about his memories about 
Iraq, emigration and settlement, I met him and his wife at the Nehemia mall. We 
occupied a table outdoors, chatting about his health and the upcoming elections. Avri 
expressed concern about the build-up of Hamas arms which was being reported in 
media coverage. “It’s like they want war! And the Arabs are supporting them, and they 
are in the belly of Israel!” he said anxiously while pointing towards his stomach.  “No, 
you can never really trust an Arab!” Judith joked.  
 
Sentimental identification with Iran 
 
Iranian Jewish ethnic festivals have been revived within a Zionist framework. In Israel, 
Iranian Jews link Jewish history in Iran with contemporary Iranian life in Israel through 
cultural performances. Religious and cultural customs from Iran form the moreshet 
(heritage) for Iranian Jews in Israel. Iraniness is invoked through activities, seminars, 
evening entertainment and TV programmes. The sharing of these activities reinforces 
the reality of an invented past (Leshem and Shuval 1998:392). 
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 This view corresponds to statements by the World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries 
(WOJAC) which has lobbied for compensation after claiming that they were expelled from Arab 
countries
.
 It was founded in France in 1976 and argues that the issue of expulsion of Jews from Arab 
countries and the losts of property should be measured against any ‘dept’ that Israel might pay out to the 
711,000 Palestinian refugees who fled or were forced to leave the coutnry during 1948 war (Shenhav 
2006:229).
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Revital and Benny Chackotay did not remember much of their early childhood 
in Tehran but stressed the importance of traditional Persian core values such as family, 
faith and education. One evening in January 2009, we watched a Channel 2  
documentary together in their living room about Iran’s Jewish minority which triggered 
strong reactions among the family members.   
The  Iranian-Dutch filmmaker Ramin Farahani, interviewed members of the 
20,000 strong Iranian Jewish community in Tehran, Isfahan and Shiraz who have stayed 
in the country after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. There were scenes that demonstrated 
various prejudices against the Jewish communities, and other scenes that enacted 
friendship among Muslims and Jews. In Ishfahan, the director documented the love and 
passion that Iranian Jews have developed for their city. In Teheran, the old Jewish 
musician, Nejat Bakshishi, told about his experience with discrimination when his 
musical store was taken over my Muslim owners.  
 
We owned our store for sixty years, then they forced us to leave. They tricked us...they 
got the store for free. Just like that...God be my witness, they did no even pay a penny. 
Because the store belonged to my brother and he isn’t in Iran. He lives in Israel and it’s 
difficult for him to return. They won’t allow him to go back and forth. So I came here. 
Since the instruments were rotting away at home. I rented this place here. Now, of all 
Jews in Iran, I am the only one who owns a music store. I am the best Tar repairer. I am 
the only one left (Farahani 2005). 
 
 Watching this, Benny was moved to tears. He shook his head, pushing his 
glasses back into place and said: “I am so happy we live in Israel.” Revital was visibly 
upset with a scene where Jews expressed allegiance to Iran after a synagogue service. 
Although the film evoked sentimental identification on the religious-cultural level, they 
condemned the Israel-hostile regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Persian Jewish 
family’s past in Tehran was nurtured and remembered but they believed Israel was the 
only real safe place for Jews. Symbolic identification with a country considered hostile 
to Israel, challenged the Zionist myth of one unified memory but did not translate into 
political loyalty to Iran. As for Avri, symbolic identification with another homeland 
intersected with experiences of nationness in Israel.  
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Defiant memory 
 
In Kiryat Shemona there were several narratives about suffering and loss. At the same 
time, feelings of fear and suspicoin permitted nationalism and social unity. Most of my 
informants who expressed symbolic identification with previous homelands, did not 
express loyalty or nationalist sentiments for these places. Like their children, they had 
learned love and loyalty towards the Israeli nation-state through schooling and military 
service. However, as I have shown in earlier chapters, individuals challenged the 
unconditional ties of loyalty and identification that nationalism promotes.  
Mazal Salma (62) was a part-time seamstress in the Chackotay’s store. She 
utilised memory and pride for her country of birth, Turkey, to cope with feelings of 
bereavement and disillusionment over life in Israel. On Tuesday October the 7
th
 2008, 
during the morning hours, I visited the store. It was always quite busy but the staff took 
time to chat with customers who were usually more eager to share the latest gossip than 
to purchase goods. I met Mazal in the sewing room which was located behind the main 
room.   
A few customers had entered the room to be measured and fitted, bringing 
pattern books and materials with them. As the customers left, Mazal sat down in front of 
a sewing machine surrounded by threads and fabrics and continued to work as we 
talked. She had a black shawl over her sholders and beads twisted around her wrinkled 
hands. Although it was the first time we had met, I learned a great deal about her when 
she shared her life history. Mazal grew up in a moderately well-off Jewish home in 
Istanbul. Her ancestors had fled the inquisition in Spain and resettled in Istanbul. “They 
received us with open hands,” Mazal said admiringly, stretching out her hands to 
demonstrate her point. In Turkey, Jews and Muslims took care of each other and the 
rich would give to the poor and needy. Jews formed a part of the Turkish government. 
Mazal’s mother used to run a small laundry service for mostly Turkish Muslim women. 
Her customers loved her mother and used to give her money and food in payment for 
her services. They loved her so much that they told her: “Don’t go to Israel. We want 
you to stay here with us, in Turkey.”  Mazal’s mother told her customers that she 
wanted to leave for Israel where relatives already had resettled. She went to senior 
officials and sheiks to ask for permission to leave.  She would have only been allowed 
to leave when she reached the age of eighty but she was only thirty-six at the time, so 
she emigratied in 1956 against the will of the authorities. 
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Mazal believed that her family was the first Turkish family to arrive in Kiryat 
Shemona. Her Moroccan husband had passed away thirty years earlier and she was 
depended upon her children. Her daughter worked in Tel-Aviv, another son worked in a 
kibbutz factory and one was unemployed. She expressed a wish to return to Turkey 
permanently because “Israel was not what it used to be”.  She provided a subversive 
critique of Israel by juxtaposing it to its enemy country, Iran and saying that she 
understood why Jews remained in Iran. Mazal exoticised Turkey as the most beautiful 
country in the Middle East, protecting their Jews and assisting Israel when “they ran to 
Turkey for help”. She recalled that her son, while studying, had promised to bring his 
mother to visit Istanbul, a trip she could not afford. She was clearly frustrated that her 
son had not kept his promise. 
 
I’m still waiting for him to take me. But I’m soon 63 years old! The other day I told 
him: If you don’t take me now, I’m sure I’ll die before I have the opportunity to go.    
Now they want to leave the town to find a job in the centre. I told him; if you leave I’m 
sure I will die! For 2,000 years God forgot about us. He forgot the Jews, because we 
made many mistakes. 
 
Mazal experienced a sense of being ‘stuck’ both from cultural dispossession and 
socio-economic and geographic entrapment (Lavie 2011). She experienced economic 
hardship after early widowhood, as her husband  had been the main financial provider in 
the family. She had little education and had been a housewife until the death of her 
husband. When her only son did not have the finances to provide for her needs, she had 
found part-time work as a tailor in the Kol-Bo-Tal store. She expressed resentment 
towards the neo-liberal Israeli State that seemed unable to provide for its citizens. 
Mazal’s experience of great economic distress might have strengthened her nostalgia 
and wish for a better life in Turkey. The evocation of an idealised future provided 
comfort in the present. By telling her mother’s memories of an open and inclusive 
Turkey, she shared values that no longer existed for her in Israel. She narrated her 
mother’s world as once lost but still accessible through her son’s promise of a return.  
Her capacity for what I term ‘defiant memory’,  revealed the existence of a space where 
she could project her aspirations outside the legitimate boundaries of the national 
collective and learn to cope with the reality of her marginalised situation. Her imagined 
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future in Turkey transcended national borders and rejected the formal goal of the nation-
state where rootedness in Eretz Israel is paramount.  
 
Transnational ties as status symbols 
 
Many of my informants, who sometimes fashioned themselves as overtly patriotic, 
genuinely engaged with and dreamt of alternative lives outside Israel. Those who could 
demonstrate financial and linguistic access to the Western world were admired in the 
local community. Sometimes I was met with a mix of admiration and feelings bordering 
on envy and suspicion for my own mobility and Westerness as a researcher. There were 
vast socio-economic differences within families, often between those who had left the 
town and those who had remained. A small but visible minority in Kiryat Shemona was 
prosperous and the signs of success were conspicuous: expensive cellphones, fancy cars 
and newly constructed villas. Speaking about family relatives involved in transnational 
practices who spoke English could translate into ‘status attainment’, enhancing social 
status and personal prestige. 
The first time I encountered Shosha Ezra (60) was in the Chackotay’s store on a 
warm August afternoon. Her hair was bleached light blond, revealing dark roots, a 
general trend amongst Mizrahi women in Israel trying to be more European or 
Ashkenazi looking. Cultural and racial stereotypes are associated with dark skin, and 
several Mizrahim make an effort to hide their ‘Eastern’ traits. By embracing physical 
embodiments of European traits, they hope to attain cultural and social leverage in order 
to enjoy the same recognition and privileges as the Ashkenazim.  
Upon meeting Shosha, she immediately introduced her son, taking his passport 
photo out of her leather wallet. For a moment I thought that she was playing the role of 
a shadchan or matchmaker, looking for a wife for her son, like many mothers in Kiryat 
Shemona. She was excited to overtly boast about the achievements of her offspring. 
Proudly she told me that her son worked in the field of electronics in Raanana, that he 
had travelled in the United States and his ambition was to open an electronics store in 
Miami. She gesticulated with her jewellery-covered hands and said enthusiastically: 
“thousands of Kiryat Shemonim (a term used to describe people born and raised in 
Kiryat Shemona) live in Miami.” In this statement there seemed to be an element of 
trying to impress me with her knowledge of the outside world. I particularly noticed that 
at no point in our conversation did she mention the centre of Israel where the economic 
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power is concentrated. The implicit statement seemed to be “who cares about Tel-Aviv 
when my son can live in Miami”. She distanced herself from the Israeli national 
collective and included herself in the Jewish/Israeli collective of the United States, a 
population she generalised and stereotyped as Kiryat Shemonim just like her.  However, 
in the United States, like in Israel, there is a range of attitudes within the Jewish 
segment of society. Some citizens are deeply involved both ideologically and 
materially, in the nationalist project of Israel, whereas others are fiercely critical of it.
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The month after our initial meeting, I visited Shosa in the small fabric store 
where she worked, located opposite the Chakotay’s store. She was thrilled, very 
talkative and was dressed in pink garments from head to toe, with matching fingernails. 
She excitedly showed me old family photos her sister had brought from Ashkelon. She 
pointed to the photo of different family members in a black and white photo, then 
paused and closed her eyes while turning away from the photo. She took a deep breath 
and started talking, in long emotional sentences, into the tape recorder.  
 
Sometimes I watch documentaries with stories from the countries we came from. Iraq 
was a wealthy country before Saddam Hussein’s regime. I remember that my mother 
made uniforms for the British soldiers. Some of my mother’s sisters married soldiers 
that brought them back to England. I don’t know whether they were Jewish or not. If 
my mother was still alive I could have asked her. I am sure I have distant relatives in 
England. The similarity between Jews from Iraq, Iran and Morocco is that they guarded 
their Judaism. Because they were living in Arab countries, they had to guard their 
religion. They did not marry a goy, no way. Gan HaEden (paradise) was close to 
Euphrates and Tigris, where the most tasteful fruits were. I tell my children that 
according to the Bible, our border is from Euphrates and Tigris until Lebanon in the 
North and the other border to Jordan. 
 
Shosha expressed nostalgia for a specific place and time period, enthusiastically 
embracing the mythologised version of Babylon. She romanticised the beauty of the 
place, the taste of the fruit and how the Jews protected their religion.  Her rhetoric of the 
ancient glory of Babylon coincided with the biblical concept of Greater Israel stretching 
from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River. Her national sentiments interconnected 
both with nostalgia for an idealised past and her transnational imaginings experienced 
                                                 
139
 In August 2011 leading Jewish organisations in the United States were protesting what they saw as 
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through the life of a family member. She stressed the presence of Kiryat Shemonim in 
America. Her son had successfully entered the middle class by demonstrating financial 
and linguistic access to the outside world which enabled Shosha to increase her local 
status in the community with amazing stories to tell. Her references to relatives in the 
United States and England, the tasty fruit in Babylon and exaggeration about her 
connections to a cosmopolitan world, all indicated a need to downplay the structural 
impact of the Israeli cultural and socio-economic centres and her own class-position in 
Kiryat Shemona.  
 
Morocco as a safe place  
 
In contrast with other Middle Eastern countries where Jews have lived, such as Iraq, 
Iran, Syria, Libya and Yemen, the Moroccan government made it possible starting in 
the 1970s and 1980s for Israeli Moroccan Jews to return and travel freely. Due to this 
policy of openness, a substantial number of Israeli Moroccan Jews have travelled back 
to Morocco, where today an estimated 5000 Jews live (Shabi 2010:57). Some have 
returned as pilgrims to the tombs of famed saints or zaddikim. The pilgrimages gather 
Jews from Israel, France, Canada and the local Jewish community, symbolically 
reproducing and strengthening the ties of a “Moroccan diaspora” (Weingrod & Levy 
5:2007). Sizeable numbers have also gone on so-called ‘heritage trips’ where they visit 
places they previously lived. Others have travelled alone or with their family to visit 
relatives or places they had heard about from their parents and elders.  
 Itzik, the owner of the music shop, never told me about his experiences with 
immigrant absorption.  However, one day as I was about to leave his shop, Itzik picked 
up a DVD and handed it to me. “Watch this, it is a present for you!” he uttered 
excitedly. The film, Tipat Mazal  (a bit of luck) by the Israeli director Zeév Revach 
depicts a Moroccan immigrant and his talented daughter’s struggle to integrate into 
Israeli society. The film shows the difficulties the new immigrants had in adjusting to 
their new lives, especially to the language and the Ashkenazi way of life. It became a hit 
throughout Israel after it was released in 1992 and is still popular today in Kiryat 
Shemona. It is a part of a growing literature of film and books that represent the past in 
glowing colours, nourishing nostalgia for the old ways through Arabic language and 
music. Although the film is humorous, it clearly shows the Ashkenazi establishment’s 
condescending attitudes towards Mizrahim. Perhaps Itzik gave me the film because it 
190 
 
dramatised the hardship he had gone through, without his needing to articulate such 
painful memories.  
One warm mid-November day, I visited Itzik’s shop. It smelled of old 
newspapers and roasted coffee. A small TV with American sitcoms was switched on in 
the corner. He offered me the only chair behind the counter while he leaned towards a 
pile of CDs. There had been no customers that day and he blamed it on the global 
economic recession. The poor sales did not seem to affect his mood. He had just 
returned from a trip to Istanbul with his wife and was eager to tell me about the city’s 
greatness and impressive size in comparison with Kiryat Shemona. I asked Itzik how 
life in Kiryat Shemona has been through the years. 
 
The mentality here in Kiryat Shemona is different and people are more stressed. We 
experience a lot of balagan (mess) in the army and the miloim  (army reserves). In 1976 
I had to leave my wife and children to serve the IDF for a whole month. I was stationed 
in Sharm El-Sheik and there was only one name there, Muhammad.  
 
After Itzik jokingly labeled all Muslim others Muhammad, he explained in a low 
but clearly upset tone about the “rainfall” of Katyusha rockets on the town. His 
granddaughter had wet her bed until she was six years old, out of fear. He pointed 
towards the street outside his shop to show me where a Katyusha rocket had landed. He 
described the terrible sound of the shells and how the rocket lit up the sky at night. He 
claimed that the Mizrahim in Kiryat Shemona had suffered much more than the 
Ashkenazi kibbutznikim, revealing the underlying socio-economic tensions between the 
two segments of society. 
“Life here is not calm, and the stress really gets to people,” he said nervously 
touching a pile of CDs with his fingertips. Itzik nurtured ties to Morocco and had visited 
Casablanca in 1991. He found life there to be calm and relaxing. He felt secure when he 
was amongst his relatives, even though people outside his family knew that he was from 
Israel.  
 
It was like coming home. At twelve o clock in the afternoon everyone would sit in their 
homes and enjoy a lunch followed by a one-hour siesta. At four they would return to 
work. At seven or seven thirty it was dinnertime. They worried less; they don’t have the 
same stress as us. In Morocco I slept heavily, better than here. 
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Itzik’s case highlights the dominant national morality of being at home in the 
homeland. For him, the notion of home entailed both a sense of loss and of the new. 
Itzik had experienced another home within his lifetime and compared the Israeli 
landscapes in relation to that other world. He articulated stressful and traumatic 
memories from his army service and wartime. The ordinaryness of armed conflict 
perhaps strengthened his need to nurture bonds to a homeland where he could construct 
a ‘safe zone’. Despite the hardships, he did not intend to emigrate and emphasised his 
strong attachment to the town, manifested through family networks and his livelihood.  
  
Dual belonging, one national loyalty  
 
I occasionally spent time with the Dahan family, a Moroccan Jewish family living in the 
moshav of Migdal next to the Sea of Galilee, a forty minute drive from Kiryat Shemona. 
Having known the family from the beginning of my stay in Israel, I visited them 
whenever I went to Tiberias. The moshav is in close proximity to the Northern border 
but the experience of the middle-class Dahan family differed from the families in the 
development town of Kiryat Shemona. They did not compete with Israeli Arabs for jobs 
and had come to experience financial security over time through independent small 
business ownership. Josh Dahan’s (56) family came from Morocco to Palestine several 
generations ago and belonged to the elite cluster of old established Sephardic families. 
He took great pride in being the son of native-born Palestinian (subsequently Israeli) 
Jews. Josh knew Arabic and he claimed that “his father still thought in Arabic”. His 
wife, Neti Dahan (50) emigrated with her family during the late 1950s.
140
 When they 
got married, she was included in his elite network of old and prestigious families, 
thereby bypassing the usual economic hardship. The family had an above-average 
income, as Josh had led several construction projects in the moshav. Neti was dedicated 
to her job, working long hours in a health shop in Tiberias. Their three children worked 
in the travel industry, organising rented acccommodation of popular zimmers (based on 
the German word for room) for well-off Israelis, the majority of whom were middle and 
upper class Israelis from the Tel-Aviv area.  
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12,000 to 17,000.  Most of them live in Casablanca, but also in Fez and other cities. France received 
80,000 Moroccan Jews, Canada 20,000, Spain 5,000 and the US 4,000 (Zohar 2005:297). 
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The family strongly identified with a Moroccan Jewish Diaspora culture. Israel 
was for them the Jewish homeland but Morocco was also home, but a home without 
borders (Schroeter in Wettstein 2002:150). Neti was born in Casablanca and had visited 
Morocco twice as a grown-up. During the previous visit, she went on a pilgrimage to 
the tombs of Jewish saints. She perceived Morocco generally as a safe place to visit and 
less hostile towards the Israeli State than neighbouring Lebanon and Syria. She was 
proud of the good historical and contemporary diplomatic relations between Israel and 
Morocco, and talked warmly about the role the kings of Morocco had played in 
promoting good relations with Jews.
141
 Their appreciation of the Royal Family was 
reflected in a framed picture of King Muhammad V which hung in their entrance hall; 
and they had Morocco’s red flag with its green stars displayed in the living room.  
The Dahan family’s nostalgia for and symbolic identification with Morocco 
existed alongside the expression of strong right-wing political attitudes. During the 
Israeli war on Gaza, I watched news coverage at Channel 2, together with the family 
and Josh uttered racist comments such as: “We should throw the Palestinians to the 
Sea” and “look how they hide behind women and children, using them as human 
shields.”  
These comments initially surprised and shocked me, as I knew that the Dahan 
family in other contexts would talk kindly about their Palestinian workers. Actual 
interethnic relations deviated from the descriptions in his statement. In January 2008, I 
followed Josh to a building site and he told me that he felt more akin to the Arab 
workers than the Ashkenazi window installer. He did not like the way the kibbutznikim 
treated the Arab workers. “They command them around like they are dogs or 
something! They are extremely snobbish!” Josh was frequently invited to the private 
homes of his employees in the Arab villages surrounding the moshav. Later the same 
month, on the Jewish holiday of Tu Bishvat (New Year of the Trees) January 22nd, I 
joined him in an Arab village where he wanted to buy an olive tree. His Arab employee, 
Saleem, joined us as a guide. We were tucked together in the back seat of the car. The 
Star of David with the words am Yisrael hai (the people of Israel lives) was plastered on 
the rearview mirror, leaving little doubt about the nationality of the driver. However, 
inside the car it was Arab music which was turned on full volume. The atmosphere was 
relaxed and humorous, with Josh bragging about how I had been to the other side of the 
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border. “Ya’allah, she has been to Demessek!” he shouted to Saleem who seemed 
equally amused and surprised by this fact. On another occasion Keren, disclosed that 
Josh’s brother was married to an Arab woman from a neighbouring village. However, 
the marriage worked very well “because they had a very similar tarbot (culture)”.  
The fact that Josh had hired several Palestinian construction workers, and his 
brother had married a Palestinian woman, was at odds with his racist description of 
Palestinians during wartime. A Jewish Israeli who might be tolerant towards an 
individual Arab was hostile towards an Arab presence as a ‘phenomenon’. The 
distinction between Arabs as individuals and Arabs as a collective became very much 
blurred and collapsed in times of war (Rabinowitz 2001:17). It was clear that Josh’s 
attitudes during war differed in the workplace and during peaceful holidays. Although 
the family felt a strong symbolic connection to Morocco and a cultural affiliation with 
Israeli Arabs, these sentiments did not transfer into identifying with the suffering 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories during wartime. Josh accorded the ethnocracy 
an ontological stature by being hostile towards Arabs, but challenged it with his own 
affiliation to Arab culture.  
 
Forgetting the past 
 
During the year that I lived and studied in Haifa, I noticed that my Mizrahi friends and 
informants, who belonged to the middle-class and lived in urban areas, rarely identified 
themselves as Mizrahi or talked about family memories from an Arab past. There were 
major differences between those who remembered life in Arab countries and those who 
were born in Israel. First-generation Israelis seemed more concerned with the past than 
their children, whereas my younger informants seemed eager to distance themselves 
from Arabness. The relative little attention given to the topic in everyday practice and 
conversation was in stark contrast to Kiryat Shemona, away from Israel’s social and 
cultural centres, where ‘the ethnic issue’ informed much of everyday life across 
generations.   
I met Moshe Attia from Haifa at the Mount Carmel, a café close to the 
University of Haifa, on June 4
th
 2008. Wearing a blue shirt with a white collar, he 
looked very self-confident. While I was preparing my tape-recorder, he was greeting the 
staff and other customers; he was clearly a familiar face. Moshe immigrated to Israel 
with his family as a three-year-old child in 1956; the eldest son of Moroccan 
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immigrants. He had five brothers and two sisters but his parents could not afford to 
educate him. He remembered growing up in a strictly religious family but as a grown-up 
he considered himself more masoriti (traditional), than dati (religious). Moshe had 
never visited Morocco, neither had his father. He talked about the difficulties his parents 
had undergone in Israel and his relationship to their country of origin.  
 
When we lived in Morocco, my father’s family dreamt of the Holy Land and Jerusalem. 
As soon as the government gave them the opportunity, they left. They arrived straight to 
Haifa, whereas my uncle was sent to Beit Shaan in the North. The distance might only 
be one hour from Haifa, but the mentality is entirely different, really like another world. 
My father came from Morocco without any education. Today he is 92 years old, and has 
no interest in Morocco. He would never go back because once they left it was forever. 
My grandmother was more than sixty years old when she came to Israel. For her it was 
too difficult to start studying Hebrew, so we spoke Arabic at home. My mother speaks 
Hebrew fluently, but she can’t read the newspapers. People might want to visit Morocco 
for nostalgic reasons, but they don’t care about the country as such. The previous Israeli 
minister of defence, Shoal Mofaz, is originally from Iran, but now he is promoting war 
against Iran. There is no real political support for these countries among Sephardic 
Jews.
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 It is just a part of the past. It was a place they lived.  
 
  Moshe’s identity as an Israeli seemed structured around estrangement from Arab 
history, tradition and language. Having made a career as a football manager he had 
successfully moved across the ethnic boundary, acquiring class membership associated 
with Ashkenazim. He transgressed the ethnic boundary further and had lived in several 
different countries in Europe, like Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria in order to do 
business and secure a better financial future for his family. He sent all his children 
abroad to study but expected them to return. He claimed that those who leave Israel 
permanently because of the security threats are like “hysterical mothers not wanting to 
send their children to the army”; they were weak. Moshe’s social mobility had made the 
Mizrahi ethno-class less relevant, and he attributed Mizrahim living in the peripheries 
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 The term Sephardim referred initially to Ladino-speaking Spanish Jews exiled from Spain in 1491 as 
well as to the specific religious customs of Ladino-speaking and some Arabic- and Persian-speaking 
Jews, whose religious customs differed from Yiddish-speaking Jews and often amongst themselves. Their 
descendants settled mostly on the northern shores of the Mediterranean and in what is now Northern 
Morocco. Today the term is used to refer to Jews of the Mediterranean Basin as a whole and also to those 
from the Middle East (Zohar 2005:13). 
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with an ‘entirely different mentality’. Like many of my informants, he used the term 
Sephardic instead of Mizrahi to avoid the low-status connotations of the term. The 
Zionist Eurocentric discourse on culture and identity seemed to have succeeded in this 
case and created the Mizrahi category as inferior to an Israeli Western category of 
belonging. Moshe presented himself as a cosmopolitan Zionist, willing to make 
sacrifices for the country but he realised its limitations and built his own economic 
success and consequential liberating space beyond the nation.  
Rinat and Nir Zaid, both graduates from University of Haifa, also distanced 
themselves from their parents’ Moroccan past. I visited their downtown flat a few days 
after their son’s bar mitzvah. He was ashamed that his mother had been employed by a 
cigarette manufacturer working long days for a low wage. "I don't know how she could 
be content with such a life!" He blamed his parents for their lack of mobility, saying 
that they could have done more to succeed as new immigrants. The evocation of his 
parents’ class position revealed his bitterness. Perhaps he knew that it was not his 
mother’s lack of aspirations that had hindered her mobility but the unequal distribution 
of power within Israeli society in favor of its Ashkenazi population. Although their 
parents occupied a low social position in Israeli society, both Nir and Rinat had 
managed to move into the socio-economic hierarchy through education. They were both 
fluent in English and had several foreign students as  friends. While not denying that 
their parents came from Arab countries, they distanced themselves from the underclass 
position they had occupied. To them, a place like Kiryat Shemona connoted the very 
marginality and exclusion they had successfully escaped through social mobility. 
Comfortably placed in the middle class, I never heard them use the category Mizrahi but 
rather stressed the category of being Israeli. 
 
Leaving the Promised Land   
 
“I love my country but the fighting, it never ends,” the fictional character Zohan says in 
the comedy “You Don’t mess with the Zohan”, by the American Jewish comedian 
Adam Sandler. He plays the Israeli combat soldier Zohan, who wants to leave his 
conflict-ridden homeland and create a new life for himself in New York City as a 
hairstylist. This story resonated in Israeli reality. Israelis, especially the younger 
generations, have become trans-national, sharing in uneven measure their allegiances 
between the Jewish Homeland and “Otherlands” (Weingrod and Levy 2006:16). The 
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Israeli daily newspaper Maariv reported in 2007 that approximately a quarter of the 
Israeli population were considering emigration. This trend is clearest among the young 
people, where more than half were thinking of leaving the country (Maariv 20 April 
2007).   
Twenty-five years ago, during the previous financial recession in Israel, those 
who considered or thought about yeridah, emigrating from Israel, were generally 
condemned. Emigrants were considered weak Zionists who left the homeland for 
shallow material gains. Just as aliyah was a more permanent decision, emigrating from 
Israel was considered an all-consuming total break with the homeland and a threat 
against national cohesion. However, the stigma attached to yordim, as people who 
abandoned the Zionist nation-building project, is changing as Israel has gradually 
become a neo-liberal State with diminishing government intervention, especially in the 
economy. One reason for this is the large number involved, an estimated 700,000 
Israelis live abroad. This changing attitude towards yeridah are also linked to Israelis’ 
growing disillusionment with their own country. Their reasons for considering 
emigration include disappointment with the government, unemployment and concern 
over the security situation (Gold 2002:31).  
My driving instructor, Oded, was disillusioned with Israel because as a country 
it did not live up to his expectations. Approaching downtown Haifa on a practice run in 
an Arab neighbourhood he shared a sentiment that was widely held: 
 
Ten years ago my son said he was considering leaving Israel. I remember I would 
protest loudly and say: How can you leave our country? If he had told me the same 
today, I would not have rejected his wish. I have fought four wars and gone through 
difficult days (iamim kashim) in this country, but times have changed. The entire 
political system is corrupt. Just look at Olmert and his poor judgment and leadership. 
Today there are only liars (shakranim) and thieves (ganavim) left. The Arabs can sleep 
safely, because we (the Jews) are creating enough trouble for ourselves. 
 
Other informants from the settlement generation in Kiryat Shemona stressed the 
importance and obligation of living in Israel, despite the difficult and hard life. The 
hardships they had gone through had made them strong citizens. They argued that the 
new generation differed from their founding generation and uttered complaints such as 
“if Israelis used to do everything for their country, today they do everything for 
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themselves” or “life used to be better before, we did not have much, but we were 
together”. Esther contrasted the greed and self-seeking individualism of the present with 
the togetherness of the past, constructing a positive narrative around traditional values 
such as modesty and moderation. “I wish I could have my childhood back. Like Kiryat 
Shemona used to be.” 
These complaints and nostaliga were telling examples of the tension between 
collective obligation and individual aspiration. The younger generation was described as 
wealthier, more self-oriented and mobile than the older generation. A sense of grievance 
was definitely less salient among my younger informants and the highly educated 
middle class. Alternative and negative opinions about Zionism were not considered 
subversive but seen as a part of the growing divide of Israeli culture. Thirty-year-old 
Yiftach described developments the following way: “Our parents founded the country. 
Now the air has gone out of the Zionist bubble, and we are trying to find new paths.”  
In the face of contemporary processes of neo-liberal development and global 
mobility, several dreamt of breaks from Israel and alternative routes in life. The 
demands from the nation-state were, for some, experienced as too demanding. The 
younger generation seemed less motivated by pioneering and collective values than 
their parents’ generation. Some expressed a wish to leave Kiryat Shemona and move to 
the centre, migrate or have short stays abroad to ‘clear their heads’ and escape the 
instability of the region.  
Globalisation has made labour migration easier and decreased the distance 
between Israel and the United States. It has intensified the Americanisation process and 
the longings for a space that imaginatively encompasses the ‘rest of the world’. 
Alternative futures were imagined through transnational mass-media images, scripts and 
sensations and gave residents the opportunity to creatively cope with feelings of 
entrapment (Appadurai 1996:6).  
Noa, a student in Kiryat Shemona, quoted the Israeli supermodel Bar-Rafaeli in 
her Facebook profile writing: “Why live in Israel when you can live in New York?” 
Particularly, it was the dream of America that was verbalised and kept alive in Kiryat 
Shemona. American popular culture still holds tremendous soft power in Israel, perhaps 
since the Israeli State maintains strong political and economic links with their original 
colonial ‘sponsor’. Israel could never enjoy the relative freedom and prosperity it does 
without the massive political, economic and military support of USA. Because of this, 
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the American Dream in the Israeli context is not completely free from nationalising 
forces. 
New de-territorialised technologies have not necessarily affected the 
construction of belonging to particular states and territories.  Several of the people I got 
to know were active on the Internet, chatting to friends and relatives abroad. 
Simultaneously, they were strong supporters of right-wing ethno-nationalism and some 
attributed their steadfastness to a sacred mission of protecting a geo-political frontier.  
The realisation of yeridah has a clear class-dimension. Those who can afford to 
leave are primarily secular and educated Ashkenazim who identifiy with Western and 
global culture. With few exceptions, it was members of the financial elite in Kiryat 
Shemona who could act upon the dream. Children of financially well-off families were 
sent abroad to work in the US or Europe selling Dead Sea products. The son of Mila, a 
Russian informant in Kiryat Shemona, found a job with an Israeli firm in the United 
States after having served in an elite unit of the army. The economically privileged were 
going on backpacking trips to South-America and Asia, a common Israeli post-army rite 
of passage.  
Just as many olim (immigrants) will spend a few years in Israel and return to 
their native country, several yordim (emigrants) spend a few years abroad and return to 
Israel. Dual citizenship has become more common in Israel, and several informants 
stressed the benefits of enjoying citizenship rights in more than a single state. The 
growing phenomenon of dual and multiple state citizenship threatens the governability 
of states as these blur the linear boundaries of belonging (Yuval-Davis 2011). Faced 
with growing unemployment, an American or European passport open new employment 
opportunities overseas. Some Israelies I got to know perceived a second passport as a 
personal risk-aversion strategy in the face of future threats of war.  
Twenty-eight year old Omer expressed the anxiety he felt about wanting to live 
abroad versus being ‘at home’ close to family and friends. He was a pacifist and deeply 
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. His frustration with the direction Israeli politics 
and society had taken,  led him to move to Barcelona for a period to find some sense of 
normalcy. His father’s family connections to Austria had secured Omer (who identified 
as Mizrahi) an Austrian passport and access to the European labour market. Omer, like 
many other Israelies I got to know, had viewed this stay abroad as temporary. A second 
passport did not necessarily bring about ambivalence over belonging but rather opened 
up alternative routes and created impermanence. As such, he did not go to Europe to 
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assimilate but to relax. His heart was still in Israel. For many of my more steadfast 
informants in Kiryat Shemona, talking about potential plans for the future did not 
necessarily involve acting upon them. There was a fear that the American Dream would 
not live up to its expectations. As such, the imagination might have greater power than 
the realisation.  
 
Conclusion 
Peripheral nationhood both work within and override national borders. In Kiryat 
Shemona, the negotiation of national belonging at the margins of the state was made up 
of transnational movements and longings. Many Mizrahi residents felt strongly 
connected to the country where they were born or from where their ancestors came. 
Their ‘return to the homeland’ as narrated by Zionist ideology, did not bring about an 
absolute end to ties of belonging to one’s former country. They engaged with and 
created new ties with homelands which were symbolic rather than political, as they did 
not express political loyalty to a nation-state other than Israel. The transnational 
belongings and longings often emerged from conditions within Israel itself. Many were 
disillusioned and expressed a sense of entrapment living at the geographical and socio-
economical margins of Israeli society. Living in an Israeli border town characterised by 
relative economic deprivation and anxiety against future threats of attack encouraged 
many to invest financially and emotionally in transnational connections as potential 
‘emergency-exits’. To emphasise global connections  increased status and prestige and 
was also an effective strategy used to reduced the sense of entrapment. The younger 
generation seemed to be less worried about the sovereignty and identity of the nation 
than their parents and found it easier not only to dream, but also to act upon these 
alternative belongings. The involvement in transnational practices shows how the 
Zionist rigid definition of wholesome homes are problematic. These tension-laden 
tendencies reflected not only dispositions and deep divisions which arose from Israel’s 
troubled establishment, development and existence, but also ruptures in what it meant to 
be Israeli in a globalising world. With the ongoing economic, political and social-
ideological development, it appears that Israeli immigration will continue to increase. It 
remains to be seens whether future olim and yordim are able to maintain as strong an 
attachment to Israel as had their predecessors. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has explored the character, dynamics and negotiations of nationhood 
amongst Mizrahim in the Israeli border town of Kiryat Shemona. The development 
towns in frontier regions were glorified by the Ashkenazi elite and functioned as a 
settler-colonial practice for controlling territory and peripheral populations. Jews from 
Arab and Muslim countries were placed on the geographic and socio-economic margins 
of Israeli society, positioned between the Ashkenazi Euro-dominated leadership and 
indigenous Palestinians, solidifying ethno-class stratification. Whereas Mizrahi Jews 
were located on the borders of modern Jewish identity and transformed into internal 
others, Palestinian Arabs were transformed into definitive others. Mizrahim were 
included as members of Zionist nation-building, but excluded from the centres of 
power, without receiving full recognition for their ‘pioneering’ activities.    
The people who I got to know in Kiryat Shemona were not just passive victims 
of state-imposed ideology and categories but carved out their own personal and 
collective maneuvering space within the ethnocratic-colonial dynamic of social 
exclusion and inclusion. I have named the practice of social actors negotiating and co-
authoring national belonging from the margins as peripheral nationhood. Peripheral 
nationhood entails not only movement and resistance from the periphery but also a 
reconfiguration and negotiation of hegemonic nationness.  
 I have moved beyond the conventional axis of binary opposition 
(Mizrahi/Ashkenazi, lower class/upper class) to a focus based on the multiple shifting 
and relational self and other-identifications. Socio-economic mobility had implications 
for identification with the ethnicised category Mizrahi. The vast majority of my 
informants in Kiryat Shemona avoided using the collective label that has been 
employed to justify discrimination and exclusion of Mizrahim in Israel. For them, the 
Mizrahi category suggested ethnic subjugation and low socio-economic status. 
Intermarriage, inter-generational social mobility and ethnic networks challenge the 
homogeneity of the constructed categories of Mizrahi. However, Mizrahi remains a 
crucial category of analysis because it has been shaped by an ethnocratic ideology, 
preserved at the social and economic peripheries and continues to inform belonging and 
not-belonging. Despite social mobility and intermarriage, Israelis who do not match up 
to the ethno-national ideal of a Western and modern Jew, e.g., Mizrahi, an ultra-
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orthodox Jew, or an Arab and or Ethiopian Jew, are perceived as less Israeli and subject 
to negative stereotyping. 
Examining the daily experiences of my informants, they challenged the 
boundaries of Ashkenazi secular Israeliness by stressing the importance of religion, 
community, memory and morality. These identifications challenge the definition of 
Mizrahiyut (Easterness) as an axis of identification that must be erased and forgotten in 
order to enter the Israeli collective. Other ethnic categories such as Russian-speaking 
Israelis (both Jews and non-Jews) and Palestinian Israelies were also involved in the 
process of challenging the Ashkenazi dominated centre.  
The interplay of class, ethnicity and place were factors which created the 
Mizrahi-ethno class and shaped social experience. When compared to the centre, 
economic gaps were not narrowing but growing. Statistics from CBS show that the 
socio-economic class largely corresponds to a Mirahi background in peripheral border 
towns which are spatially marginalised from the Ashkenazi structure of power. 
However, there were also varying degrees of ethno-classism in Kiryat Shemona. The 
Zakay family complained about financial hardship and governmental neglect and were 
economically stuck. The Chackotay family had been upwardly mobile and could rely on 
their wealthier children. For both them and middle class Mizrahim in urban centres, the 
ethno-class was less relevant. Irit aloni, who had studied in the centre, emphasised 
intermarriage and social mobility as the solution to ethnic exclusion and hiearchy. 
Nevertheless, the shared diffused sense of origin and solidarity, coupled with persisting 
marginality and hardship, create frustration and resentment that reinforce an attachment 
to the town. The Mizrahim I met, from varying socio-economic backgrounds and places 
of residency, had experienced Ashkenazi prejudice and sense of superiority.  Ethnicity 
based discrimination per se is not only true to 'poor' Mizrahim. Middle-class Mizrahim 
are still not fully accepted into the dominant Ashkenazi society because of their non-
European backgrounds.  
Mizrahim marked boundaries against differentiated others through ethnicised 
categories, stereotypes and casual racism that produced and maintained ethno-racial 
hierarchies inherent in Zionism. Some of my Mizrahi informants used religion as a 
source for their exclusionary attitudes towards Russian- speaking Israelis who were 
accused of having doubtful Jewishness and consequently weaker national loyalty. In 
response, both Russian immigrants in the ulpan and Russian-speaking Israeli informants 
fashioned themselves as devoted and loyal Zionists. Mizrahi residents redeployed the 
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oriental stereotypes they had been subjected to in their stigmatisation of Arab minority 
populations. By supporting colonial subjugation of internal Arab others they reproduced 
the colonial logic underlying Israeli ethno-nationalism.   
Existential insecurity was an ordinary situation in Kiryat Shemona. Fear and 
anxiety about future wars were brought to the level of daily life. In addition, the Israeli 
government perpetuated imagined threats, further intensifying the sense of living 
exposed on a frontier. Fear and suspicion, coupled with their marginalised socio-
economic and ethno-cultural position, made the local presence of the army, synagogue 
life and family networks sources of security and strength. Whereas my informants 
expressed great mistrust in their elected officials, the IDF was largely praised as the 
keeper of the Israeli future. Right-wing nationalistic political parties who promised 
well-being through settler-colonial practices, such as Likud and Yisrael Beitenu, gained 
massive support. Ethno-nationalist discourses had appeal for the less mobile Mizrahim 
who had been marginalised in the Zionist nation-building ethos.   
 In the ordinary context of real and imagined threats, self-fashioning onseself as 
strong demonstrated my informants’ desire to position themselves across and within the 
Israeli nation. ‘Strength’ as a spoken and behavioural value was utilised as a response to 
their marginalised ethno-class position in a stigmatised periphery and to empower 
themselves as essential members of the nation. There was a significant divergence 
between their self-fashioning as strong and steadfast and the way in which campaigns 
and politicians presented them as passive victims of conflict.  
Even in the ordinary context of conflict and existential insecurity, not all forms 
of self-identification were national or directed at the nation-state. The concern with 
being ‘civilised’ was an equally important axis of identification along with other large-
scale ideological categories of national, ethnic and religious affiliations. Mizrahi 
residents were contesting hegemonic Ashkenazi Israeliness by identifying with Arab or 
‘Persian’ homelands and traditions. Simultaneously, they were paradoxically 
reinforcing a Eurocentric boundary of Israeliness with their concern about being 
civilised, a shared manifestation of settler colonial societies. Competing claims to 
civilisation illustrate the lasting effects of colonial Zionism on self-identification. 
Although related to the ethnic hierarchies intrinsic to Zionism, the nation was not an 
explicit frame of reference in these claims.   
The many non-nationalist self-identifications and situations I observed in Kiryat 
Shemona demonstrated that social actors did not think or behave in nationalist terms at 
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all times. This challenges Billig’s theory of nationalism as an “omnipresent, endemic 
condition” (Billig 1995:6).  Billig analyses rhetoric and discourse to show the pervasive 
and often unnoticed power of nationalism. His theory is useful for analysing the 
material presence of the nationalist ‘stuff’ such as flags, news, sporting events, etc., and 
how these evoke reminders of nationhood. However in this view, social actors are 
always nationalist if not mindfully so. Nationalism, even in a ‘hot’ nationalist context, 
was only intermittently salient. This thesis has, therefore, presented a revisionist 
perspective of theories of everyday nationalism in the discipline of social anthropology. 
The anthropology of nationalism must specify how and in what situations the nation is 
called upon to give meaning to a variety of needs and expectations.  
In ordinary times of existential insecurity, there were competing claims over 
Israeliness. This observation challenges Benedict Anderson’s outline of the nation as a 
“deep horizontal comradeship” (1983:7). His theory is not sufficient in describing 
multiple and shifting identifications that are not centered on the nation-state. Although 
the myth of the Israeli nation as socially, morally, culturally and religiously united was 
celebrated during state commemoration events glorifying the nation-in-arms, the nation 
was in reality highly challenged and characterised by deep socio-economic and ethno-
religious cleavages. During wartime, ethno-religious, regional, political and class 
divisions were temporarily undermined and national unity heightened. National 
campaigns, politicians and religious leaders aligned the border towns to the central 
regions and temporarily moved the Mizrahim from the margins of exclusion to the 
centre of inclusion. While marginalised in the periphery, the residents in Kiryat 
Shemona still aspired to be part of the national frontier ethos. They fashioned 
themselves into nationalised subjects and supported the fighting, despite the suffering 
they faced. Their creative self-fashioning thus reinforced the logic of militaristic ethno-
nationalism.    
Although Arabness was publically stigmatised,  my older Mizrahi informants in 
Kiryat Shemona felt strongly connected to the country where they were born or where 
their ancestors had came from. This transnational belonging and longing also emerged 
out of conditions within Israel and Kiryat Shemona. Disillusionment with the socio-
political life and a sense of entrapment at the margins of Israeli society, strengthened the 
need for projects and imagined futures which transgress the nation-state. My informants 
created symbolic and material attachments to idealised Arab homelands or a utopian 
American Western future, thus bypassing the rhetoric of rootedness in Zionist ideology. 
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Self-appointed cosmopolitan claims and nostalgically remembered pasts show how 
cultural flows do not align themselves neatly within national borders or nation states. 
Although dual and multiple belongings can be analysed as hybridity, the vast majority 
of my informants did not feel fragmented but effortlessly faced in several directions at 
once.  
Even if there is a multiplicity of cultures and languages in Israel, there is no real 
multicultural ideology. Israel’s laws resulting in discrimination and daily exclusion 
against a large number of its citizens reflect the ethnocratic character of the state. Real 
multiculturalism that includes the equal treatment of all citizens would necessitate a 
social and ideological revolution in the Israeli context. The national elite would have to 
abandon its grandiose Zionist scheme of building a homogenous, secular Jewish, 
Western society and adopt an ideology of multiculturalism, where citizenship and full 
civil rights need not imply a particular cultural or religious identity. The state and its 
schools would need to totally abandon the convenient coherence of collective memory 
and encourage its citizens’ capabilities to hold multiple and sometimes conflicting 
narratives. Open acknowledgment of ethnic and socio-economic divisions is a 
prerequisite for the struggle against the colonial ethnocracy and the inequalities and 
racism it produces. Israeliness must be open to all citizens and transformed to adapt to 
the cultural reality it dominates. Marginalised citizens, both Jews and non-Jews, must 
be able to be included in the centre of power of the hegemonic Israeli culture. For 
Mizrahim, the transformation to a multicultural ideology would mean greater socio-
economic equality, greater incorporation of Arab-Judeo culture and traditions into the 
national culture and treatment as equals. The abandonment of ethnocratic ideology 
would potentially weaken the stigma attached to the East and produce a shift towards a 
more inclusive society and future regional reconciliation.  
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